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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent increase in bankruptcy litigation over the proper treat-
ment of a debtor-participant's interest in a pension plan indicates
that few bankruptcy trustees understand the plan administrator's
problem when confronted with a turnover demand. Whether a court
excludes such interests from the bankrupt's estate is at the heart of
the efficacy of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA).' This decision determines whether the policy fostering
private retirement funds for retirement succeeds or fails. Unless the
courts adopt the analysis set forth in this Article, ERISA will en-
compass a hodge-podge of state laws rather than the uniform federal
law mandated by Congress to protect retirement funds and to expand
the private pension system.
This Article begins by explaining the problem currently facing
plan administrators. Second, it examines the relevant ERISA pro-
visions, especially those dealing with alienation of benefits and com-
patibility with federal law.2 Third, the Article discusses the policy
objectives of ERISA, and the relevant Bankruptcy Code3 provisions,
especially those dealing with exclusions from, and exemptions for,
the debtor-participant's estate.4 Fourth, the Article explains the pol-
icy objectives of the Bankruptcy Code. Fifth, it discusses the current
lack of uniformity in the treatment of plan interests by the various
circuit, district, and bankruptcy courts that have dealt with the sit-
uation. Many courts have perceived a conflict between these pro-
visions of ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code. This Article then
performs the reasoning that the courts should adopt to resolve the
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1056(d)(1), 1144(d) (1988).
3. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2651 (1978) (codified as amended in 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330
(1988)).
4. 11 U.S.C. §§ 522, 541 (1988).
[Vol. 94
ERISA AND BANKRUPTCY
erroneously perceived conflict between ERISA and the Bankruptcy
Code. Finally, it concludes that both ERISA and the Bankruptcy
Code mandate that courts exclude employee plan interests subject
to the anti-alienation provision from the debtor-participant's estate.
This approach will insure the uniform law of employee benefit plans,
encourage their growth, and provide that fresh start intended for
debtor-participants in the Bankruptcy Code.
II. THE DLMMA
When a bankruptcy filing by a debtor-participant for liquidation
under Chapter 75 or rehabilitation under Chapter 136 occurs, the
plan administrator receives a turnover demand for the debtor-par-
ticipant's interest in the plan from the debtor-participant's bank-
ruptcy trustee.7 Chapter 7 provides the debtor-participant future
5. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-66 (1988). For a liquidation under Chapter 7, the bankrupt's estate is
created immediately at the time of filing and does not increase subsequently for property acquired
later by the bankrupt. Id. § 541. A Chapter 7 filing may be made voluntarily by the bankrupt or
involuntarily by his creditors. Id. §§ 301, 303.
6. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-30 (1988). For a rehabilitation under Chapter 13, the bankrupt's estate
is kept open so that it can increase subsequent to the time of filing by the acquisition of after-acquired
property by the bankrupt. Id. § 1306(a)(1). A Chapter 13 filing may only be made voluntarily by
the bankrupt. Id. §§ 301, 303. A debtor may not use Chapter 13 unless he has regular income with
less than $100,000 in unsecured debts and $350,000 in secured debts. Id. § 109(e). This requirement
can eliminate professionals if they permit entry of a malpractice judgment against them before filing
for bankruptcy.
Chapters 1, 3, & 5 of the Bankruptcy Code, dealing with general provisions, case administration,
creditors, debtors, and the estate, apply equally to both Chapter 7 liquidations and Chapter 13 re-
habilitations. Id. § 103. Thus the exclusions and exemptions should apply to a Chapter 7 liquidation
and a Chapter 13 rehabilitation similarly.
A study conducted in 1983 indicated that the reasons given for declaring bankruptcy in both
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 proceedings were increases in cost of living (67% of Chapter 7 respondents
and 72% of Chapter 13 respondents), unemployment (36% of Chapter 7 respondents and 34% of
Chapter 13 respondents), and unusual medical bills (36% of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 respondents).
COMPTROL.ER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CH ~iuAN, HousE Comm-rEE ON
Tm JuDIcuY, BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978-A BEFORE AND AYrTR LOOK 15-16 (1983).
7. The bankruptcy trustee ascertains the role of the plan administrator from the debtor-par-
ticipant's list of creditors and schedule of assets. The Bankruptcy Code requires this filing. 11 U.S.C.
§ 521(1) (1988). Schedules are required for this filing, under the Bankruptcy Code. Id. app. Rule
1007. The Schedules provide for a listing with addresses of priority creditors on Schedule A-1, secured
creditors on Schedule A-2, and unsecured creditors on Schedule A-3. Id. app. Form 6. The debtor-
participant also lists his realty on Schedule B-i, his personalty on Schedule B-2, his property held
by third parties with addresses on Schedule B-3, and the property that he claims as exempt under
section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code on Schedule B-4. Id. He should list interests in an employee
benefit plan, since they are held by a third party, on Schedule B-3. From this schedule, the bankruptcy
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income protection, along with protection of exempt assets, by dis-
charging some of his existing debts in exchange for a liquidation of
some of his assets. 8 Chapter 13 provides the debtor-participant asset
protection along with partial income protection by discharging more
of his existing debts than in a Chapter 7 liquidation. In exchange
for this protection under Chapter 13, the debtor-participant pledges
a portion of his disposable income over a time-period of several
years pursuant to a rehabilitation plan9
For a certain class of employee benefit plans, compliance with
this turnover demand results in several undesirable consequences: (1)
the administrative and accounting costs of the plan increase; (2) the
plan administrator faces liability for breach of fiduciary duty; and
(3) the plan risks losing its favorable taxation treatment. Non-com-
pliance with the turnover demand forces the debtor-participant to
face a determination of his plan rights in a non-jury trial by an
trustee obtains the plan administrator's address for making the turnover demand.
If the debtor-participant believes that the plan interests are excluded from the bankruptcy estate,
he might omit them from the Schedules. When a creditor later discovers this property, he may make
a motion to reopen the case so the new bankruptcy trustee may make the turnover demand of the
plan administrator. Id. §§ 350(b), app. Rule 5010. This is a risky procedure for the debtor-participant
in a Chapter 7 liquidation. This debtor- participant might have his discharge revoked for fraudulently
obtaining the discharge, provided the action is brought within one year of the discharge. Id. § 727(d)-
(e).
If the debtor-participant has claimed the plan interests as exempt property, the property is au-
tomatically exempt unless a creditor or the bankruptcy trustee objects. Id. §§ 522(I) (granting the
privilege to parties in interest), 1109 (defining parties in interest to include creditors and the bankruptcy
trustee). The bankruptcy court determines the matter of the objections to the exemption in a non-
adversarial proceeding without regard to the rules of evidence. Id. app. Rule 4003.
The plan administrator may also be a secured creditor of the debtor-participant entitled to notice
of the bankruptcy sent to all creditors listed on Schedule A by the clerk of the bankruptcy court.
Id. app. Rule 2002. A plan may make a loan to a participant provided the loan is adequately secured.
See infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1988).
9. Id. § 1328 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989). The normal length of a rehabilitation plan is three years.
Id. § 1322(c). However, a court may extend it to five years. Id. § 1329(c).
The court will not approve a debtor-participant's rehabilitation plan unless the amount proposed
to be paid to unsecured claimants is not less than what they would be paid in a Chapter 7 liquidation.
Id. § 1325(a). Even though payments made to creditors may be the same under the two Chapters,
a debtor-participant might desire to file, or convert to, Chapter 13, because the discharge is greater
under Chapter 13. So two issues relating to pension plans surface in a Chapter 13 rehabilitation: (1)
whether the bankruptcy trustee can use the debtor-participant's right to receive a payment from the
pension plan to satisfy claims under the Chapter 13 rehabilitation plan, and (2) whether the bankruptcy




interested judge and to risk his interests in the plan that are reachable
in no other action.
A. The Affected Plans
ERISA defines two types of employee benefit plans to which the
turnover demand might apply: the welfare plan, which provides ben-
efits in the nature of medical, disability, death, severance, vacation,
or education benefits; and the pension plan, which provides retire-
ment income or deferred income.10 There are two types of pension
plans: (1) the defined contribution plan, such as a profit-sharing
plan, a money purchase pension plan, or a thrift plan; and (2) the
defined benefit plan.1" The turnover demand only affects the plan
administrator of a pension plan. The plan administrator of a welfare
plan can safely comply with the turnover demand under ERISA.
The plan administrator of a pension plan, not well versed in the
Bankruptcy Code but knowledgeable in ERISA, will refuse the turn-
over demand. ERISA specifically provides that the plan adminis-
trator, as a fiduciary of the plan,12 must comply with the plan's
terms, 3 else he breaches his fiduciary duty for which he could be
monetarily liable.' 4 One of those plan terms is the anti-alienation
provision required of certain pension plans by ERISA.'5 This pro-
vision prohibits the assignment or alienation of plan interests. Sim-
ilarly, the ERISA portion of the Internal Revenue Code requires the
same provision' 6 for plan qualification to obtain favorable tax treat-
ment. The employee pays income tax only upon actual receipt of
his benefit, typically years after receipt by the plan. 7 The employer
then gets a deduction for contributions, when made to the plan,"
10. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)-(3) (1988).
11. Id.
12. Id. §§ 1002(16), 1102.
13. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
14. Id. § 1109(a).
15. Id. § 1056(d)(1).
16. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (1988).
17. Id. § 402(a) (income tax on receipt); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(a) (1988 & Supp. I 1989) (receipt
may be on latter of separation or retirement).
18. 26 U.S.C. § 404(a) (1988).
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and the plan pays no tax on the contribution or on any income it
makes on the contribution. 19
This anti-alienation provision does not apply to all pension plans.
ERISA specifically exempts the following from this requirement:
unfunded, deferred compensation plans for highly-compensated em-
ployees; plans maintained by fraternal societies; plans maintained
by voluntary employee benefit associations; certain pre-1959 plans
funded by employees; labor organization plans without employer
contributions; plans for payments to retired or deceased partners;
individual retirement accounts; individual retirement annuities; ex-
cess benefit plans; and certain pre-1974 plans that replace terminated
plans. 20 ERISA itself does not cover governmental plans, church
plans that have not opted into ERISA, workers' compensation plans,
plans for nonresident aliens, and unfunded excess benefit plans .2'
B. The Undesirable Consequences Under ERISA
The anti-alienation provision should preclude the plan admin-
istrator's compliance with the bankruptcy trustee's turnover demand.
The courts have confirmed this interpretation of the anti-alienation
provision when a creditor in a nonbankruptcy situation makes the
analogous turnover demand. 2
The real problem deals with payment of the benefit. The debtor-
participant does not receive his benefit until the latter of severance
19. Id. § 501(a).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 1051 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989).
Litigants have suggested the same principle that applies to ERISA-qualified plans with respect
to anti-alienation should also apply to individual retirement accounts (IRAs), but have generally lost
since the law does not require IRAs to have anti-alienation provisions. E.g., Smith v. Winter Park
Software, Inc., 504 So. 2d 523, 524 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Halliburton Co. v. Mor, 555 A.2d
55, 56 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988); Long Island Jewish Hillside v. Pendergast, 509 N.Y.S.2d
697, 699 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986); Rowland v. Strickland, 362 S.E.2d 892, 893 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987).
But see Citizens Bank of Ashburn v. Shingler, 326 S.E.2d 861, 861-62 (Ga. App. 1985) (court er-
roneouly concludes ERISA anti-alienation provision applies to IRAs); Mallory v. Mallory, 432 A.2d
950, 952 (N.Y. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981) (dicta); Edwards v. Edwards, 713 S.W.2d 642, 647-48
(Tenn. 1986) (same; but then permits a domestic relations order exception), appeal dismissed and cert.
denied 479 U.S. 1024 (1987). See also Education Assistance Corp. v. Zellner, 827 F.2d 1222, 1225
(8th Cir. 1987) (IRA has no spendthrift provision (bankruptcy case)); Bartlett Co-op. Ass'n v. Patton,
722 P.2d 551, 556 (Kan. 1986) (nbt exempt from state garnishment laws). See generally Lohwater,
Who Can Attack Your IRA, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 19, 1982, 22.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989).
22. See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
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or retirement.Y If bankruptcy occurs before this event, some courts
hold that the bankruptcy trustee has no greater rights than the debtor-
participant?' In such a case, the bankruptcy trustee would obtain
only funds presently available to the debtor-participant from the
pension plan, such as possibly a hardship withdrawal or a plan loan.25
If bankruptcy occurs after this event, if the bankruptcy estate re-
mains open until it occurs,m or if the bankruptcy court treats the
interest as an asset assignable to one or more of the creditors, 27 then
how should courts determine the division of the interest and its
payment? Courts are incapable of solving this problem alone since
it depends on the specific plan's provisions including vesting sched-
ules.28
23. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(a) (1988 & Supp. 1 1989).
24. E.g., American Nat'l Bank v. Huff (In re Huff), 61 B.R. 678, 684-85 (N.D. Ill. 1986)
(bankruptcy trustee cannot compel turnover of pension assets if debtor cannot); Schechter v. Balay
(In re Balay), 113 B.R. 429, 443-46 (Bankr. N.D. IM. 1990) (same); Christison v. Slane (In re Silldorff),
96 B.R. 859, 866 (C.D. Ill. 1989) (same); Halverson v. Micro, Inc. (In re Loe), 83 B.R. 641, 646
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1988) (same); Gray v. Ingles Markets, Inc. Employees' Stock Bonus Plan & Trust
(In re DeWeese), 47 B.R. 251, 256 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985) (same); see also In re Brooks, 60 B.R.
155, 160 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986) (suggesting bankruptcy trustee cannot reach segregated account in
pension plan by a turnover order), affd sub nom. Brooks v. Interfirst Bank, 844 F.2d 258 (5th Cir.
1988). Contra Humphrey v. Buckley (In re Swanson), 873 F.2d 1121, 1125 (8th Cir. 1989) (affirming
turnover order without addressing issue of availability); Watson v. Kincaid (In re Kincaid), 96 B.R.
1014, 1021 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989) (same), rev'd, 917 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1990); Magill v. Lyons (In
re Lyons), 114 B.R. 572, 578 (Bankr. C.D. Il. 1990) (to avoid keeping the case open), rev'd, 118
B.R. 634 (C.D. Ill. 1990); Morrison v. Rouleton (In re Smith), 103 B.R. 882, 883 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1989).
25. See infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text. See also Parkinson v. Bradford Trust Co.
of Boston (In re O'Brien), 50 B.R. 67, 79 (E.D. Va. 1985) (ordering a Keogh plan terminated and
moneys withdrawn per plan provisions).
26. See Magill v. Lyons (In re Lyons), 114 B.R. 572, 578 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1990) (in Chapter
7 case for state retirement system, court ordered turnover of pension-plan moneys to avoid payment
to creditors 30 years hence); In re Miller, 33 B.R. 549, 553 n.11 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983) (in Chapter
7 case, court speculated if pension-plan interests were not exempt, trustee would have to keep case
open indefinitely).
27. See Halverson v. Micro, Inc. (In re Loe), 83 B.R. 641, 646 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988) (ordering
turnover of pension-plan moneys only as they become available to the debtor); Gray v. Ingles Markets,
Inc. Employees Stock Bonus Plan & Trust (In re DeWeese), 47 B.R. 251, 256 (Bankr. W.D.N.C.
1985) (directing the trustee to abandon or liquidate the nominal present value of an interest in a
pension plan).
28. See Clark v. O'Neill (In re Clark), 711 F.2d 21, 23 n.2 (3d Cir. 1983) (dicta; include only
the vested portion); Samore v. Independent Pension Services, Inc. (In re McKenna), 58 B.R. 221,
223-24 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985) (include only the vested portion); Parkinson v. Bradford Trust Co.
of Boston (In re O'Brien), 50 B.R. 67, 79-80 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) (self-employed debtor's post-
petition contributions to a Keogh plan, plus earnings thereon, not included in Chapter 7 estate but
1991-92]
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Defined contribution plans might require separate accounting to
insure subsequent employer contributions and earnings do not inure
to the creditors. Most such plans do not have provisions authorizing
separate accounting since ERISA does not generally require them.
Defined benefit plans might require formulae for dividing the ac-
crued benefit. Such formulae would depend on how the plan accrues
benefits.
Congress solved this problem for divorce courts through the
qualified domestic relations order (QDRO). 29 ERISA now requires
pension plans to have provisions authorizing procedures for handling
and reviewing QDROs and requiring plan administrator approval
before they can become effective. This insures the order does not
require payments of more than the participant's portion of his ac-
crued benefit in improper payment forms and times.30 However,
Congress deemed the added cost of the plan administrator's review
of a QDRO (typically requiring an attorney), and the additional
accounting, worthwhile for a previous plan beneficiary (a spouse or
dependent).3 Congress may not conclude similarly for numerous im-
provident, but otherwise wealthy, undeserving creditors.
Since compliance with the bankruptcy trustee's turnover demand
violates ERISA's anti-alienation provision, a complying plan ad-
earnings on prepetition contributions are included). See generally, Donna Litman Seiden, The Bank-
ruptcy Code and ERISA: Do They Conflict as to Whether a Debtor's Interest in or Rights Under
a Qualified Plan Can Be Used to Satisfy Claims and Expenses?, 3 BANK. Dav. J. 1, 85-92 (1986)
(hereinafter Seiden, The Bankruptcy Code), reprinted in, Seiden, Chapter 7 Cases: Do ERISA and
the Bankruptcy Code Conflict as to Whether a Debtor's Interest in or Rights Under a Qualified Plan
Can Be Used to Pay Clais? (pts. 1 & 2), 61 AM. BANa. L.J. 219 (1987), 61 AM. BAtxR. L.J.
301, 326-32 (1987) (hereinafter Seiden, Chapter 7 cases).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (1988 & Supp. 1 1989).
30. Id. § 1056(d)(3)(D), (G).
31. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2547 [hereinafter S. Rm. No. 575] ("[t]o provide for greater equity under private pension plans for
workers and their spouses and dependents by taking into account changes in work patterns, the status
of marriage as an economic partnership, and the substantial contribution to that partnership of spouses
who work both in and outside the home .... "); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988 & Supp. 1 1989)
(purpose of ERISA is to provide security for both the participant and his dependents, conspicously
leaving out creditors); Craig Westbrook, Retirement Plan Assets in Arkansas Bankruptcy, 43 ARK.
L. Rnv. 253, 288-89 (1990) (calling for an amendment to ERISA's anti-alienation provision for a
Qualified Bankruptcy Order); Charles G. Huber, Jr., Note, ERISA, Employees, and Creditors Rights:
A Search for a Consistent Theme, 67 WAsH. U. L.Q. 461, 486-87 (1989) (same).
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ministrator would be liable to make the plan whole again. 32 Any
participant, beneficiary, fiduciary, or the Secretary of Labor, may
bring such an action.33 The plan administrator would then repay an
amount equal to the amount transferred to the bankruptcy trustee.34
This merely shifts the payment to the creditors from the debtor-
participant to the plan administrator.
However, a far greater danger for the plan exists. Compliance
with the turnover demand could jeopardize the plan's tax qualified
status, thereby adversely affecting all participants. The Internal Rev-
enue Service enforces rules against violation of those plan terms
required for qualification under the ERISA portion of the Internal
Revenue Code;35 ERISA's anti-alienation provision is one such re-
quirement. 36 Disqualification of a plan results in taxation of the plan
assets, once as a trust 37 and again in the hands of all participants. 38
The Internal Revenue Service has stated it would bring such an ac-
tion if a plan administrator violated the anti-alienation provision
through compliance with a turnover demand. 39 This could jeopardize
the further existence of all plans. Employers would become ex-
tremely reluctant to establish or continue plans whose benefits could
vanish for circumstances beyond the sponsor's control. Such cir-
cumstances could create potentially large tax liabilities for the highly-
compensated management employees unable to reach plan funds to
pay the tax due to other plan provisions. 4
32. 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1988).
33. Id. § 1132(a)(3), (5).
34. See, e.g., Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985) (plan can
recover as a whole under § 409(a), not the beneficiary); Call v. Sumitomo Bank of Cal., 881 F.2d
626, 632-33 (9th Cir. 1989) (cause of action exists for plan for loss on unsecured real estate investment);
Kim v. Fujikawa, 871 F.2d 1427, 1429-31 (9th Cir. 1989) (prohibited transaction payments made to
administrator reimbursed to plan); Lowen v. Tower Asset Mangement, Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1221 (2d
Cir. 1987) (investment manager liable to reimburse fees to plan for prohibited transaction).
35. 26 U.S.C. §§ 402(b), 404(a)(5) (1988).
36. Id. § 401(a)(13); 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-13 (1990).
37. Rev. Rul. 74-299, 1974-1 C.B. 154 (disqualified trust taxed as general trust and must main-
tain separate accounts to allocate beneficiaries' share in net trust assets and income).
38. 26 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1988) (contributions made to a previously qualified plan, but now a
disqualified plan, are included in the employee's gross income for the year in which his rights to the
contributions become substantially vested). The employer may lose partially its current deduction. Id.
§ 404(a)(5) (employer's deduction for contributions made to a disqualified plan occurs when employee
includes the contribution in his gross income).
39. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
40. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1056(a) (1988 & Supp. 1 1989) (permitting plan prohibition of payment
1991-92]
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Moreover, plan administrators regard turnover demands as both-
ersome. Under ERISA, their duties flow to all the plan beneficiaries,
not to some third party requiring an explanation of ERISA. De-
pending on the federal circuit, 41 the response to these demands may
require detailed knowledge of state law. Rather than have the plan
attorney investigate the appropriate state law, however, many plan
administrators merely respond with a form letter prepared by the
plan's attorney, stating that the plan interest is excluded from the
bankrupt's estate and citing a few favorable cases. At any rate, the
response letter serves only to drive up the cost of administering the
plan with no added benefit to all plan participants.
C. The Effect on the Debtor-Participant
The plan administrator of the ERISA-qualified pension plan will
then receive notice for an adversarial proceeding concerning the
turnover of the debtor-participant's plan interest in the custodianship
of the plan administrator. 42 The bankruptcy trustee brings this action
- effectively one to clarify rights to future benefits under the plan
- in bankruptcy court43 and not in state or federal district court
as required by ERISA." The significance of this difference lies with
until the latter of separation or retirement).
The possibility of employers terminating plans is significant. A survey made in 1990 by the
National Institute of Pension Administrators indicates that 46% of small businesses terminated their
plans the three preceding years due to the lowered contribution caps caused by amendments made
in 1986. New York Times Service, Paranoia in Pensions: High Cost of Employee Plans Scaring Off
Many Small Companies, SAN ANToNio ExPaRss NEws, June 3, 1991, at I-C. Consequently, the Bush
Administration has proposed the Pension Opportunities for Workers' Expanded Retirement Program
to provide small businesses with simplified preapproved pension plans calling for employer contri-
butions of 2% of compensation, employee contribution up to $4200, and matching employer con-
tributions up to 50% of employee contributions. Id.
41. See infra notes 247-82 and accompanying text.
42. See 11 U.S.C. § 543 (1988). The adversarial proceeding is conducted as a formal trial.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(E) (1988) (turnover proceeding is a core proceeding and may be heard
by the bankruptcy judge); see Watson v. Kincaid (In re Kincaid), 96 B.R. 1014, 1016-17 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1989) (holding that Bankruptcy Code's jurisdiction provision overrides ERISA's jurisdictional
provision), rev'd, 917 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1990).
44. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(l)(B), (e)(l) (1988).
Under ERISA the bankruptcy trustee is not one of the parties that may bring suit. Id. § 1132(a).
However, the trustee might have derivative standing to bring the ERISA suit on behalf of the debtor.
participant. See, e.g., Michael Reese Hosp. and Medical Ctr. v. Solo Cup Employee Health Benefit
Plan, 899 F.2d 639, 640 (7th Cir. 1990) (plaintiff was an assignee of a beneficiary); Hermann Hosp.
v. MEBA Medical & Benefits Plan, 845 F.2d 1286, 1289 (5th Cir. 1988) (an assignee of medical
[Vol. 94
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the possibility of jury trial in ERISA actions45 and the lack of in-
benefits has standing to sue); Multicare Health Care Servs., Inc. v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 720
F. Supp. 581, 582 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (assignee of benefit had derivative standing to sue); Kennedy v.
Deere & Co., 492 N.E.2d 199, 202 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (same), affd and remanded on other grounds,
514 N.E.2d 171 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1064 (1988). See generally David P. Kallus, ERISA:
Do Health Care Providers Have Standing to Bring a Civil Enforcement Action under Section 1132(a)?,
30 SANTA CLARA L. Pray. 173 (1990). Pension plans, unlike the welfare plans described in the above
cases, involve ERISA's anti-alienation provision, which would prevent derivative standing as an as-
signee.
45. See George Lee Flint, Jr. ERISA: Jury Trial Mandated for Benefit Claims, 25 Loy. L.A.
L. Ray. 361 (1992). ERISA actions in state court generally permit jury trial under a state constitutional
provision despite ERISA preemption of state law. E.g., Overcash v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 381
S.E.2d 330, 338 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989). In other state cases, the parties do not question the right.
E.g., Herbst v. Humana Health Ins., Inc., 781 P.2d 762, 763 (Nev. 1989); Felts v. Graphic Arts
Employee Benefit Trust, 680 S.W.2d 891, 892-93 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). Other state courts follow the
federal district court decisions permitting jury trials. E.g., Walker v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 544
N.Y.S.2d 958, 959-60 (Sup. Ct. 1989); Fuller v. INA Life Ins. Co., 533 N.Y.S.2d 215, 217-18 (Sup.
Ct. 1988). Contra Pfeiffer v. Roux Labs, 547 So. 2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
Federal courts generally find no right to a jury trial for benefit lawsuits under ERISA because
the suit is an equitable action or may involve legal questions only. E.g., Cox v. Keystone Carbon
Co., 894 F.2d 647, 649-50 (3d Cir. 1990) (equitable), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 47 (1990); Pane v. RCA
Corp., 868 F.2d 631, 636 (3d Cir. 1989) (equitable); Daniel v. Eaton Corp., 839 F.2d 263, 268 (6th
Cir. 1988) (following equitable precedent), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 826 (1988); Nevill v. Shell Oil Co.,
835 F.2d 209, 213 (9th Cir. 1987); Brown v. Retirement Comm. of Briggs & Stratton Retirement
Plan, 797 F.2d 521, 527 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1094 (1987); Turner v. CF & I Stgel
Corp., 770 F.2d 43, 47 (3d Cir. 1985) (equitable), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986); Berry v. Ciba-
Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006 (4th Cir. 1985) (not a fact question); Blau v. Del Monte Corp.,
748 F.2d 1348, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984) (following equitable precedent), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985);
In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318, 319-20 (8th Cir. 1982) (equitable); Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235,
1237 (5th Cir. 1980) (not a fact question); Wardie v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension
Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 829 (7th Cir. 1980) (equitable), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981).
However some federal district courts have permitted trial by jury in an ERISA action, viewing
it as legal in nature. E.g., Puz v. Bessemer Cement Co., 700 F. Supp. 267, 268 (W.D. Pa. 1988)
(contractual in nature); Abbarno v. Carborundum Co., 682 F. Supp. 179, 181-82 (W.D.N.Y. 1988)
(legal question); Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 114 F.R.D. 587, 597-98 (E.D. Wash. 1986) (contractual
in nature); Paladino v. Taxicab Indus. Pension Fund, 588 F. Supp. 37, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (legal
question); Pollock v. Castrovinci, 476 F. Supp. 606, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (legal question), affd without
opinion, 622 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1980); Stamps v. Michigan Teamster Joint Council No. 43, 431 F.
Supp. 745, 747 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (legal question). See generally Comment, The Right to Jury Trial
in Enforcement Actions under Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, 96 HA~v. L. Rv. 737 (1983) (explaining
the two grounds for denial as: (1) viewing the arbitrary and capricious review standard as a legal
question and not a fact question, and (2) viewing the matter as an equitable one because it involves
a trust).
Bankruptcy courts generally deny jury trials for core proceedings such as turnover actions. E.g.,
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frates (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 911 F.2d 380, 389-92 (10th Cir. 1990) (in a
core adversary proceeding for the turnover of fraudulently transferred assets, the bankruptcy court
does not have authority to conduct a jury trial); In re United Missouri Bank of Kansas City, 901
F.2d 1449, 1454-57 (8th Cir. 1990) (in a core adversary proceeding to recover a preference, the bank-
ruptcy court has neither express nor implied authority to conduct a jury trial); see In re Cinematronics,
Inc., 916 F.2d 1444, 1451 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[B]ankruptcy courts cannot conduct jury trials on noncore
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dependence on the part of bankruptcy judges. 46 The bankruptcy
courts have muddled the law since the passage of the Bankruptcy
Code in 1978 as to whether they will decide in favor of the plan
administrator's adherence to the anti-alienation provision under ER-
ISA or the bankruptcy trustee's turnover demand under the Bank-
ruptcy Code. In some federal circuits, the outcome depends on which
state law applies under the law of the state where the bankruptcy
is filed. 47 This surprises the plan administrator, since he has become
accustomed to the uniformity of pension law as mandated under
ERISA.48 Moreover, most of the courts that have confronted the
issue of the compatibility of ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code have
permitted alienation of some, if not most, of the debtor-participant's
plan benefits49 - a result not permitted in the absence of the bank-
matters, where the parties have not consented."); Beard v. Braunstein, 914 F.2d 434, 443 (3d Cir.
1990) ("Accordingly a bankruptcy court cannot conduct a jury trial in a noncore proceeding."). Contra
Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania (In re Ben Cooper, Inc.), 896
F.2d 1394, 1401-02 (2d Cir.) (sustaining a jury trial in bankruptcy coutt in a core proceeding), cert.
granted, 110 S. Ct. 3269, and vacated and remanded 111 S. Ct. 425 (1990).
46. Bankruptcy judges, Article I (of the U.S. Constitution) judges, are appointed by the circuit
judges, 28 U.S.C. § 152 (1988), and do not receive the benefit of life-tenure and salary protection
during their term as do federal district judges, who are Article III judges. See U.S. CONST. art. III;
28 U.S.C. §§ 134-35 (1988). See generally David P. Currie, Bankruptcy Judges and the Independent
Judiciary, 16 CREaIuiroN L. REv. 441 (1983). Because of this lack of independence, the quality of
the bankruptcy judges lags behind that of federal district judges. See Geras v. Lafayette Display
Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1051-52 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., dissenting).
47. See infra notes 247-82 and accompanying text.
48. See infr notes 109-25 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 229-82 and accompanying text.
The result has engendered many articles. See, e.g., Edward W. Brankey & Frank P. Darr, Debtor
Interests in Pension Plans as Property of the Debtor's Estate, 28 Am. Bus. L.J. 275, 303-05 (1990)
(calling for the courts to retain their present control test for determining spendthrift trusts but to
place more weight on ERISA's policies in order to afford relief to participants in pension plans that
are not self-settled but permit employee contributions); Darrell Dunham, Pensions and Other Funds
in Individual Bankruptcy Cases, 4 BANKR. DEV. J. 293, 396 (1987) (approving of state spendthrift
trust analysis); John Minton Newell, ERISA Retirement Plans in Individual Bankruptcy, 19 U. MicH.
J.L. Rm:. 183, 191-99, 236-37 (1985) (setting forth the case for exclusion on the basis of state spend-
thrift law); Seiden, The Bankruptcy Code, supra note 28, at 124, reprinted in Seiden, Chapter 7 Cases,
supra note 28, at 339 (calling for a bankruptcy clarifying amendment to exclude pension-plan interests
except current rights to withdraw any portion in order to achieve uniformity); Laurence B. Wohl,
Pension and Bankruptcy Laws: A Clash of Social Policies, 64 N.C. L. REv. 3, 32-36 (1985) (proposing
that courts divide the plan interests into two components-the tax deferred investment portion would
be includable and the amount needed for reasonable needs upon retirement would be excluded or
exempted); James H. Erlinger III, Note, Creditor's Rights in Bankruptcy to Qualified Retirement
Benefits, 53 UMKC L. REV. 626, 644-45 (1985) (calling for a bankruptcy amendment to permit an
exclusion for interests in pension plans reasonably necessary for support); Elynn Lambert, Note,
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ruptcy action.5 0 Thus, a creditor cannot reach a debtor's plan interest
unless and until he forces the debtor into bankruptcy - a result
encouraging involuntary bankruptcy litigation.51 The Supreme Court
does not favor this result and has mandated keeping the substantive
law of bankruptcy the same as debtor-creditor law in general.5 2
III. THE APPLICABLE ERISA PROVISION
The lawyers and judges responsible for muddling the joint in-
terpretation of ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code neglected the basic
statutory interpretation standard: effectuate the intent of the leg-
ERISA Plans as Property of Individuals' Bankruptcy Estates, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 685, 710-711 (1984)
(advocating court bifurcation of plan interests, with inclusion of that portion not truly spendthrift
determined under state law); Nancy Roetman Menzel, Note, Corporate Pension Plans as Property of
the Bankruptcy Estate, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1113, 1134 (1985) (approving use of state spendthrift law);
Alana K. Michelson, Note, The Individual Debtor's Interest in ERISA Benefits: Is it Property of the
Estate? Is it Exempt?, 2 BANKR. DEV. J. 293, 315-16 (1985) (calling for a bankruptcy amendment
to permit an exclusion for interests in pension plans reasonably necessary for support); Daniel Spitzer,
Note, Contra Goff. Of Retirement Trusts and Bankruptcy Code § 541(c)(2), 32 UCLA L. REv. 1266,
1328 (1985) (developing a federal spendthrift trust law to include some pension-plan interests in the
estate).
All of these proposals, except that of Seiden, involve uncertain standards (control tests, spend-
thrift trust tests, or support tests) that are too complex for a plan administrator to handle and which
violate ERISA's anti-alienation provision and, in some cases, ERISA's preemption provision, all con-
trary to the statutory interpretation canon to interpret two statutes harmoniously. Seiden's standard
violates ERISA's anti-alienation provision.
50. See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
51. See Newell, supra note 49, at 216-22 (noting the anomaly between different treatment of
the same problem under bankruptcy law and nonbankruptcy law).
One of the goals of the Bankruptcy Act was to encourage rehabilitation of debtors under Chapter
13. E.g., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc.
No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, 157-67 (1973) [hereinafter H.R. Doc. No. 137]; S.R. REP. No.
989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5798-99 [hereinafter
S. REP. No. 989]. Since Chapter 13 cases are voluntary, the interaction of ERISA and the Bankruptcy
Act, as interpreted by these courts, thwarts the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code by increasing in-
voluntary Chapter 7 cases at the expense of possibly a voluntary Chapter 13 filing. The debtor-
participant, however, has the right to convert to Chapter 13. 11 U.S.C. § 706(a) (1988).
52. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) ("Uniform treatment of property interests
by both state and federal courts within a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum
shopping, and to prevent a party from receiving 'a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance
of bankruptcy."'); Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 609, 609 (1961) (same).
Debtor-creditor law prohibits garnishment of funds in the hands of the plan trustee regardless
of a right to a distribution. E.g., Tenneco v. First Va. Bank, 698 F.2d 688, 690 (4th Cir. 1983); see
infra note 74 and accompanying text.
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islature 3 Congress passed ERISA with several purposes in mind:
(1) to insure that workers received their promised retirement benefits;
(2) to preserve the federal law relating to pension plans not included
within ERISA; (3) to foster development of a uniform federal law
governing the pension system; and (4) to encourage the growth of
the private pension system. Most lawyers representing the parties in
the bankruptcy-pension dispute have overlooked the overall purposes
of ERISA to focus on two ERISA provisions. ERISA attorneys
focus on the anti-alienation provision that prohibits transfers from
certain pension plans.54 In contrast, bankruptcy attorneys focus on
the compatibility provision that leaves other federal law intact,55
meaning the superiority of the Bankruptcy Code in the event of a
conflict.
A. Anti-Alienation Provision: To Insure the Availability of
Retirement Funds
The impetus for ERISA's passage was the plight of the retiree
who had lost his pension benefits prior to retirement.5 6 To prevent
such horror stories in the future, Congress developed, through
ERISA, a comprehensive scheme to protect those benefits.57 The first
53. E.g., United States v. N.E. Rosenblum Truck Lines, 315 U.S. 50, 55 (1942) (the all-im-
portant controlling factor in determining the meaning of a statute is legislative intent); United States
v. Stone & Downer Co., 274 U.S. 225, 239 (1927) (same); Eber v. Poston, 266 U.S. 548, 554 (1925)
(same); Wisconsin Cent. R.R. v. Forsythe, 159 U.S. 46, 55 (1895) (same); Jones v. New York Guar.
& Indem. Co., 101 U.S. 622, 626 (1879) (legislative intent is the law); Indianapolis & St. Louis R.R.
v. Horst, 93 U.S. 291, 300 (1876) (same); Raymond v. Thomas, 91 U.S. 712, 715 (1875) (same);
United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 396 (1867) (same); see also United States v. Cooper
Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 605 (1941) (role of the court is to declare the legislative intent); United States
v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 630 (1817) (same).
54. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
55. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
56. E.g., S. Rm,. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838,
4841 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 127]; 120 CONG. REc. 29,928 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5177 (statement of Sen. Williams); Jom LMA.GBE N & BRUCE Wouc, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
LAW 53-57 (1990) (describing the Studebaker Incident, a plant closing in 1963, and its impact on the
pension reform movement); see generally David S. Preminger, et al, What Do You Get with the Gold
Watch? An Analysis of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 17 AmIz. L. REv.
426 (1975); G. Valdron Snyder, Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 11 VAKE FoiEsT
L. Rav. 219 (1975).
57. ERISA's Congressional declaration of policy provision provides:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect interstate commerce and
the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries .... by es-
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part of that protective scheme was to insure that employers did not
deprive employees of their benefits. Hence, ERISA contains pro-
visions for: (1) vesting standards for prohibiting forfeitures to insure
that employees receive their benefits once they meet required con-
ditions of employment; 58 (2) defined benefit plan insurance to protect
plan benefits should the employer go into bankruptcy; 59 and (3) min-
tablishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee
benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to
the Federal courts.
29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988), and
It is hereby further declared to be the policy of this Chapter to protect ... the interests
of participants in private pension plans and their beneficiaries by improving the equitable
character and the soundness of such plans by requiring them to vest the accrued benefits
of employees with significant periods of service, to meet minimum standards of funding,
and by requiring plan termination insurance.
Id. § 1001(c).
A Congressional Report on ERISA noted:
Underlying the provisions of this Act is a recognition of the necessity for a comprehensive
legislative program dealing not only with malfeasance and maladministration in the plans,
or the consequences of lack of adequate vesting, but also with the broad spectrum of
questions such as adequacy of funding, plant shut downs and plan terminations, adequate
communication to participants, and, in short, the establishment of certain minimum stan-
dards to which all private pension plans must conform ....
H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4647-48
[hereinafter H.R. REp. No. 533].
58. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-61 (1988); H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 57, at 6, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 4644-45 ("[T]he issue ... resolves itself into whether workers, after many years of labor, whose
jobs terminate voluntarily or otherwise, should be denied benefits that have been placed for them in
a fund for retirement purposes."); see also Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 510
(1981) (.'[l]f a worker has been promised a defined pension benefit upon retirement-and if he has
fulfilled whatever conditions are required ... he [should] actually receive[] it."' (quoting Nachman
Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 375 (1980)).
Forfeitures generally inure to the employer. Pre-ERISA law prohibited forfeitures from increasing
the benefits any employee would otherwise receive under the plan and ERISA continued this provision
for defined-benefit plans. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(8) (1973) with 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(8) (1988).
Money-purchase pension plans and defined benefit plans generally credit forfeitures against future
employer contributions, since they are also credited against the maximum contributions deductible by
the employer. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 404(a)(l)(A) (1988) (maximum deduction determined by the funding
limitation of section 412); id. § 412(b)(3)(B)(ii) (1988) (calculation of limit includes experience of plan,
namely benefits not required for payout but funded, that are forfeitures).
59. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1461 (1988); H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1974), reprinted
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4680 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 807] (seeking to prevent loss of benefits
upon plan termination as happened in the Studebaker Incident).
Defined benefit plans are those that promise the participant a specified benefit upon reaching
retirement age. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34)-(35) (1988). Consequently, the employer funds the benefit
over a number of years, thirty in some cases, placing a portion of the expected benefit in the plan
each year. Id. § 1082. So it is possible that, in the event of a plan termination, an employer has not
completely funded a particular participant's benefit and, without the insurance, the participant could
lose much of his benefit.
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imum funding standards to insure that employers make contribu-
tions.60
The second part prevents plan fiduciaries from absconding with
plan funds. 61 Consequently, ERISA contains provisions for: (1) fi-
duciary standards to delineate minimum fiduciary duties; 62 (2) re-
porting to employees so they may knowledgeably enforce their rights
under the plan;63 and (3) prohibitions against self-dealing and con-
flict of interest transactions by fiduciaries.64
The third part of this protective scheme prevents the participant
from using his retirement moneys for current expenditures prior to
reaching retirement age when he would most need the moneys. ERISA
accomplishes this by an anti-alienation provision, which mandates
that "[e]ach pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under
the plan may not be assigned or alienated. ' 65 ERISA lawyers and
plan administrators assert that the bankruptcy turnover order vio-
lates this provision and prevents their compliance with the turnover
demand.
Under the statutory interpretation canons, the court considers
the statute as a whole. 66 So the entire protective scheme is relevant
60. Id. §§ 1081-86; H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 57, at 7, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4645
("Without adequate funding, a promise of a pension may be illusory and empty.").
61. Id. at 7, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4645 ("Another area of concern ... has been the course
of conduct in fund transactions, the degree of responsibility required of the fiduciaries ... and the
standards of accountability they shall be governed by in the management and disposition of pension
funds.").
62. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-14 (1988); H.R. RaP. No. 533, supra note 57, at 57, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 4649 ("The fiduciary responsiblity section, in essence, codifies and makes applicable to these fi-
duciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts.").
63. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-31 (1988); H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 57, at 11, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 4649 ("[T]he safeguarding effect of the fiduciary responsibility section will operate efficiently only
if fiduciaries are aware that the details of their dealings will be open to inspection, and that individual
participants and beneficiaries will be armed with enough information to enforce their own rights as
well as the obligations owed by the fiduciary to the plan in general.").
64. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106-08 (1988); H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 57, at 13, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 4651 ("There follows a list of proscriptions which represent the most serious type of fiduciary
misconduct which in one way or another has occurred in connection with some welfare or pension
plans.").
65. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988).
66. E.g., Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB,
350 U.S. 270, 285 (1956); United States v. Boisdore's Heirs, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1850); 2A
JABEZ GIUmEY SuTwERL.xD, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.05 (Norman J. Singer
ed., 4th ed. 1984).
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to a determination that Congress intended the anti-alienation pro-
vision to prevent loss of benefits through legal process however ac-
complished. The scheme prevents loss whether by employer
misconduct, by fiduciary misconduct, or by employee misconduct.
The anti-alienation provision reappears in the ERISA portion of
the Internal Revenue Code.67 Since Congress gave authority to the
Internal Revenue Service to define the anti-alienation provision,68
courts have tended to follow the Internal Revenue Service's regu-
lation expounding upon what it covers: 69 anticipation; assignment
(either at law or in equity); alienation or subjection to attachment;
garnishment; levy; execution or other legal or equitable process.7 0
Courts, when interpreting a statute, are bound by legislative regu-
lations issued pursuant to the delegated legislative power - unless
67. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (1988). This provision did not appear in the pre-ERISA Internal
Revenue Code. Compare id. with 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1973).
68. H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 359-60 (1974) reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5038, 5139 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1280] ("Treasury is to prescribe ... necessary regulations
under the general provisions relating to participation, vesting, and funding.. . ."). The anti-alienation
provision is in ERISA's participation and vesting section. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
See also Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. § 332 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at
1374 (1988), and in 92 Stat. 3790 (vesting the Internal Revenue Service with authority to issue re-
gulations with respect to all aspects of the anti-alienation *rule and requiring the Department of Labor
to follow those rules. Id. §§ 101(a), 104.).
69. E.g., General Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455, 462 (6th Cir. 1980); Northwest Airlines,
Inc. v. Roemer, 603 F. Supp. 7, 10 (D. Minn. 1984); Commercial Mortg. Ins. Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l
Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510, 520 (N.D. Tex. 1981); see Baker v. Otis Elevator Co., 609 F.2d 686, 691
(3d Cir. 1979) (following 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-14(c)(3) (1990) for 29 U.S.C. § 1056(a) (1988)).
Courts generally follow interpretations of the Internal Revenue Service when interpreting those
portions of ERISA that correspond to Income Tax Code provisions. E.g., Tulley v. Ethyl Corp., 861
F.2d 120, 125-26 (5th Cir. 1988) (deference: following 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-1I(b)(3) (1990) as explaining
29 U.S.C. § 1055(a) (1988)); Blessit v. Retirement Plan for Employees of Dixie Eng'g, 848 F'2d 1164,
1170-71 (11th Cir. 1988) (great deference: following 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-2(b)(1) (1990) as explaining
29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (1988)); Bance v. Alaska Carpenters Retirement Plan, 829 F.2d 820, 827 (9th
Cir. 1987) (great deference: following 26 C.F.R. § 1.411(a)-7(b)()(ii) (1990) against a claim it is
inconsistent with 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1988)); Rose v. Long Island R.R. Pension Plan, 828 F.2d 910,
918 (2d Cir. 1987) (great deference: following Rev. Rul. 57-128, 1957-1 C.B. 311 as defining terms
in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) (1988)), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 936 (1988)).
70. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(1) (1991). The rule also specifies that the term includes payments
to the employer of plan benefits and direct and indirect payments, whether revocable or not, of plan
benefits to a third party. Id. § 1.401(a)-13(c). The term does not include federal tax levies and judg-
ments, federal income tax witholdings with respect to plan benefits, certain plan recoveries of benefit
payments or overpayments, plan-to-plan transfers, direct deposits to financial institutions of plan
benefits, and the statutory exceptions of (1) up to 10% of benefits in pay status and (2) secured plan
loans to participants. Id. at § 1.401(a)-13(b) to (d).
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arbitrary or capricious7 - and give great weight to interpretative
regulations issued by the administrative agency charged with ad-
ministration of that statute.72 For this reason, courts, including the
Supreme Court in dictum,73 have interpreted the anti-alienation pro-
vision to include involuntary garnishment actions by third-party
judgment creditors, even when the participant may withdraw the
funds. 74 Concerning a third party's ability to reach pension-plan in-
71. E.g., Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 426 (1977) (because it is a legislative regulation
and not an interpretive regulation); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, 235-
37 (1936); see United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 437-38 (1960); Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R. v.
Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471, 474 (1937).
72. E.g., United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 564-65 (1982); Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S.
125, 144 (1979); New York Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973); Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 121 (1973); Investment Co. Inst.
v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1971); 2A SuL x), supra note 66, § 49.05.
73. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 836 (1988).
74. E.g., Travelers Ins. Companies v. Fountain City Fed. Credit Union, 889 F.2d 264, 266
(11th Cir. 1989) (even though plan was terminated and the benefits available in lump sum); Smith
v. Mirman, 749 F.2d 181, 183-84 (4th Cir. 1984) (same); Tenneco Inc. v. First Va. Bank, 698 F.2d
688, 690-91 (4th Cir. 1983) (even though in pay-status); General Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d
455, 460 (6th Cir. 1980); Commercial Mortg. Ins., Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510,
513 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (even though sole-owner employee plan); Christ Hospital v. Greenwald, 403
N.E.2d 700, 702 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (even though paying pension); Peoples Fin. Co. v. Saffold, 403
N.E.2d 765, 768 (II. App. Ct. 1980) (same); Hoffman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Washington County Nat'l
Say., 467 A.2d 758, 769 (Md. 1983) (same); Altimaro v. Bohn, 539 A.2d 431, 434 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988) (even though had unfettered access to 50% of employer contribution); see Retirement Fund
Trust of Plumbing v. Franchise Tax Bd., 909 F.2d 1266, 1283-86 (9th Cir. 1990) (state tax levy);
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Roemer, 603 F. Supp. 7, 9-11 (D. Minn. 1984) (same). See also H.R.
REP. No. 1280, supra note 68, at 280, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5061 ("[A] plan must provide that
benefits under the plan may not be assigned or alienated. However, the plan may provide that after
a benefit is in pay status, there may be a voluntary revocable astignment (not to exceed 10% of any
benefit payment) by an employee which is not for purposes of defraying the administrative costs of
the plan. For purposes of this rule, a garnishment or levy is not to be considered a voluntary as-
signment."). But see Brosamer v. Mark, 561 N.E.2d 767, 770-71 (Ind. 1990) (can get if already paid
to participant without roll over into individual retirement account); Aronsohn & Springstead v. Weiss-
man, 552 A.2d 649, 652 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (can get Keogh plan interest on theory it
is not subject to ERISA), cert. denied, 563 A.2d 808 (N.J. 1989); Abrahams v. New York State Tax
Comm'n, 500 N.Y.S.2d 965, 967 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (same).
Some courts, however, based on a literal interpretation of one statutory exception to the anti-
alienation provision have held it only prohibits voluntary transfers. See National Bank of N. Am.
v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 400 N.Y.S.2d 482, 486-87 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (commenting on
the exception for voluntary assignments of 10% of benefits in pay status before the Internal Revenue
Service issued its regulation), aff'd per curiam, 419 N.Y.S.2d 127 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979), appeal
dismissed, 397 N.E.2d 1333 (N.Y. 1979).
There are three statutory exceptions to ERISA's anti-alienation rule for (1) qualified domestic
relations orders, (2) 10% of the amounts in the plan in pay status, and (3) secured plan loans to
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terests, there should be no difference between a judgment creditor's
garnishment order and a bankruptcy trustee's turnover order.75 The
Internal Revenue Service, in private letter rulings, has so indicated .76
participants. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1988).
Courts have allowed several exceptions to this rule. Prior to the 1978 Internal Revenue Service
regulation defining garnishment as a voluntary alienation, one court permitted a judgment creditor
to garnish. National Bank, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 486-87. Courts have created an exception to this rule
for the federal government. E.g., Ratzlaff v. Carpenters Pension Trust, 813 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1987)
(tax levy by IRS); Calhoun v. FDIC, 653 F. Supp. 1288, 1292 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (FDIC); ERISA Op.
Letter No. 79-90 (1979) (IRS tax levy); see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(1) (1991) (defining tax
levies out of the provision). Courts have also created exceptions for domestic relations orders, fraud
on the plan, and bankruptcy. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
75. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (to prevent forum shopping and creditor
windfalls, treatment of property should be the same in bankruptcy as under debtor-creditor law);
Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 608-09 (1961). But see Kokoszka v. Belford, 417
U.S. 642, 650-51 (1974) (making a distinction between a turnover order and a garnishment of wages
where prohibition in Consumer Credit Protection Act (now 15 U.S.C. § 1671 (1988)) was intended
to prevent bankruptcy). Congress, however, did not intend ERISA's anti-alienation provision to pre-
vent bankruptcy. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
76. E.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-11-037 (Mar. 16, 1990) (Chapter 7); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-51-067 (Dec.
22, 1989) (Chapter 7); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-10-035 (Mar. 18, 1989) (Chapter 7); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-29-
009 (July 30, 1988) (Chapter 13); Priv. Ltr. RUl. 81-31-020 (May 5, 1981) (Chapter 13).
Some bankruptcy courts have slighted this possibility, despite the fact that most courts follow
the Internal Revenue Service's interpretation of ERISA's provisions, albeit through regulations rather
than the much less authoritative private letter ruling. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. These
courts have claimed disqualification by the Internal Revenue Service is unlikely, In re Gribben, 84
B.R. 494, 498 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (debtor in Chapter 7 claimed exemption), even in the face of a private
letter ruling applicable to another bankrupt. In re Wood, 23 B.R. 552, 561 (Ba'nkr. E.D. Tenn. 1982)
(plan to pay benefits to Chapter 13 trustee), or suggested the Internal Revenue Service would use its
discretion not to disqualify the plan. Bishop v. Masters (In re Masters), 73 B.R. 796, 799 (Bankr.
D. Or. 1987) (turnover order to administrator); see also Rev. Rul. 80-27, 1980-1 C.B. 85 (using
flexibility not to disqualify plans complying with domestic relations orders under the then judicial
exception to the anti-alienation provision, now codified). Some of these courts have decided that the
Internal Revenue Service's interpretations in private letter rulings are irrelevant to the problem. Gou-
veia v. Pulley (In re Pulley), 111 B.R. 715, 742-46 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989) (Chapter 7); Federman
v. Gallagher (In re Gallagher), 101 B.R. 594, 603-04 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989) (same); White v. Babo
(In re Babo), 97 B.R. 827, 830 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (same); Firestone v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. (In re DiPiazza), 29 B.R. 916, 922-23 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1983) (same). Other bankruptcy courts
have formed their turnover orders so as not to violate the anti-alienation provision. Berman v. Mead
(In re Mead), 110 B.R. 434, 440 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990) (plan terminated so benefit payable); In
re Witte, 92 B.R. 218, 223-24 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1988) (debtor in Chapter 7 to formulate plan
distribution as a loan); In re Swafford, 41 B.R. 845, 845 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984) (plan to make
benefit payable to debtor in Chapter 13); see also McLean v. Central States S.E. & S.W. Areas
Pension Fund, 762 F.2d 1204, 1210 (4th Cir. 1985) (not contempt for plan to pay beneficiary in
Chapter 13, not bankruptcy trustee).
Other courts have concluded that the possibility of plan disqualification by the Internal Revenue
Service means that the court must interpret ERISA and the Bankruptcy Act to avoid this result.
Forbes v. Lucas (In re Lucas), 924 F.2d 597, 603 (6th Cir. 1991) (Chapter 7); Anderson v. Raine
(In re Moore), 907 F.2d 1476, 1480 (4th Cir. 1990); see also John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
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Courts generally use committee reports to confirm statutory
construction 77 or to determine the meaning of ambiguous language. 78
Congressional committee reports state that Congress specifically en-
acted the anti-alienation provision to "ensure that the employee's
accrued benefits are actually available for retirement purposes. ' 79
This would insure that the employee would have funds available to
him in his unemployable old age so he would not have to rely on
public moneys for support. Permitting the funds to vanish in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding violates this express legislative history on Con-
gressional intent.
Some courts, however, have not used the legislative scheme, the
Internal Revenue Service regulations, or the legislative history to
interpret the anti-alienation provision. Instead they have created three
judicial exceptions: (1) domestic relations orders, 0 (2) fraud on the
Watson (In re Kincaid), 917 F.2d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir. 1990) (Fletcher, J., concurring) (this approach
will have to be made someday).
77. E.g., Commissioner v. Bilder, 369 U.S. 499, 502 (1962); McLean v. United States, 226 U.S.
374, 380 (1912); Hepburn v. Giswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 610 (1869), overruled on other grounds,
The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 553 (1870); 2A Summu.AND, supra note 66, § 48.06.
78. E.g., Wright v. Vinton Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 459 (1937); United States v.
Missouri Pac. R.R., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929); Railroad Comm'n v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 257 U.S.
563, 589 (1922); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 474 (1921).
79. H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 59, at 68, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4734.
80. This judicially implied exception was given statutory sanction in a significantly reduced
form (decree must specify certain matters and plan approval for compliance must be obtained) through
The Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA). Pub. L. No. 98-397, § 104, 98 Stat. 1426, 1433-36 (codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (1988).
Several courts held that plan benefits could be alienated pursuant to a state court order prior
to REA. E.g., Bowen v. Bowen, 715 F.2d 559, 560-61 (11th Cir. 1983) (for alimony payments);
Operating Eng'rs Local No. 428 Pension Trust Fund v. Zamborsky, 650 F.2d 196, 199 (9th Cir. 1981)
(alimony); Stone v. Stone, 632 F.2d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 1980) (as community property), cert. denied,
453 U.S. 922 (1981); Cody v. Rieker, 594 F.2d 314, 315 (2d Cir. 1979) (family support); American
Tel. & Tel. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1979) (for family support); Ball v. Revised Retirement
Plan for Salaried Employees of Johns-Manville Corp., 522 F. Supp. 718, 721 (D. Colo. 1981) (domestic
relations decree); Central States S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Parr, 480 F. Supp. 924, 925
(E.D. Mich. 1979) (alimony); Senco, Inc. v. Clark, 473 F. Supp. 902, 908 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (family
support); Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (family support); Knapp v.
Johnson, 301 N.W.2d 548, 549 (Minn. 1980) (child support); Western Elec. Co. v. Traphagen, 400
A.2d 66, 71 (N.J. 1979) (child support); Ward v. Ward, 396 A.2d 365, 369 (N.J. 1978) (support
order); M.H. v. J.H. (In re M.H.), 403 N.Y.S.2d 411, 415-16 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1978) (alimony);
Wanamaker v. Wanamaker (In re Wanamaker), 401 N.Y.S.2d 702, 706 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1978) (ali-
mony); Commonwealth ex rel. Magrini v. Magrini, 398 A.2d 179, 183 (Pa. 1979) (family support).
The argument for this judicially implied exception was based on ERISA's purpose clause to
continue the "security of millions of employees and their dependents [that] are affected by these
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plan, 81 and (3) bankruptcy orders.82 Congress subsequently legiti-
mated only one of these judicial exceptions - the one for some,
but not all, domestic relations orders. 83 The Supreme Court struck
plans," 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988), and the pre-ERISA law that permitted attachment pursuant to
divorce decrees despite an anti-alienation provision in the plan (e.g., Weigold v. Weigold, 258 N.Y.S.
348, 350 (1932); Monck v. Monck, 172 N.Y.S. 401, 402 (1918)) or in a statute containing an anti-
alienation provision similar to the one in ERISA. E.g., Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, 112 F.2d 177, 184
(D.C. Cir. 1940) (section 16(a) of the Life Insurance Act for District of Columbia, 48 Stat. 1156,
1175 (1934)); In re Flanagan, 31 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D.D.C. 1940) (section 3 of the Act of Aug. 12,
1935, ch. 510 49 Stat. 607, 609 (amending the War Veterans Act of 1924), 38 U.S.C. § 454(a), repealed
by Pub. L. No. 85-56, Title XXII, § 2202, 71 Stat. 83, 168 (1957)); Tully V. Tully, 34 N.E. 79, 79
(Mass. 1893) (section 33 of the Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 234, 17 Stat. 566, 575 (amending veteran's
pension laws)); Brown v. Brown, 288 N.E.2d 852, 854 (Ohio 1972) (Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 407 (1988)); Huskey v. Batts, 530 P.2d 1375, 1376 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974) (same).
Congress explained that it passed the REA to clarify the alleged ambiguity between the purpose
clause and the anti-alienation provision of ERISA. H.R. REP. No. 655(I), 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 23
(1983) ("[R]emoving any ambiguity in ERISA which might permit a pension plan to refuse to honor
a legitimate state domestic relations order issued pursuant to a divorce.").
A few courts held that plan benefits could not be alienated pursuant to a state court order prior
to REA. E.g., Francis v. United Technologies Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84, 86 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (community
property); General Motors Corp. v. Townsend, 468 F. Supp. 466, 469 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (divorce
decree).
81. Crawford v. LaBoucherie Bernard, Ltd., 815 F.2d 117, 121-22 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (participant-
trustee diverted profit-sharing funds to his real estate partnership so court permitted an offset of
benefits to satisfy the plan's judgment), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987), reh'g denied, 484 U.S.
1020 (1988). Contra Herberger v. Shanbaum, 897 F.2d 801, 804 (5th Cir. 1990) (anti-alienation pro-
vision precludes offset against trustee's benefit for breaches of fiduciary duty to plan), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 60 (1990). This judicially implied exception arises when (1) a participant embezzles or
defrauds plan funds, (2) the other participants seek to recover the loss by obtaining a civil judgment
against the wrongdoer, and (3) the wrongdoer or plan administrator attempts to block garnishment
of his plan benefits as violative of the anti-alienation provision. See generally Michael A. Frazee,
Comment, ERISA-Exceptions to the Anti- Alienation Provision: Strengthening ERISA 's Protection
Through a Fraud Amendment, 10 W. NEw ENo. L. Rav. 317, 341-42 (1988) (advocating a statutory
amendment to the ERISA anti-alienation provision to insure the efficacy of the judicially implied
fraud exception).
The anti-alienation provision has no judicially implied exception when the participant embezzles
or defrauds the employer who makes contributions to the plan. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l
Pension Fund, 110 S. Ct. 680, 685-86 (1990) (union trustee embezzled union funds); United Metal
Prod. Corp. v. Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 811 F.2d 297, 298-99 (6th Cir. 1987) (employee embezzled
company funds), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1b9 (1988); Ellis Nat'l Bank v. Irving Trust Co., 786
F.2d 466, 469-71 (2d Cir. 1986) (employee theft and securities fraud against employer); Vink v. SHV
North Am. Holding Corp., 549 F. Supp. 268, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (employee dismissed due to illegal
activities); Helmsley-Spear, Inc. v. Winter, 426 N.Y.S.2d 778, 781 (App. Div.) (employee misappro-
priated checks and took kickbacks from suppliers), aff'd, 419 N.E.2d 1078 (N.Y. 1980). Contra St.
Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 752 F.2d 550, 552 (lth Cir. 1985) (bank president misapplied
bank funds); Planned Consumer Marketing, Inc. v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 522 N.E.2d 30, 37-38 (N.Y.
1988) (contribution made to plan to defraud judgment creditor).
82. See infra notes 229-82 and accompanying text.
83. The Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA), Pub. L. No. 98-397, 104, 98 Stat. 1426, 1433-
36 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (1988 & Supp. 1 1989)).
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down the only judicially implied exception to reach it - the one
for participant fraud on the employer. 84 This strongly suggests there
are no exceptions to the ERISA anti-alienation provision unless Con-
gress specifically expresses one. 5 To date, Congress has not specif-
ically approved any of the judicially-created exceptions to the anti-
alienation provision for bankruptcy.
The one time Congress amended the anti-alienation provision (to
permit qualified domestic relations orders) it constantly referred to
the anti-alienation provision in committee reports as a spendthrift
trust provision. 86 Clearly, Congress anticipated that ERISA's anti-
alienation provision would operate as a spendthrift trust provision
similar to that under traditional trust law. Under that law and the
Bankruptcy Code, courts exclude interests in spendthrift trusts from
84. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 110 S. Ct. 680, 685-86 (1990) (elim-
inating the previously judicially implied exception for those committing fraud on the employer); see
also supra note 81 for the prior cases recognizing the exception.
85. See Guidry, 110 S. Ct. at 687 (only Congress to change the anti-alienation provision as it
did for the QDRO); Herberger v. Shanbaum, 897 F.2d 801, 804 (5th Cir. 1990) (commenting on
Guidry and stating "IMhe fact that Congress amended the statute to allow this exception [for domestic
relations orders] lends support to the notion that Congress will create exceptions where it sees fit and
courts should not do so.").
Rather than create an exception, Congress is currently considering a bill to make clear that the
judicially implied exception for bankruptcy orders is barred. S. 1985, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(c)
(1991) (amending the Bankruptcy Code to exclude qualified pension plans from the debtor-participant's
bankruptcy estate).
86. S. REP. No. 575, supra note 31, at 1, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2547; H.R. REP. No. 655(11),
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 [hereinafter H.R. RP. No. 655]: "[Ihe bill clarifies that [a domestic relations]
order does not result in a prohibited assignment or alienation of benefits under the spendthrift pro-
visions of the Code or ERISA." S. RFP. No. 575 supra at 3, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2549; H.R. RP.
No. 655 supra at 3.
[U]nder present law, benefits ... are subject to prohibitions against assignment or
alienation (spendthrift provisions.) .... A plan that does not include these required spend-
thrift provisions is not a qualified plan under the Code .... Several cases have arisen in
which courts have been required to determine whether the ERISA preemption and spend-
thrift provisions apply to family support obligations ....
S. RaP. No. 575 supra at 18, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2564; H.R. REP. No. 655 supra at 17.
The IRS has ruled that the spendthrift provisions are not violated when .... The
committee believes that the spendthrift rules should be clarified by creating a limited ex-
ception [for domestic relations orders] .... [T]he committee believes it is necessary to
establish guidelines for determining whether the exception to the spendthrift rules ap-
plies .... [O]nly those orders that are excepted from the spendthrift provisions are not
preempted by ERISA .... The bill clarifies the spendthrift provisions by ....
S. REp. No. 575 supra at 19, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2565; H.R. RaP. No. 655 supra at 18.
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the bankrupt's estate.87 Although this legislative history concerning
that 1984 amendment may not be persuasive in interpreting a statute
as a subsequent pronouncement,8 8 it serves as a current pronounce-
ment on a recently passed statute: the anti-alienation provision as
amended. Courts use such current committee reports to confirm stat-
utory construction or to determine the meaning of ambiguous lan-
guage. 9 After 1984, therefore, courts should regard the anti-
alienation provision in a qualified pension plan as creating a spend-
thrift trust.
B. The Compatibility Provision: Preserving Pre-ERISA Federal
Law
The other ERISA provision relevant to the proper relationship
between ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code is ERISA's compatibility
provision, which states that ERISA does not "alter, amend, modify,
invalidate, impair or supersede any law of the United States ... or
any rule or regulation issued under such law." 9 The legislative his-
tory of that section of ERISA makes no reference to the compat-
ibility provision. 91 However, the Supreme Court has refused to read
87. The Bankruptcy Code, excludes from the bankrupt's estate interests in spendthrift trusts
that are enforcable under "applicable nonbankruptcy law." 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988). The spend-
thrift trust provision, ERISA's anti-alienation provision, is enforcable under nonbankruptcy law. See
supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
88. Pronouncements of a legislative committee with respect to a previously enacted statute form
a hazardous basis for determining a statute's interpretation. See Consumer Product Safety Comm'n
v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 (1980) (remarks before a committee of one of a bill's
sponsors). These statements, although relevant (see Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666 n.8
(1980); United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1804)) are less weighty than a subsequent
statute. Consumer Product, 447 U.S. at 119 n.13. The reason is that memories fade and intentions
change. Id.; see also Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 317 (1942) (using 1892 report
of the Morris Senate Comittee on Indian Affairs for the Allotment Act of 1887 as virtually conclusive
due to the time proximity, less than five years, and consideration the same committee that reported
on the original bill).
89. See supra notes 77-78.
90. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1988). ERISA only repealed the Welfare and Pension Disclosure Act.
Id. §§ 1031(a)(l), 1144(a).
91. See H.R. Rap. No. 533, supra note 57 at 28, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4666; S. REP. No.
127, supra note 56, at 47, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4883; H.R. REP. No. 1280, supra note 68, at 383,
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5162; 120 Cong. Rec. 29,933 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177,
5188 (Sen. Harrison).
The provision appears in the earlier versions of the bill. See H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 114
(as introduced Jan. 3 1973), reprinted in 1 Legislative History of the Employment Income Security
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the compatibility provision broadly to eviscerate ERISA's anti-al-
ienation provision for judgment creditors relying on a nonbank-
ruptcy federal statute. 92
Despite such narrowness, bankruptcy lawyers and creditors assert
that ERISA is irrelevant to their turnover order issued pursuant to
the federal Bankruptcy Code. They seize upon the alleged plain-
meaning of this provision of ERISA to claim that ERISA is inferior
to the Bankruptcy Code, both in individual bankruptcy cases93 as
well as employer bankruptcy cases.9 The earliest court to consider
Act of 1974: Public Law 93-406, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1974) [hereinafter Legislative History];
S.4, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 609 (as introduced Jan. 4, 1973), reprinted in 1 Legislative History at
196-88. ADmNISTRATION RECOM NDATIONS TO THE HOUSE AND SENATE CONFaREES OF H.R. 2 TO
PROVIDE FOR PENSION REroRm, 109, reprinted in 3 Legislative History at 5174.
92. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 110 S. Ct. 680, 686 (1990) "Were we
to accept respondent's position, ERISA's anti-alienation provision would be inapplicable whenever a
judgment creditor relied on the remedial provisions of a federal statute. Such an approach would
eviscerate the protections of [ERISA's anti-alienation provision], and we decline to adopt so broad
a reading of [ERISA's compatibility provision]." Id.
93. The courts that have faced this argument have merely noted ERISA's compatability pro-
vision, asserted the Bankruptcy Code's superiority, and cited a few prior cases holding likewise. E.g.,
Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268, 1273 (8th Cir. 1984) (Chapter 7 case); Goff v.
Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 588 n.38 (5th Cir. 1983) (individual bankruptcy); Ottawa Cartage
v. Central States (In re Ottawa Cartage, Inc.), 55 B.R. 371, 377-78 (N.D. Il. 1985) (Chapter 7 case
to recover contribution to plan made within 90 days of bankruptcy action against the inapplicable
ERISA's non-inure provision); Threewitt v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. (In re Threewitt), 20 B.R. 434, 437
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1982) (Chapter 7 case for turnover), rev'd, 24 B.R. 927. (D. Kan. 1982); see also
Eisenberg v. Baviello (In re Baviello), 12 B.R. 412, 417 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (turnover for a pre-
ERISA Keogh plan under pre-Bankruptcy Code law).
94. E.g., Local 144 Hospital Welfare Fund v. Baptist Medical Center of New York, Inc. (In
re Baptist Medical Ctr. of New York, Inc.), 52 B.R. 417, 423-24 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (Chapter 11 case
to recover unpaid contributions); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Health and Welfare and Pension
Funds v. Columbia Motor Express, Inc. (In re Columbia Motor Express, Inc.), 33 B.R. 389, 394
(M.D. Tenn. 1983) (Chapter 11 case to recover unpaid contributions and denied injunction for future
contributions); Sterling Die Casting Co. v. Local 365 UAW Welfare and Pension Fund (In re Sterling
Die Casting Co., Inc.), 118 B.R. 205, 208 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1990) (Chapter 11 case to recover em-
ployer's contribution to plan against ERISA's non-inure provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1103 (1988)); In re
U.S. Lines, Inc., 103 B.R. 427, 434 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Chapter 11 case seeking legal fees for
work on plan against ERISA's attorney's fee provision, 29 U.S.C. § I132(g)(1) (1988)); In re Miller
Block Co., Inc., 63 B.R. 99, 101-03 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986) (plan claim against bankrupt employer
for legal fees against ERISA's attorney's fee provision); Pulaski Highway Express, Inc. v. Central
States S.E. and S.W. Health and Welfare Pension (In re Pulaski Highway Express, Inc.), 41 B.R.
305, 309-10 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984) (Chapter 11 case to recover contributions made to plan against
ERISA's non-inure provision).
This Article is not concerned about employer bankruptcies and ERISA. Their situation is entirely
different from the case of individual bankruptcies because of the absence of the anti-alienation pro-
vision's application, the subject of this Article.
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this argument concluded that, although the preemption provision
eliminates garnishment and levy by state action, it does not affect
such action under federal law - such as the Bankruptcy Code -
because of the compatibility provision.95 The leading circuit court
opinion, decided before the 1984 amendment to the anti-alienation
provision, concluded that ERISA's provisions have no general ap-
plication in bankruptcy. 96
Before a court becomes concerned about a statute's superiority,
a litigant must show that the two statutes conflict. 97 When Congress
passed ERISA, there was no conflict between ERISA's anti-alien-
ation provision and the then current bankruptcy laws. Prior to ER-
ISA's passage, courts excluded from the debtor-participant's estate,
interests in pension trusts that were subject to an anti-alienation
provision contained in the plan, whether in accordance with federal98
95. Baviello, 12 B.R. at 417.
96. Goff, 706 F.2d at 588 n.38.
97. See infra notes 338-40 and accompanying text.
98. The pre-Bankruptcy Code law provided that the bankruptcy trustee did not become vested
in the property of the bankrupt that could not be transferred or levied on. 11 U.S.C. § 1l10(a)(5)
(1976).
Several courts, in a bankruptcy setting, have upheld anti-alienation provisions in trusts by plan
provision in accordance with federal law. See, e.g., TVA v. Kinzer, 142 F.2d 833, 835, 838 (6th Cir.
1944) (rule contained in plan documentation for TVA's retirement system trust fund that prohibited
transfer, assignment, pledge, seizure, or other voluntary or involuntary alienation or encumbrance
upheld against bankruptcy trustee); In re McManaman, 50 F. Supp. 869, 870 (N.D. Ill. 1941) (rule
contained in plan documentation for FRB's retirement system trust fund prohibited benefits before
termination upheld against bankruptcy trustee). Since these cases involve trusts with transfer restric-
tions, they correspond to those excluded trusts under the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2)
(1988).
Other courts, in a bankruptcy setting, have upheld a federal statutory anti-alienation provision.
See, e.g., Nunnally v. Nunnally (In re Nunnally), 506 F.2d 1024, 1025-26 (5th Cir. 1975) (dicta:
veterans benefits subject to statutory anti-alienation provision, now 38 U.S.C. § 5301 (1988)); In re
Howe, 381 F. Supp. 1025, 1026 (N.D. Fla. 1974) (veterans benefits subject to statutory anti-alienation
provision, now 38 U.S.C. § 5301 (1988)); Avant v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 802, 804-05 (E.D.
Va. 1958) (civil service retirement under statutory anti-alienation provision, 5 U.S.C. § 2265 (now 5
U.S.C. § 8346 (1988)); In re Walker, 94 F. Supp. 49, 50 (N.D. Ohio 1950) (veteran's life insurance
under statutory anti-alienation provision, 38 U.S.C. § 454(a), repealed by Pub. L. No. 85-56, Title
XXII, § 2202, 71 Stat. 83, 168 (1957), and now covered by 38 U.S.C. § 5301 (1988)); In re Barry,
52 F. Supp. 492, 493 (E.D.N.Y. 1943) (civil service retirement funds not in bankruptcy estate due
to statutory anti-alienation provision, 5 U.S.C. § 729 (now 5 U.S.C. § 8346 (1988)), aff'd sub nom.
Barry v. Morris Plan Industrial Bank of New York, 141 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1944); In re Bean, 100
F. 262, 263 (D. Vt. 1900) (U.S. pension under Rev. Stat. § 4747, Act of March 3, 1873, § 32, 17
Stat. 566, 575 (1873)); Comptroller General's Opinion, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 54,032 (Oct. 8, 1942)
(same). Since these cases do not involve trusts, see infra notes 181-87 and accompanying text, they
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or state law. 99 ERISA only required additional plans - namely,
correspond to the exemption for federally restricted benefits. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1988). Thus,
the Bankruptcy Code did expand the limits of the bankrupt's estate by including these benefits in
the estate, see infra note 241 and accompanying text, necessitating the exemption.
99. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Blane (In re Baxter), 104 F.2d 318, 320 (6th Cir. 1939)
(contract with insurance company to provide annuities upon retirement for a large oil company match-
ing thrift plan prohibited anticipation and encumberance of contract benefits upheld against bank-
ruptcy trustee without reference to state law); Mason v. Eastman Kodak Co. (In re Parker), 473 F.
Supp. 746, 750 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (Kodak thrift plan under ERISA with an anti-alienation provision);
In re Hurd, [1977-78] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 66,926 (Bankr. D. Conn. July 12, 1978) (non-contributory
profit-sharing plan that had spendthrift clause upheld against bankruptcy trustee); In re Byrd, [1970-
73] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 64,209 (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 23, 1971) (contractual transfer restriction
in retirement trust fund upheld against bankruptcy trustee); In re Ladas, 52 Am. Bankr. (N.S.) 16
(S.D. Cal. 1942). See also In re Taylor's Mobile Home Sales, Inc., [1978-1981] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH)
67,226 (Bankr. 9th Cir. June 19, 1979) (upholding the employer non-inurement provision in a company
profit-sharing plan against bankruptcy trustee); In re Philips, [1967-70] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 63,370
(Bankr. D. Ill. Aug. 22, 1969) (not vested in profit-sharing plan so bankruptcy trustee cannot obtain
them).
Before ERISA a number of states had statutory provisions that interests of beneficiaries in
employee plans would not be subject to the claims of creditors or that the interests may be made
nontransferable by assignment. See, e.g., 1955 Fla. Laws ch. 29948; LA. REv. STAT. AN., § 20:33
(West 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561B:88 (West 1967), repealed by 1969 Minn. Laws § 17:1006;
Miss. CODE ANN. § 6995.3 (1942); N.Y. Pans. PRop. LAw § 13-d (McKinney 1967); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 60, §§ 327, 328 (West 1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 272.18(31) (West 1955) (renumbered 815.18(31)
effective Jan. 1, 1976). See generally Note, Legal Problems of Private Pension Plans, 70 HARV. L.
R v. 490, 498-500 (1957).
These cases and statutes involve plans now encompassed within ERISA and so would be required
to have an anti-aienation provision enforcible under federal law, not state law as in the past, due
to ERISA's preemption provision. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1988). So ERISA only changed the law under
which the anti-alienation provision in pension plans was enforcable from state law to federal law.
This pre-Bankruptcy Code law also excluded from the bankrupt's estate benefits from plans that
permitted employee contributions, which many courts under the Bankruptcy Code have refused to
do. See infra note 274 and accompanying text.
Several courts, in a bankruptcy setting, have upheld anti-alienation provisions pursuant to state
statutes in plans that would not now necessarily be subject to ERISA. See, e.g., Negin v. Salomon,
151 F.2d 112, 113 (2d Cir. 1945) (N.Y.C. employees' retirement system under N.Y. INS. LAw § 200(7)
(now N.Y. INS. LAw § 4607 (1985)); In re Dill, [1977-78] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 66,872 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. June 12, 1978) (teacher retirement under state anti-alienation provision); In re Santos, [1973-75]
Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 65,322 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. July 1, 1974) (municipal retirement under state and
municipal law); In re Barry, 52 F. Supp. 496, 497-98 (E.D.N.Y. 1943) (city retirement funds not in
bankruptcy estate due to statutory anti-alienation provision, N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 1109.o (now N.Y.
EDUC. LAw § 524 (1988)), aff'd sub nom. Barry v. Morris Plan Industrial Bank of New York, 141
F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1944); see also Voltz v. Goodwin (In re Goodwin), 57 F.2d 31, 32 (6th Cir. 1932)
(not vested in fireman's pension under state law). To the extent these cases also involve trusts with
transfer restrictions, they correspond to those excluded trusts under the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(c)(2) (1988).
Under the pre-Bankruptcy Code law, only when the plan benefits were in pay-status did the
trustee succeed in obtaining title to the benefits. See, e.g., Short v. Grand (In re Short), 507 F.2d
425, 427 (8th Cir. 1974) (public school retirement); Dunlavey v. Newnum (In re Newnum), 2 B.R.
500, 502 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1980) (received lump sum 6 months after bankruptcy); In re Solomon,
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those that had not already voluntarily done so - to include an anti-
alienation provision, thus expanding the total amount of plan in-
terests that courts would exclude from all debtor-participants' es-
tates. The purpose was to assure that debtor-participants had
retirement funds upon retirement and would not become a burden
on society.
The question that should have been investigated by the courts
accepting the ERISA inferiority argument was whether Congress,
through the Bankruptcy Code, expressed an intent to repeal this
prior result providing that courts exclude certain pension-plan in-
terests from the debtor-participant's estate. Although the Bank-
ruptcy Code contains no express provision repealing any part of
ERISA,1 0° courts may imply a repeal01 based on the legislative intent' °2
as determined by the usual legislative-interpretation rules. 03 Courts
presume against repeal by implication,""4 however, and a court may
[1970-73] Bankr. L. Rep. 64,141 (Bankr. D. Ala. Sept. 11, 1970) (profit-sharing plan); In re Ashbaugh,
[1970-73] Bankr. L. Rep. 63,710 (Bankr. D. Inl. Feb. 13, 1970) (received before bankruptcy); In re
Page, [1967-70] Bankr. L. Rep. 62,720 (Bankr. D. Va. Apr. 3, 1968) (profit-sharing plan).
Under pre-Bankruptcy Code law, exclusion from the owner-employee's bankruptcy estate of
benefits from plans benefiting owner-employees was unsettled. Compare Turpin v. Wente (In re Tur-
pin) 644 F.2d 472, 474 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (spendthrift provision in professional corporation plan
valid against bankruptcy trustee) with Judson v. Witlin (In re Witlin) 640 F.2d 661, 663 (5th Cir.
Unit B 1981) (spendthrift provision in Keogh plan void as self-settled trust under state law). See also
Clark v. O'Neill (In re Clark), 711 F.2d 21, 23 n.2 (3d Cir. 1983) (conceded Keogh plan in estate);
Ferwerda v. Zevers (In re Ferwerda), 424 F.2d 1131, 1134 (7th Cir. 1970) (reserving decision on issue
for Keogh plan when turnover order requested); Baviello v. Eisenberg (In re Baviello), 12 B.R. 412,
416 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (pre-ERISA Keogh plan in estate as it lacked anti-alienation provision);
In re Mendenhall, 4 B.R. 127, 129 n.l. (Bankr. D. Or. 1980) (same). This pre-Bankruptcy Code law
has been cited for the propositions that the pre-Bankruptcy Code included plans of the self-employed,
see, e.g., Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 587 (5th Cir. 1983). It has also been cited for
excluding plans of the self-employed. See e.g., Barr v. Hinshaw (In re Hinshaw), 23 B.R. 233, 234
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1982).
100. See Bankruptcy Code, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 (1978) (repealing
the Bankruptcy Act). The implication is against repeal of a statute not specifically mentioned in the
subsequent statute's repealing section. Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 342, 364 (1842). See
also The Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 129 (1974) (provision declaring certain
statutes inapplicable to present statute's subject matter).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Belt, 319 U.S. 521, 522-23 (1943); United States v. Yuginovich,
256 U.S. 450, 463 (1921); McDonnell v. Jordan, 178 U.S. 229, 238 (1900); Hanrick v. Hanrick, 153
U.S. 192, 197 (1894); District of Columbia v. Hutton, 143 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1892).
102. See, e.g., Posadas v. National City Bank of New York, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936); Yugi-
novich, 256 U.S. at 463; United States v. Claflin, 97 U.S. 546, 551 (1878).
103. See, e.g., Posadas, 296 U.S. at 503; Hutton, 143 U.S. at 27.
104. See, e.g., Graham v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409, 425 (1931); Eckloff v. District of Columbia,
135 U.S. 240, 243 (1890).
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not repeal by implication if it is possible to harmonize the statutes. 0 5
Some courts have suggested that the Bankruptcy Code impliedly
amended ERISA's anti-alienation provision.106 In determining whether
Congress impliedly amended a statute, courts may consider subse-
quent legislation.°7 For ERISA, that subsequent legislation, the 1984
amendment, suggests that courts are to regard certain pension plans
as spendthrift trusts, the interests of which courts exclude from the
bankrupt's estate under the Bankruptcy Code. 08
C. The Preemption Provision: Purpose of A Uniform Federal
Law
ERISA's legislative history indicates that Congress designed the
entire statutory scheme to accomplish two additional goals that are
relevant to the relationship between ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code.
First, Congress desired to establish uniform federal rules for em-
ployee benefit plans. Consequently, ERISA contains a preemptiQn
provision eradicating state laws "insofar as they ... relate to any
employee benefit plan . "...",09 This appears both in the committee
reports and in statements of committee members. Some bankruptcy
courts, in contrast, use state rather than federal law to determine
whether plan interests belong in the debtor-participant's estate. 10
Two committees considered and reported on the effect that the
preemption provision was to have. Although most of the committee
105. See, e.g., United States v. Burroughs, 289 U.S. 159, 164 (1933); Washington v. Miller, 235
U.S. 422, 428 (1914); Ex parte United States, 226 U.S. 420, 424 (1913); Petri v. Creelman Lumber
Co., 199 U.S. 487, 497 (1905); United States v. Greathouse, 166 U.S. 601, 605 (1897). See also infra
notes 338-40 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1982); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas
Health and Welfare and Pension Fund v. Stephenson (In re McLean), 41 B.R. 893, 900-02 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 1984), rev'd sub. nom. McLean v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 762
F.2d 1204 (4th Cir. 1985); White v. Babo (In re Babo), 97 Bankr. 827, 830 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989);
Gray v. Ingles Markets, Inc. Employees' Stock Bonus Plan and Trust (In re DeWeese), 47 B.R. 251,
256 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985); Firestone v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (In re DiPiazza), 29 B.R. 916,
923 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983).
107. See, e.g., Cape Girardeau County Ct. v. Hill, 118 U.S. 68, 72 (1886).
108. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
109. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
110. E.g., Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 582 (5th Cir. 1983) (exclusion from the
bankrupt's estate of spendthrift trust under the Bankruptcy Code depends on state law); Judson v.




language made references to state law, even the early drafts of the
proposed legislation that became ERISA contained the federal com-
patibility provision.11' The report of the Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare indicated that Congress intended ERISA pre-
emption to create uniformity in employee benefit law in order to
give interstate plan fiduciaries certainty about the legality of their
actions without reference to varying state laws.1 2 Some courts are
thus in error in their determination of whether pension-plan interests
are included in the debtor-participant's estate by reference to that
very same variable state law. For a pension plan, that state law does
not exist by virtue of the preemption provision. The report of the
Senate Committee on Education and Labor stated that ERISA alone
was "a uniform source of law" for fiduciary standards in the area
of vesting,"1 which certainly would include plan administrators' han-
dling of a turnover demand.1 1 4
Courts often treat the explanations of committee reports made
by a committee member or the committee chairman as supplemental
111. See supra note 91.
112. S. REP. No. 127, supra note 56, at 29, 35, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4865, 4871.
Furthermore, a fiduciary standard embodied in Federal legislation is considered de-
sirable because it will bring a measure of uniformity in an area where decisions under the
same set of facts may differ from state to state....
Finally, it is evident that the operations of employee benefit plans are increasingly
interstate. The uniformity of decision which the Act is designed to foster will help admin-
istrators, fiduciaries and participants to predict the legality of proposed actions without the
necessity of reference to varying state laws.
... [S]tate law is preempted. Because of the interstate character of employee benefit
plans, the Committee believes it essential to provide for a uniform source of law in the
areas of vesting, funding, insurance and portability standards, for evaluating fiduciary con-
duct, and for creating a single reporting and disclosure system in lieu of burdensome multiple
reports.
Id.
113. H.P,. REP. No. 533, supra note 57, at 17, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4655.
Except where plans are not subject to this Act and in certain otheN enumerated cir-
cumstances, state law is preempted. Because of the interstate character of employee benefit
plans, the Committee believes it essential to provide for a uniform source of law in the
areas of vesting, funding, insurance and portability standards, for evalutaion of fiduciary
conduct, and for creating a single reporting and disclosure system in lieu of burdensome
multiple reports.
Id.
114. ERISA's anti-alienation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1988), is in the subtitle on vesting.
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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committee reports." 5 Senator Jacob Javits, a co-sponsor of the orig-
inal draft legislation" 6 and senior ranking Republican on the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare," 7 stressed that "the in-
terests of uniformity ... required that the ERISA preemption pro-
vision provide for the displacement of State action in the field of
private employee benefit programs."1 8 Similar remarks were made
by Senator Harrison Williams, Jr. (then Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare," 9 the other co-sponsor of
the original draft legislation, 12° and floor manager of the bill) 2' and
Representative John Dent (the second ranking Democrat on the
House Committee on Education and Labor' " and House sponsor
of the original legislation).2
The report of the House Committee on Education and Labor
- resulting from the Joint Pension Task Force study conducted
after ERISA's passage - indicated that Congress intends the ERISA
preemption to bring about the uniformity of decision necessary for
115. See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 475-77 (1921); see also
Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, 300 U.S. 440, 459 (1937) (explanations
given in Congress make meaning plain); Helvering v. Twin Bell Oil Syndicate, 293 U.S. 312, 322
(1934) (chairman of committee so stated); United States v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 278 U.S. 269, 278
(1929) (statements by those in charge); Railroad Comm'n v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 257 U.S. 563,
589 (1922) (explanatory statements of members in charge); United States v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry.
Co., 247 U.S. 310, 318 (1918) (remarks in nature of supplementary report); United States v. Coca
Cola Co., 241 U.S. 265, 281 (1916) (chairman explaining the provision); 2A SuTH.nm, supra note
66, at §§ 48.14, 48.15.
116. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 156 (1985); Theodore Paul
Manno, ERISA Preemption and the MeCarran-Ferguson Act: The Need for Congressional Action,
52 TEmP. L.Q. 51, 61 (1979).
117. 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. XCII.
118. 120 CoNG. Rac. 29,942 (1974).
119. 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. XCII. Sen. Williams stated that ERISA preemption is to eliminate "the
threat of conflicting or unconsistent state and local regulation of employee benefit plans." 120 CoNG.
REc. 29,933 (1974).
120. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 156 (1985); Manno, supra note
116, at 61.
121. Leon E. Irish & Harrison J. Cohen, ERISA Preemption: Judicial Flexibility and Statutory
Rigidity, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REn. 109, 113 (1985).
122. 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. CVIII. Rep. Dent stated that ERISA preemption is to reserve "to
Federal authority the sole power to regulate the field of employee benefit plans." 120 CoNG. REc.
29,197 (1974).
123. Robert L. Aldisert, Note, Blind Faith Conquers Bad Faith: Only Congress Can Save Us
After Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 21 Loy. L.A. L. Rnv. 1343, 1355 (1988).
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plan fiduciaries to determine their actions without reference to state
laws. 124
This legislative history demonstrates an intent to make the rules
governing employee benefit plans nationally uniform. This unifor-
mity simplifies legal matters for plan administrators of interstate
plans and thereby reduces the cost of operating plans. Plan ad-
ministrators only need to consult the uniform federal law and not
additional and potentially different state law. Some bankruptcy courts
clearly defeat Congressional efforts to create that national unifor-
mity by requiring interstate plan fiduciaries to determine a debtor-
participant's interest in a pension plan by reference to non-uniform
state law.'25 One interstate plan, for example, could have several
different results for different debtor-participants depending on which
state they reside in. The gain provided by such action serves only
to relieve creditors from their own foolishness, at the expense of
the public who is consequently unable to shift the cost of retirement
benefits equal to that gain to the private sector.
D. Purpose of Fostering Plan Growth
Second, Congress intended ERISA to foster the growth of the
private pension system so that further burdens would not accrue to
the social security system. A House committee report on one of the
predecessor bills to ERISA noted that "the objective is to increase
the number of individuals participating in employer-financed plans
... [and to] continue the approach in present law of encouraging
the establishment of retirement plans which contain socially desirable
124. HousE CoMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, Acnivrry REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 1785, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 46-47 (1977).
Based on our examination of the effects of section 514, it is our judgment that the
legislative scheme of ERISA is sufficiently broad to leave no room for effective state reg-
ulation within the field preempted. Similary it is our finding that the Federal interest and
the need for national uniformity are so great that the enforcement of a state regulation
should be precluded .... Accordingly, any activity by a state or political subdivision thereof,
which relates to employee benefit plans ... is preempted by section 514(a).
Id.
125. See Liscinski v. Mosley (In re Mosley), 42 B.R. 181, 191 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1984), criticizing
Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983), for its unlikely theory that Congress revived
state regulation through the Bankruptcy Code: unlikely because of the strong policy for national
uniformity in pension law).
1991-92]
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
provisions ... - 126 The Senate report urging the passage of ERISA
noted that ERISA "will also serve to restore credibility and faith
in the private pension plans designed for American working men
and women, and this should serve to encourage rather than diminish
efforts by management and industry to expand pension-plan cov-
erage and to improve benefits for workers."'7 Senator Williams noted
that ERISA was "designed to improve and encourage the expansion
of private pension plans." 1 The ranking majority member of the
House Ways and Means Committee, Representative Al Ullman, made
similar remarks on the introduction of the conference committee
report that led to ERISA's passage. He stated that ERISA's re-
quirements were "carefully designed to provide adequate protection
for employees and, at the same time, provide a favorable setting
for the growth and development of private pension plans.' ' 29 Thus,
Congress balanced two interests: (1) lowly-compensated employees
would receive some benefits with security while (2) highly-compen-
sated employees, in control of the employer, would get incentives
to establish plans.
The primary encouragement for these pension plans was the fa-
vorable tax consequences to the employer'30 and the skewing of ben-
126. H.R. REP. No. 779, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974).
127. S. REP. No. 127, supra note 56, at 13, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4849.
128. 120 CONG. REc. S29,928 (1974).
129. 120 CoNG. REc. H29,198 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5166. "This legislation
provides urgently needed reform in the pension area. But, at the same time, it continues the basic
governmental policy of encouraging the growth and development of voluntary private pension plans."
Id.
ERISA has succeeded in this goal. Estimates indicate that private pension plans have grown from
500,000 in 1974 to over 900,000 by 1988. 60A AM. JuR. 2D Pensions and Retirement Funds § 1
(1988). Private pension-plan assets exceed one trillion dollars. Chuck Paustian, $1 Trillion Milestone.
Top 100 Soared With Bull Market, PENSION & INVEsTMENT AGE, Jan. 25, 1988, at 1. They cover
over fifty million American workers and provide 37% of United States retirement income. Hage &
Oslund, Pension Funds: Secure Futures or Big Risks?, MINN. STAR & TRn., Jan. 20, 1985, at ID.
130. H.R. RaP. No. 807, supra note 59, at 9, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4677.
The tax advantages associated with qualification under the Internal Revenue Co4e are sub-
stantial. Employers, within certain limits, are permitted to deduct contributions made to
such plans on behalf of covered employees, whether or not the interests of covered employeel
are vested; [and] earnings on the plan's assets are exempt from tax ....
Id.
[I]f a retirement plan is to qualify for the favorable tax treatment, it will be required to
comply with specified new requirements which are designed to improve the retirement sys-
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efits towards the highly-compensated management employees.
Employers normally get a deduction for payments made to un-
qualified plans in the year the plan pays the funds to the employee. 31
But for those funds paid to an ERISA-qualified plan on behalf of
an employee, the employer gets a current deduction. 32 Since qual-
ified trusts are not taxed, 33 the moneys in the plan increase without
reduction for income taxes on the earnings.
The individuals that benefit most from the tax-free compounding
of these pension moneys are the ones with the largest interests in
the plans. 13 4 These are the highly-compensated, typically, manage-
ment individuals, since allocations to defined contribution plans, as
well as benefits payable from defined benefit plans are generally
based on compensation. 135 But ERISA contains authorization for
integration with social security, 136 that is, not making a contribution
with respect to a specified amount of the participant's compensation.
That amount corresponds in some loose manner with the employer's
social security tax paid to the government on behalf of the partic-
ipant. Integration has the tendency to reduce the proportion of the
contribution going to those with total annual compensation below
the social security wage base. Providing the highly-compensated with
most of the contribution is offset by requiring broad participation
of the lowly-compensated 37 and, in some cases, after the Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act, 8 minimum contributions for the lowly-
tern. Since the favorable tax treatment is quite substantial, presently involving a revenue
loss of over $4 billion a year, it is anticipated that plans will have a strong inducement to
comply with the new qualification rules and thereby become more effective in fulfilling
their objective of providing retirement income.
rd.
131. 26 U.S.C. § 404(a)(5) (1988); 26 C.F.R. § 1.404(a)-12 (1991).
132. 26 U.S.C. § 404(a)(1), (3) (1988).
133. Id. § 501(a).
134. Clearly the tax-free increase in defined contribution plans directly inures to the participants
since the trust's income is added to their accounts. For defined benefit plans, the increase inures to
the participants indirectly. The increase normally reduces the employer's future contributions, which
may enable the employer to expand the plan or increase wages.
135. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(5) (1988); 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i)-(ii) (1991).
136. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(5)(D), 4010) (1988).
137. 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (1988); 26 U.S.C. § 410 (1988).
138. Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 240, 96 Stat. 324, 515 (1982) (amending only the ERISA portion
of the Internal Revenue Code).
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compensated. 39 The idea clearly was that the lowly-compensated em-
ployees would get some benefits, even if Congress had to redesign
the rules.1 40
Another encouragement was the liberal rules for getting money
out of the plans, used primarily by the highly-compensated. These
rules permit the participant to expend some of his benefits on current
consumption. Profit-sharing plans, for example, may allow members
to withdraw all employer contributions after a specified time14' or
for hardship. 42 All pension plans, on the other hand, may provide
for loans from the plan provided they are adequately secured. 43
There are limits, however, to the amount of the loan. Since the
participant may use as security only fifty percent of the present value
of the vested accrued benefit, 144 the plan can only loan something
less than that amount unless the participant provides other security.
Loans in excess of the lesser of $50,000 or the greater of fifty percent
of the present value of the vested accrued benefit or $10,000 are
subject to inclusion in taxable income and an additional early dis-
tribution penalty. 45
Thus, the complexity of ERISA arises from the desire to balance
the interests of the highly-compensated and the lowly-compensated
employees. Congress gave the highly-compensated employees several
limited advantages so that they would establish plans that minimally
benefited the lowly-compensated. The latter then would not become
139. 26 U.S.C. § 416(c) (1988).
140. See supra notes 322-24 and accompanying text.
141. Rey. Rul. 68-24, 1968-1 C.B. 150 (after five years' participation); Rev. Rul. 54-231, 1954-
I C.B. 150 (withdrawal two years after contribution).
Distributions from plans are taxable if the participant has not previously paid the income tax
on them; 26 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1988). They are also subject to an additional 1Oo penalty tax If
distributed before age 59 1/2, id. § 72(t), and not rolled over into another plan or IRA. Id. § 408(d)(3).
142. Rev. Rul. 71-224, 1971-1 C.B. 124.
143. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (1988); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1056(d), 1108(b) (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-
1(b) (1991); see also 26 U.S.C. §§ 72(p), 4975(d)(1) (1988).
144. 29 C.F.R. § 1550.408b-1 (1991); 26 U.S.C. § 72(p)(2)(A)(ii) (1988). Use of the plan interest
as security carries risks for the debtor-participant and his creditors. Upon default, typically defined
in loan documents as filing bankruptcy, the plan forecloses on the security, typically by offset as
provided in the loan documents. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-l(f)(2) (1991). This creates a current distri-
bution from the plan without any additional cash, a taxable event, 26 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1988), subject
to the early distribution penalty if the debtor-participant is under age 59 1/2. Id. § 72(t).
145. Id. § 72(p), (t).
[Vol. 94
ERISA AND BANKRUPTCY
wards of the state. When bankruptcy courts threaten pension plans
with disqualification and ignore ERISA's interplay, they seriously
undermine that delicate balance that Congress itself has reworked
several times. Under the guise of the bankruptcy laws, some courts
now desire to thwart this ERISA goal by subjecting plans to bank-
ruptcy transfers out of employee benefit plans.
IV. THE APPLICABLE BANKRUPTCY CODE PRovisioNs
In the absence of ERISA, ERISA lawyers and debtor-participants
fall back on the Bankruptcy Code's exclusion provision or try to
fit the plan interest under an exemption. Bankruptcy lawyers and
creditors dealing with the relationship between ERISA and the Bank-
ruptcy Code have focused primarily on these two Bankruptcy Code
sections and their legislative history and have ignored entirely the
statutory interpretive canons to look for the purpose behind the
Bankruptcy Code: to permit the debtor-participant a fresh start in
life. Instead, their interpretation of the relationship between ERISA
and the Bankruptcy Code thwart this purpose of the Bankruptcy
Code.
A. Exclusion Provision: To Preserve Prior Anti-Alienation
Decisions
The pre-Bankruptcy Code law excluded from the bankrupt's es-
tate assets that he could not transfer.146 Under this rule, courts ex-
cluded from the debtor-participant's estate interests in pension plans
that had anti-alienation clauses in accordance with federal or state
law. 47 Some, but not all, of these cases turned on whether the anti-
alienation clause was enforceable under federal law. 48
Before adopting any change to this rule, Congress selected a
committee to examine the bankruptcy laws and make recommen-
146. 11 U.S.C. § l10(a)(5) (1976).
147. See supra notes 98-99.
148. E.g., TVA v. Kinzer, 142 F.2d 833, 835, 838 (6th Cir. 1944) (federal law; TVA's retirement
system trust rule); In re McManaman, 50 F. Supp. 869, 870 (N.D. I11. 1941) (federal law; FRB's
retirement system trust rule); see also Judson v. Witlin (In re Witlin), 640 F.2d 661, 663 (5th Cir.
1981) (state law; trust document); In re Barry, 52 F. Supp. 496, 497-98 (E.D.N.Y. 1943) (state law;
education statutory rule), affd, 141 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1944); Standard Oil Co. v. Blane (In re
Baxter), 104 F.2d 318, 320 (6th Cir. 1939) (state law; insurance contract).
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dations.149 This committee recommended that the rules for deter-
mining the limits of the bankrupt's estate abandon the use of state
law in order to achieve uniformity. The committee also recom-
mended that Congress eliminate the exclusion of interests in spend-
thrift trusts (including pension plans with an anti-alienation provision)
with the exception of the extent needed for support of the bankrupt
and his dependents. 50 However, Congress did not adopt these re-
commendations. 15' Therefore, the Bankruptcy Code includes an ex-
clusion for "[a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest
of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable non-
bankruptcy law ....,52 Since courts presume that Congress did not
intend to adopt rejected limitations53 - such as the rejected inclu-
sion in the debtor-bankrupt's estate of interests in pension plans
with anti-alienation provisions - they must conclude that interests
in such pension plans are excluded from the debtor-participant's
estate.
The issue under this provision that the courts have focused on,
however, is whether "applicable nonbankruptcy law" includes ER-
ISA. 54 Clearly, the anti-alienation provision is a restriction on trans-
fer contained in a trust. 55 Those courts affirmatively deciding this
issue need not consider bankruptcy exemptions.
The committee reports for this provision are inconclusive. 156 The
Senate report does not indicate whether it encompasses state or state
149. H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 51, pt. I, at v.
150. Id. at 17, 197.
151. See S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 541(c) (1977) (retaining the exclusion to the extent
necessary for support); H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 541(c) (1977) (retaining the exclusion
regardless of support requirements).
152. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988).
153. E.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-24 (1983); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S.
546, 580-81 (1963); Carey v. Donohue, 240 U.S. 430, 437 (1916); see United States v. St. Paul, M.
& M.R.R., 247 U.S. 310, 318 (1918) (can be of use if provision ambiguous); Pennsylvania R.R. v.
International Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184 (1913) (most persuasive); 2A SUTmHRLAND, supra note
66, § 48.18.
154. Compare Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 581-87 (5th Cir. 1983) with Forbes
v. Lucas (In re Lucas), 924 F.2d 597, 600-02 (6th Cir. 1991).
155. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
156. See Lucas, 924 F.2d at 602; Anderson v. Raine (In re Moore), 907 F.2d 1476, 1478 (4th
Cir. 1990). Contra Daniel v. Sec. Pac. Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352, 1360 (9th Cir. 1985);




and federal law. However, the report does state that the provision
"preserves restrictions on a transfer of a spendthrift trust [provided]
that the restriction is enforceable under nonbankruptcy law ....
The House report indicates that the provision covers two types of
trusts, spendthrift trusts and support trusts, and "continues over the
exclusion from property of the estate of the debtor's interest in a
spendthrift trust to the extent the trust is protected from creditors
under applicable state law."' 158 These reports do agree that the pro-
vision preserved the pre-Bankruptcy Code practice.
Courts presume that Congress is familiar with prior judicial de-
cisions when passing a statute, and so they interpret that statute in
accordance with those prior judicial decisions.159 Those decisions ex-
cluded from the debtor-participant's estate an interest in a pension
plan with an anti-alienation provision created under federal law. 60
Thus, "applicable nonbankruptcy law" includes trust anti-alienation
provisions created in accordance with federal law such as ERISA.
Courts also presume that the same phrase in a statute has the
same meaning throughout the statute.1 61 "Applicable nonbankruptcy
157. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 51, at 83, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5869; H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 176 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6325 [hereinafter H.R. REP.
No. 595] (same).
158. Id. at 176, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6136 (citing a citation that refers to 1 RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRusTs §§ 153-54 (1959), relating generally to trust provisions for anti-alienation and
support).
The citation to the Restatement indicates that the House envisioned at least two types of trusts
within this exclusion, namely spendthrift trusts and support trusts. See H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra
note 51, pt. II, at 147-48 & 151 (committee recommendation for an exemption for "a restriction on
the transfer of a beneficial interest under applicable nonbankruptcy law" explained as creating an
exception for "spendthrift and support trusts"). So Congress did not intend to limit the exclusion
to spendthrift trusts only. Moreover, ERISA trusts are created for support during retirement. But
see id. at 129 (federal exemption for ERISA plans with support limit so that their treatment would
be thd same as spendthrift trusts under the exclusion).
159. E.g., Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501
(1986); District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441, 453-54 (1941); Blake v. McKim, 103 U.S.
336, 339 (1880); 2A SUTHERLAD, supra note 66, at § 50.01; see Communications Workers of Am.
v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 759-60 (1988) (Congress presumed to know about labor union practices when
passing labor laws).
160. See supra note 98.
161. E.g., Morrison-Knudsen Constr. Co. v. Director, OWCP, 461 U.S. 624, 633 (1983); United
States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 606 (1941); Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S.
84, 87 (1934); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932). 2A SUTHERLAND,
supra note 66, § 46.06.
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law" appears a number of times in the Bankruptcy Code. 162 Con-
gressional reports for some of these other sections indicate that they
include federal law. 163 Courts have held that some of these sections
include federal law.' 64 So the exclusion provision for nontransfer-
ability must include those provisions established under federal law
such as ERISA.
When Congress uses different language in various parts of a
statute, courts presume a different meaning. 65 When Congress de-
sired to limit the applicable law to only state law, it clearly so stated
in the Bankruptcy Code. 66 Thus, nonbankruptcy law means some-
thing different than merely state law.
A court should conclude from an examination of the Bankruptcy
Code's exclusion provision that Congress intended to exclude in-
terests in ERISA-qualified pension plans from the debtor-partici-
pant's estate. Congress made changes during the legislative process
to exclude from the debtor-participant's estate interests in spend-
thrift trusts which includes interests in most qualified pension trusts.
The Congressional committee reports expressed a desire to preserve
162. E.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(51)(F), 108(a), 363(f)(1), 365 passim, 510(a), 522(b)(2)(B), 524(c),
541(c)(1) & (2), 552(b), 927, 943(b)(6), 1123(a), 1125(d), 1126(b)(1), 1142(a) (1988).
163. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 51, at 30, 121, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5816 (applicable non-
bankruptcy law in § 11 U.S.C. § 108(a) (1988) is derived from 11 U.S.C. § 29(e) (1977), § 11(e) of
the old Bankruptcy Act, which stated "Federal or state law"), 5907 (applicable nonbankruptcy law
under 11 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1988) relieves court of the need to follow federal or state law); H.R.
REP. No. 595, supra note 157, at 318, 409, 410, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6275 (applicable nonbankruptcy
law in 11 U.S.C. § 108(a) (1988) is derived from 11 U.S.C. § 29(e) (1977), § ll(e) of the old Bankruptcy
Act, which stated "Federal or state law"), 6365 (applicable nonbankruptcy law under 11 U.S.C. §
1125(d) (1988) includes the Securities Act and the Exchange Act), 6366 (applicable nonbankruptcy
law in 11 U.S.C. § 1126(b)(1) (1988) includes the Exchange Act).
164. See Eisenberg v. Feiner (In re Ahead By a Length, Inc.), 100 B.R. 157, 162-63 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1989) (applicable nonbankruptcy law in 11 U.S.C. g 108(a) (1988) includes RICO); In re
Stanley Hotel, Inc., 13 B.R. 926, 931 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981) (applicable nonbankruptcy law in 11
U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1988) includes the federal securities laws). See also Bavely v. United States (In re
Terwilliger's Catering Plus, Inc.), 911 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir. 1990) (priority of "statutory liens"
under 11 U.S.C. § 724(d) (1988) determined by federal law); In re Laymon, 117 B.R. 856, 864 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 1990) (allowable post-petition "interest" under 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988) determined by
federal judgment rate); In re Wedtech Corp., 87 B.R. 279, 288 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("unen-
forceable" claim under 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (1988) includes those under RICO and the federal securities
laws).
165. E.g., Guarantee Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guarantee & Surety Co., 224 U.S. 152, 158-60
(1912); United States v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R., 220 U.S. 37, 44 (1911).
166. E.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(c)(2), 362(b)(12), 522(b)(1), 523(a)(5), 903(1), 1145(a) (1988).
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prior law that excluded interests in most qualified pension trusts
from the debtor-participant's estate. The legislative history for the
same language, as used in the exclusion provision located elsewhere
in the Bankruptcy Code, indicates that the language covers both
federal and state law. And Congress failed to limit expressly the
exclusion provision to only state law as done elsewhere in the Bank-
ruptcy Code.
B. Exemption Provision: To Conserve Some Debtor Assets
Failing to have the pension-plan benefits excluded from the
debtor-participant's estate, the debtor-participant and the plan ad-
ministrator next try to fit these benefits under one of the exemptions
from liquidation under Chapter 7 or disposable income under Chap-
ter 13. To provide a fresh start for the bankrupt, the Bankruptcy
Code lists a number of exemptions for the debtor-participant's estate
that are unavailable for distribution to the creditors. Unlike ERISA,
the Bankruptcy Code failed to mandate uniformity amongst the states
through a unitary exemption system.167 Consequently, the exemp-
tions provided the debtor-participant by the Bankruptcy Code de-
pend on his state of residence. This fact explains the readiness of
bankruptcy judges to delve into state law with respect to employee
plans, much to the amazement of plan administrators accustomed
to the uniformity provided by ERISA.
The Bankruptcy Code sets up three different exemption schemes:
(1) the federal scheme, (2) the voluntary state scheme, and (3) the
involuntary state scheme. 16e Normally a debtor-participant has a
choice of selecting either the federal exemption scheme or the vol-
untary state scheme; however, a state may opt out of the federal
167. Compare H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 51, at 171 (recommending uniform federal law
for exemptions) with 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988) (providing for the triple system of exemptions).
168. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988).
The Treasury Department has recently recommended elimination of state exemption schemes to
obtain nationally uniform exemptions, a thinly disguised attempt to eliminate liberal California and
Texas exemptions to protect the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. DEARTmENT op TREAsuRY,
MODERNIG THE Fm ciAL SysmTu: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SASFR, MoE Co mPETrrvE BANMs, XX-
6 (1990); see also S. 713, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991) reprinted in 137 CoNo. Rac. S3739-3779 (daily
ed. Mar. 21, 1991).
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scheme by statute, in which case the debtor-participant may only
use the required involuntary state scheme. 169
The federal scheme only permits a limited exemption for certain
non-contractual, non-trusteed federal benefits such as social security
and veterans benefits and for:
a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, annuity, or similar plan
or contract on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service, to
the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent
of the debtor, unless ... such plan ... does not qualify under section 401(a),
403(a), 403(b), 408, or 409 of the Internal Revenue Code. 70
The failure to exclude ERISA pension plan interests under the ex-
clusion provision results, under the federal scheme, in only a partial
protection of these interests.
This federal-scheme-exemption provision is a holdover from the
Bankruptcy committee's recommendation to prohibit the exclusion
from bankrupts' estates of interests in spendthrift trusts - including
certain qualified pension plans - and to permit their exemption to
the extent necessary for the support of the debtor-participant."I The
Senate bill did not have this provision and so the Senate report omits
169. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988). Most states have opted out. E.g., ALA. CODE § 6-10-11 (Supp.
1980); ALAsKA STAT. § 9.38.055 (1983); ARiz. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1133(B) (1987); Aiu. CODE
ANN. § 36- 210, 211 (Michie 1987); CALiF. Crv. PROC. CODE § 703.130(a) (Deering 1983); CoLO. REv.
STAT. § 13-54-107 (1987); DEL. CODE. AN. tit. 10, § 4914 (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ch. 222.20 (1988);
GA. CODE ANN. § 44-13-100(b) (Michie 1982); IDAHo CODE § 11-609 (1990); IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 81,
1505 (Smith-Hurd 1987); IND. CODE § 34-2-28-0.5 (1986); IOWA CODE § 627.10 (Supp. 1991); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-2312 (1983); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 427.170 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3881(B) (West Supp. 1991); ME. R v. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4426 (West
Supp. 1990); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-504(g) (1989); Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-3-1
(Supp. 1990); Mo. REv. STAT. § 513.427 (Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-2-106 (1989); NEB.
R"v. STAT. § 25-15,105 (1989); NEv. REv. STAT. § 21.090(3) (1987); N.H. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 511:
2-a (1983); N.Y. DEBT. & CREn. LAW § 284 (McKinney 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1C-1601() (Supp.
1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-17 (Supp. 1990); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2329.662(16) (Baldwin
1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § 1(B) (1991); OR. Rav. STAT. § 23.305 (1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-
41-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990); S.D. CoDnqlD LAws ANN. § 43- 31-30 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 26-2-112 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-15 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 34-3.1 (Michie 1990); W.
VA. CODE § 38-10-4 (1985); Wyo. STAT. § 1-20-109 (1988).
170. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(A), (B), (E) (1988).
1.71. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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it.172 The House bill did not have the support limitation.17 3 Thus,
the provision arose from a compromise between the Senate and the
House, with the House probably yielding on the support limitation
to obtain the provision. 7 4
The federal-scheme-exemption provision also contains a Bank-
ruptcy Code reference to ERISA's provisions. 175 The federal-scheme
exemption provides an exemption for certain retirement benefits pro-
vided they derive from: (1) qualified pension plans under section
401(a) of the ERISA portion of the Income Tax Code; (2) qualified
annuity plans under section 403(a); (3) tax-sheltered annuities under
section 403(b); (4) individual retirement accounts under section 408;
and (5) retirement bonds under section 409.176 One court suggested
that this reference means that all benefits derived from ERISA-qual-
ified pension plans are included in the debtor-participant's estate
else this provision is surplusage.17 7 However, this view overlooks the
intricacies of ERISA. Notall qualified pension plans, qualified an-
nuity plans, or tax-sheltered annuities are subject to the anti-alien-
ation provision. 178 Individual retirement accounts and retirement
172. S. 2266, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 522 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, supra note 51, at 75, 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5861.
173. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 522 (1977); H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 157, at
361-62, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6317-18 (indicating the provision came from the Uniform Exemptions
Act of 1976). The Uniform Exemptions Act, however, does have the support limitation. UNw. Ex-
EMpTIONS AcT § 6(b), 13 U.L.A. 224 (1986).
174. See S. REP. No. 989, supra note 51, at 6, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5792 (critizing the House
bill's exemption provision as creating instant affluence for the debtor). Assumptions about a Con-
gressional compromise, however, are too speculative to provide a basis for interpretation. See Fox
v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 96 (1925) (eliminated words during passage not conclusive); Andrews
v. Hovey, 124 U.S. 694, 716 (1888) (arguments based on assumed phases in its passage are very
unreliable).
175. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E)(iii) (1988).
176. 26 U.S.C. §§ 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989); 26 U.S.C. § 409 (Supp.
11 1978). The Bankruptcy Code still refers to I.R.C. § 409 (Supp. 11 1978) (dealing with retirement
bonds), which was repealed in 1982 by the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369 §§ 491(b),
(e), 98 Stat. 494, 848, 852 (1984), so that old I.R.C. § 409A (dealing with additional requirements
for employee stock ownership plans) became I.R.C. § 409. Congress has apparently yet to make this
technical correction.
This exemption also applies to social security and veterans benefits, 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(A),
(B) (1988), that are the subject of the federal exemption under the state scheme. See infra note 183.
177. Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81, 82 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706
F.2d 574, 585 (5th Cir. 1983).
178. The Internal Revenue Code's anti-alienation provision (26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (1988); see
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bonds are not subject to an anti-alienation provision.' 79 So several
classes of qualified pension plans are not subject to ERISA's anti-
alienation provision, and, therefore, courts cannot exclude their in-
terests from the debtor-participant's estate as interests in a trust with
a transfer restriction. These included interests, then, are the ones
subject to the federal-scheme exemption, not those containing ER-
ISA's anti-alienation provision.
The federal-scheme exemption works to protect retirement ben-
efits in two ways. First, the exclusion provision excludes qualified
pension trusts with anti-alienation provisions. Second, the federal-
scheme exemption exempts the remaining retirement benefits: those
non-contractual, non-trusteed federal benefits, such as social security
and veterans benefits and qualified pension plans not subject to the
anti-alienation provision, albeit with a support limitation. This was
the best the House could obtain from the Senate for these latter
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1988 & Supp. 11989)) does not apply to (1) government plans, (2) church plans,
and (3) plans which have not received employer contributions since 1974. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-13(a)
(1991); see 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b), 1031 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989). The non-employer contribution plans
would include the plans of fraternal societies organized under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(8) (1988), voluntary
employee benefit associations organized under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(9) (1988), and certain pre-1959 plans
funded by employee labor organizations without employer contributions as provided under 26 U.S.C.
§ 501(c)(5) (1988). See 26 U.S.C. § 411(e) (1988). Each of these plans can have a pension plan qualified
under 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1988 & Supp. 1 1989), provided that they satisfy the requirements of pre-
ERISA 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(7) (Supp. IV 1974). See 26 U.S.C. § 412(h) (1988). Thus these plans are
qualified under section 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1988 & Supp. 1 1989) but are not subject to the anti-
alienation provision. So their interests are not excluded from the bankrupt's estate as interests in a
spendthrift trust. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988).
These same government and church plans have an employer eligible to purchase annuity contracts
from qualified annuity plans under 26 U.S.C. § 403(a) (1988). Qualified annuity plans are required
to satisfy the requirements of 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1988 & Supp. 11989). 26 U.S.C. §§ 403(a), 404(a)(2)
(1988). But government and church plans satisfy 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1988 & Supp. 1 1989) without
satisfying the anti-alienation provision. Thus there is a class of qualified annuity plans under 26 U.S.C.
§ 403(a) (1988) that are not subject to the anti-alienation provisibn. So their interests are not excluded
from the bankrupt's estate as interests in a spendthrift trust. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988).
Similarly, church employers are eligible to purchase tax-sheltered annuities under 26 U.S.C. §
403(b) (1988). Tax-sheltered annuities must have an anti-alienation provision unless the holder is
qualified under 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1988 & Supp. 1 1989). 26 U.S.C. § 401(g) (1988). But church
plans are not required to contain the anti-alienation provision. Again there is a class of tax-sheltered
annuity plans under 26 U.S.C. § 403(b) (1988) that are not subject to the anti-alienation provision.
So their interests are not excluded from the bankrupt's estate as interests in a spendthrift trust. 11
U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988).
179. 26 C.F.R. § 1.408-4(a)(2) (1991) (alienation of an individual retirement account amounts
to a distribution subject to a penalty tax of 10%); 26 C.F.R. § 346.7, 346.8 (1982) (retirement bonds
are not transferable unless redeemable, but they are redeemable early for a 10% penalty tax).
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interests. Failure to exclude qualified pension trusts with anti-alien-
ation provisions only creates an anomaly between different types of
retirement programs with respect to their availability for distribution
to creditors. Federal benefits would not be subject to a support
limitation but private benefits would.
Under the state scheme, voluntary or involuntary, the debtor-
participant may exclude "property that is exempt under federal law,
other than" bankruptcy law. 80 The committee reports contain a non-
exclusive list of items this exemption covers, omitting ERISA.1 81 So
courts have concluded the state scheme's federal exemption does not
include ERISA.'8 2 The listed items are generally employee benefits
provided (1) from federal funds under federal law, or (2) in in-
dustries protected by the federal government.1 83 These employee ben-
efits are also subject to a federal statutory anti-alienation provision
and not a federal requirement for an anti-alienation provision in the
plan as with ERISA. 184
180. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1988).
181. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 51, at 75, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5861; H.R. REP. No. 595,
supra note 157, at 360, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6316. But see Note, Exemption of ERISA Benefits
Under Section 522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, 83 MicH. L. Rnv. 214 (1984) (arguing that
exemption under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1988) includes ERISA qualified pension plans).
182. E.g., Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff) 706 F.2d 574, 585 (5th Cir. 1983).
The fact that ERISA is omitted from the list has led some to conclude "Federal [nonbankruptcy]
law" does not include ERISA, and hence ERISA cannot be "applicable nonbankrutpcy law" of the
exclusion. Newell, supra note 49, at 196. But the reason the legislative list omits ERISA is that interests
subject to its provisions are excluded by the trust exclusion or exempted by another exemption and
so do not need required listing.
183. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 51, at 75, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5861. The list specifies Foreign
Service Retirement and Disability payments; social security payments; injury or death compensation
payments for war risk hazards; wages of fishermen, seamen, and apprentices; civil service retirement
benefits; Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act death and disability benefits; Rail-
road Retirement Act annuities and pensions; railroad unemployment insurance (mislabeled "veterans
benefits"); veterans benefits (mislabeled "special pensions paid to winners of the Congressional Medal
of Honor"); and federal homestead lands.
184. The list specifies the following statutory anti-alienation provisions: (1) Foreign Service Re-
tirement and Disability payments, 22 U.S.C. § 1104 (1978) (not "assignable ... or subject to exe-
cution, levy, attachment, garnishment or other legal process .... ."), repealed by Pub. L. No. 96-
465, § 2205(1), 94 Stat. 2071, 2159 (1980) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 4042 (1988)); (2) social security
payments, 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1988) (not "transferrable or assignable ... [or] subject to execution,
levy, attachment or other legal process"); (3) injury or death compensation payments from war risk
hazards, 42 U.S.C. § 1717 (1990) (not "transferrable or assignable ... [nor] subject to execution,
levy, attachment or other legal process"); (4) wages of fishermen, seamen, and apprentices, 46 U.S.C.
§ 601 (1978) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 11109 (1988) ("not subject to attachment .... payment
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This list led one court to assert that the state scheme's federal
exemption for trusts with a transfer restriction means that the ex-
clusion provision does not exclude from the bankrupt's estate ben-
efits subject to a federally required anti-alienation provision, such
as ERISA's. 15 Otherwise, the exemption for federal statutory anti-
alienation provisions would be superfluous. This view, however,
overlooks the difference between benefits created under pension plans
set up by private companies subject to federal requirements and
benefits created and specified solely by federal statute. Private ben-
efits are contractual in nature,1 6 but public benefits are subject to
divestment by statutory amendment at any time.'87 Unlike benefits
of wages ... is valid, not withstanding any ... assignment;") (5) civil service retirement benefits,
5 U.S.C. §§ 729, 2265 (1978), repealed by Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 7, 80 Stat. 378, 631 (1966) (codified
at 5 U.S.C. § 8346 (1988)) ("not assignable... or subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment,
or other legal process .... "); (6) Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act death
and disability benefits, 33 U.S.C. § 916 (1988) ("no assignment ... [and] exempt from ... levy,
execution, and attachment"); (7) Railroad Retirement Act annuities and pensions, 45 U.S.C. § 228(L)
(1978), repealed by Pub. L. No. 93-445, § 14, 88 Stat. 1305, 1345 (1974) (codified at 45 U.S.C. §
231m (1988)) (not "assignable... [or] subject ... to garnishment, attachment or other legal process");
(8) railroad unemployment insurance (mislabeled "veterans benefits"), 45 U.S.C. § 352 (1988) (not
"assignable ... [or] subject to ... garnishment, attachment or other legal process"); (9) veterans
benefits (mislabeled "special pensions paid to winners of the Congressional Medal of Honor"), 38
U.S.C. § 5301 (1988) (not "assignable ... [or] liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by ... legal
... process"); and (10) federal homestead lands on debts contracted before issuance of the patent,
43 U.S.C. § 175 (1975) (not liable to satisfy debt), repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2987
(1976). H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 157, at 360, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6316.
Of these ten types of benefits, six involve a fund that might be a trust. See 22 U.S.C. § 4042
(1988) (Foreign Service Retirement Disability Fund); 42 U.S.C. § 401 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989) (Federal
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund); id. § 1701 (war risk hazards uses the Employees'
Compensation Fund); 5 U.S.C. § 8348 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989) (Civil Service Retirement and Disability
Fund); 45 U.S.C. § 231n (1988 & Supp. 1 1989) (Railroad Retirement Account); 45 U.S.C. § 360
(1988) (Railroad unemployment insurance account). Only these six types of benefits might be subject
to the Bankruptcy Code's spendthrift-trust exclusion. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988).
The other four types of benefits do not involve trusts. Seamen's current wages and homestead
land clearly do not. Longshoremen's benefits are secured by insurance, not trusts, 33 U.S.C. § 932
(1988), and veterans benefits are payable from the Treasury, not a trust. 38 U.S.C. § 3020 (1988).
185. Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 585 (5th Cir. 1983).
186. See George Lee Flint, ERISA: The Arbitrary and Capricious Rule Under Siege, 39 CATH.
U. L. Rav. 133, 160-62 (1989) (explaining that after World War I the two methods of handling private
pension rights were the contractual approach and the trust-law approach).
187. With respect to those benefits that have special funds that might be a trust for purposes
of the bankruptcy exclusion, see supra note 185, courts have refused to give effect to government-
fostered expectations that in the private sector form the basis of contractual rights or an estoppel
for (1) social security benefits (e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 646 (1975); Richardson
v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 80 (1971); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 609-10 (1960), (2) civil service
retirement benefits (e.g., Zucker v. United States, 758 F.2d 637, 638 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (no claim to
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from ERISA-qualified plans, these non-contractual, non-trusteed,
federally-specified benefits are not encompassed within the exclusion
provision for trusts with a transfer restriction and would, therefore,
require an exemption.
Under the state scheme, the debtor may also avail himself of the
many state statutes that exempt interests in pension plans.188 Those
states that did not already have such an exemption started passing
these exemptions for pension plans after the courts refused to rule
interests in pension plans excluded under the exclusion provision. 89
benefits that are subject to lawful change), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 842 (1985); American Postal Workers
Union v. U.S. Postal Serv., 707 F.2d 548, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (same), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100
(1984); Stouper v. Jones, 284 F.2d 240, 242 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (same)), and (3) railroad retirement
annuities and pensions. E.g., Freeman v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 192 F.2d 51, 52 (5th Cir. 1951)
(same), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 909 (1952). The courts should find similarly for foreign service retirement
and disability benefits, war risk hazard payments, and railroad disability insurance benefits.
Benefits from qualified pension plans, in contrast, cannot be divested once they have vested. 29
U.S.C. § 1053(c) (1988); 26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(10) (1988).
188. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.38.017(a)(1) (Supp. 1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1126(B)
(1990); ARK. CODE STAT. ANN. § 16-66-220 (Michie Supp. 1991); CALIF. Civ. PROC. CODE § 704.115
(Deering 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-54-104(1.1) (Supp. 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-352b(m)
(West Supp. 1991) (limited by support); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.21 (West 1989); GA. CODE ANN. §
18-4-22 (Michie 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 651-124 (Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE § 55-1011 (Supp. 1991);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 12-1006 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-28-1(a)(6) (Burns
Supp. 1991); IowA CODE ANN. § 627.6(8)(e) (West Supp. 1991) (limited by support); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-2313(a)(1) (Supp. 1990); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 427.150(2)(f) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp.
1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20:33 (West Supp. 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4422(13)(B)(E)
(Vest Supp. 1990) (limited by support); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-504(h) (1989);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37-24 (West Supp. 1991) (limited by support); Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-3-
l(l)(b)(iii) (Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.430(10)(e) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (limited by support);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-2-06 (1991) (reference to federal exemption with support limitation); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25-1563.01 (1989) (limited by support); N.Y. DEBr. & CRED. LAW § 282(iii)(2)(e) (McKinney
1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 2 8-22-03.1(3) (Supp. 1990) (limited by dollar amount); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2329.66(A)(4)(b) (Anderson 1991) (limited by support); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § I(A)(20)
(West 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 23.170(2) (1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8124(b)(1)(vii) (1991); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 9-26-4(12) (Supp. 1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-30(10) (Law. Co-op. 1989); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 26-2-104(b) (Supp. 1991); TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.0021 (Vest Supp. 1991); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-23-5(l)(j) (Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2740(19)(J) (Supp. 1991); VA.
CODE ANN. § 34-34 (Michie 1990) (limited by dollar amount); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 6.15.020(3)
(Vest Supp. 1991); W. 'VA. CODE § 38-10-4(j)(5) (1985) (limited by support); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
815.18(3)(j) (Vest Supp. 1991); Wyo. STAT. § 1-20-110 (Supp. 1991).
189. See In re Volpe, 100 B.R. 840, 848 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) (explaining the Texas ex-
emption, TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.0021 (West Supp. 1991), as the response to Goff v. Taylor
(In re Goff) 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983)), aff'd sub nom. NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank v. Volpe, 120
B.R. 843 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); Jonathan T. Baer, Note, ERISA Preemption of State Exemption
Laws: The Effects in Bankruptcy, 7 BANKR. DEV. J. 615, 617-18 (1990).
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The Bankruptcy Code authorizes these state exemptions. 9° The issue
for the courts regarding these exemptions is whether - since ERISA
preempts any state law relating to an employee plan - courts regard
these exemptions as federal law and hence valid, or state law and
hence invalid. Some courts have decided the latter and have struck
down these state exemptions as violative of ERISA's preemption
provision that forbids the application of state law to pension plans.'9'
The state-scheme exemption works to protect retirement benefits
as follows. As under the federal scheme, the exclusion provision
excludes interests in qualified pension trusts with anti-alienation pro-
visions. The state-scheme exemption for federal benefits exempts
those non-contractual, non-trusteed federal benefits such as social
security and veterans benefits, albeit in a more expansive list than
under the federal scheme. A court might also exempt the remaining
retirement benefits - those not subject to the anti-alienation pro-
vision - provided the state legislature has adopted such an ex-
emption. So both the federal and state schemes, although in differing
and incomplete fashion, attempt to protect all retirement benefits
from creditors.
But due to court decisions, plan administrators generally do not
obtain the result they expected from ERISA and the Bankruptcy
Code. The exemptions do not provide the required protection -
whether the federal one limited by a support requirement, or the
state one emasculated by either the legislative history on other fed-
eral nonbankruptcy exemptions or ERISA's preemption provision.
The reason for the exemption failure is obvious. Congress did not
anticipate courts would have to apply them to interests in qualified
pension plans with an anti-alienation provision since the exclusion
for trusts with a transfer restriction should have protected these
interests.1 92
190. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988); H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 157, at 363, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6319 (debtor's choice to use federal scheme or state scheme); 124 CONG. REc. H1l,089 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6436, 6453 (statement of Rep. Don Edwards) (states may bar the
federal scheme); 124 CONG. REc. S17,406 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6505, 6521 (state-
ment of Sen. Dennis DeConcini) (same).
191. See infra note 304.
192. See The Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings on S.235 and S.236, Before the Subcomm. on
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C. Purpose of a Fresh Start
When interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, the Supreme Court gen-
erally follows the plain-meaning rule confirmed by an examination
of the Bankruptcy Code's object and policy. 93 So the policy behind
the Bankruptcy Code has significance for interpretation.
The Bankruptcy Code serves two main purposes: equality of dis-
tribution among creditors and a fresh start for debtors. 194 With re-
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
664, 679 (1975) [hereinafter Hearings]. Congressional hearings on an earlier bill recorded the following
response by John J. Creedon, American Life Insurance Association, to a written question:
Question 2. Why do you believe that it is more equitable to include in the proposed ex-
emptions all pension plans qualifying under section 401, 403, 408 or 409...?
Answer. Retirement benefits can be provided in different ways .... Each of the tax qual-
ified retirement plans has been recognized by Congress as a means of encouraging retirement
planning .... If any exemption for retirement benefits is warranted it would seem that
benefits pursuant to any tax qualified plan should be recognized - although different plans
require different kinds of exemptions.
Id. So Congress did not expect one exemption scheme to cover all plans, but several exemptions (and
exclusion) to protect interests in all pension plans.
193. See infra note 337 and accompanying text.
194. H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 51, pt. I, at 75; see Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 648
(1971) (basic purpose of the bankruptcy laws is to give certain debtors a fresh start); S. REP. No.
989, supra note 51, at 6, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5792 ("The committee feels that the policy of the
bankruptcy law is to provide a fresh start .... ).
Creditors have often suggested that one purpose of the bankruptcy laws is to assist in debt
collection. See DAviD T. STANLEY & MsARiORm GnRTH, BANRupTcy: PROBLEMS, PROCESS AND REFORM
20-21 (1971) (describing one of the purposes as debt-collection and creditor-distribution); Wohl, supra
note 49, at 5 (to permit creditors to recoup as much owed them as possible); see also S. REP. No.
989, supra note 51, at 5, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5791 ("to include all of the property of the debtor
in the bankruptcy case .... As a result of these changes the amounts that will be returned to all
creditors can be greater.").
However, this is an erroneous view. The creditor rights laws of the various states serve this
purpose. Bankruptcy law, in contrast, uniquely provides discharge and only assists in debt collection
to the extent state law does not extend beyond its state borders. H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 51,
at 63-64; see Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966) (to convert the estate of the bankrupt to
cash and distribute it and give the bankrupt a fresh start); Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473
(1913) (same).
The erroneous view reflects nineteenth century bankruptcy law. There have been five federal
bankruptcy statutes, namely, (1) the Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 [hereinafter the 1800
Act], repealed by the Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248; (2) the Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9,
5 Stat. 440, [hereinafter the 1841 Act] repealed by the Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614; (3)
Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517; [hereinafter the 1867 Act], repealed by the Act of June
7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99; (4) the Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 [hereinafter the
Bankruptcy Act] repealed by the Bankruptcy Code, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. IV, § 401(a), 92 Stat.
2651, 2682 (1978); and (5) the Bankruptcy Code. Id. (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330
(1988)). Except during the brief time of the 1867 Act, prior to 1898, the bankruptcy laws favored
1991-92]
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
spect to liquidations under Chapter 7 and rehabilitations under
Chapter 13, the creditor-favoring purpose is of little import.95 An
individual debtor in bankruptcy has a choice to protect (1) all his
future income by exposing some of his assets - namely those not
exempt - to liquidation under Chapter 7, or (2) all his assets by
exposing some of his future income - namely his disposable income
for several years - to distribution, in accordance with a rehabili-
tation plan under Chapter 13.196 The debtor surrenders his claims
to either (1) certain non-exempt assets in a Chapter 7 liquidation,
or (2) disposable income for several years in a Chapter 13 reha-
bilitation in exchange for a discharge't of some of his existing
debts. 198 Discharge relieves the debtor from the burdens of existing
debt and places him in the marketplace again to earn, consume, and
borrow,'9 by freeing all or a portion of his future income potential
from his past financial obligations.20
the creditor. Compare Reed v. McIntyre, 98 U.S. 507, 512 (1878) (stating that the Court has "often
declared that the pro rata distribution of the property of the bankrupt was the main purpose of the
bankrupt statute [the 1867 Act].") with Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918):
[Tihe federal system of bankruptcy is designed not only to distribute the property of the
debtor, not by law exempted, fairly and equally among his creditors, but as a main purpose
of the [Bankruptcy Act], intends to aid the unfortunate debtor by giving him a fresh start
in life, free from debts, except of a certain character, after the property which he owned
at the time of bankruptcy has been administered for the benefit of creditors.
Id.
The main favoring device was the requirement of creditor approval for relief. Section 36 of the
1800 Act, 2 Stat. 31 (two-thirds); Section 4 of the 1841 Act, 5 Stat. 443 (majority). But see Section
29 of the 1867 Act, 14 Stat. 531-32 (without creditor consent, before it was amended). See generally
Richard E. Flint, Bankruptcy Policy: Toward a Moral Justification for Financial Rehabilitation of
the Consumer Debtor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 515 (1991).
195. See STANLEY & Gmi-, supra note 194, at 20-21 (showing historically from 1946 to 1969
over 70% of Chapter 7 cases involved no assets); TERESA A. SULLVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR
DEBORs 216, 339 (1989) (showing that two-thirds of the debtors in Chapter 13 could not make their
payments to creditors from disposable income).
196. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text. See also H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 157,
at 118, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6079 (explaining that the advantage of Chapter 13 to the debtor is his
ability to protect his assets).
197. 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1328 (1988). Discharge is denied for certain norms specified in the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Id. §§ 523(a), 727(a), 1328(a). Discharge under Chapter 13 is viewed as more generous,
since fewer debts are non-dischargeable under Chapter 13. Compare id. § 1328(a) with Id. § 727(b).
198. See Charles G. Hallinan, The "Fresh Start" Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical
Inventory and an Interpretative Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 51 (1986) (discharge "is, rather,
the principal (if not the sole) point of the exercise."); Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy
in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1393, 1393 (1985) ("The principal advantage bankruptcy offers
an individual lies in the benefits associated with discharge.").
199. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) ("[o]ne of the primary purposes of the
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In furtherance of this policy, the Bankruptcy Code contains sev-
eral provisions to foster the fresh start not contained in earlier bank-
ruptcy statutes. One set of provisions encourages the use of
rehabilitations under Chapter 13 to obtain the broader discharge for
the fresh start.20' The Bankruptcy Code made two major changes
to encourage consumer bankruptcies that would provide that broader
discharge: Congress (1) broadened the definition of the debtor who
could use Chapter 13 to include small businessmen and investors 2°2
and (2) broadened the discharge of existing debts to include all debts
except family support orders. 2 3 Another set of provisions insures
bankruptcy act is to 'relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit
him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfor-
tunes."' (quoting Williams v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915)); H.R. Doc.
No. 137, supra note 51, pt. I, at 71 ("to rehabilitate debtors for continued and more value-productive
participation, i.e., to provide a meaningful 'fresh start."').
200. 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(6), 704 (all future earnings freed in Chapter 7), 1322(c), 1325(b) (1988)
(a portion of future earnings freed in Chapter 13, with disposable income dedicated to plan payments
for three years).
201. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 51, at 13,140 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5799 ("The new Chapter
13 will permit almost any individual with regular income to propose and have approved a reasonable
plan for debt repayment . . . .") ("Increased access to the simpler, speedier, and less expensive debtor
relief provisions of Chapter 13 is accomplished by .... "); H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 157, at
4,117, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5966 ("The second major problem under current bankruptcy law is the
inadequacy of relief that the Bankruptcy Act provides for consumer debtors .... This bill makes
bankruptcy a more effective remedy for the unfortunate consumer debtor .... In the consumer area,
proposed Chapter 13 encourages more debtors to repay their debts over an extended period rather
than to opt for straight bankruptcy liquidation and discharge."), 6077-78 ("[consumer debtors] opt
for straight bankruptcy only because present Chapter XIII simply cannot meet their needs .... This
bill attempts to cure these inadequacies in the Bankruptcy Act and to prevent the frequent problems
confronting consumer debtors .... First, the bill simplifies, expands, and makes more flexible wage
earner plans . . ").
202. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1988) (individual with regular income and owing unsecured
debts of less than $100,000 and secured debts of less than $350,000) with 11 U.S.C. § 1006(8) (1976)
(wage earner whose principal income is derived from wages, salary, or commissions). See also H.R.
REP. No. 595, supra note 157, at 119, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6079-80 (explaining that the reason for
the change was to make Chapter 13 asset protection available to the small businessman (who is a
self-employed sole propietor, since the difference between him and the employee is slight) and to
small investors, even those on social security).
203. Compare II U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1982) (before the 1990 amendments adding education loans
and motor vehicle judgments as nondischargeable) with 11 U.S.C. §§ 35, 1060 (1976) (listing taxes,
certain torts, debts of breaching fiduciaries, certain wages, moneys to secure performance, family
support orders, willful and malicious injuries, and federally insured loans as nondischargeable). See
also S. REP. No. 989, supra note 51, at 142, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5928-29 (describing a less limited
discharge in the Senate bill); H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 157, at 430. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6386
(discharge of all debts except family support orders).
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the availability of a fresh start by increasing the exemptions. 204 Con-
gress provided two provisions to expand exemptions: (1) a federal
scheme of exemptions for the debtor as an alternative to the puny
exemption schemes in some states, 205 and (2) double exemptions for
married couples in a joint bankruptcy. 2°6 Congress, by passing the
Bankruptcy Code, intended to insure that the debtor preserved suf-
ficient assets and future income so he could proceed with his fresh
start without ending up as a ward of the state.
Subsequent attempts by creditors to have Congress alter the
Bankruptcy Code confirms that its policy was asset and income pro-
tection for the debtor's fresh start. The consumer credit industry in
the throws of the early 1980s recession placed the blame for in-
creased bankruptcies on the Bankruptcy Code which, according to
them, had liberalized exemptions, expanded the discharge provisions,
and diminished Chapter 13 entry-level requirements. 2W Their major
complaints were that (1) debtors with no non-exempt assets used
Chapter 7 to discharge debts that they could have paid under a
Chapter 13 rehabilitation plan, and (2) rehabilitation plans allowed
debtors to pay less than they were capable of to get discharged from
204. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 157, at 118, 126, U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6078 ("the debtor is
given adequate exemptions and other protections to ensure that bankruptcy will provide a fresh start ....
The premises of the bill with respect to consumer bankruptcy are that use of bankruptcy law should
be a last resort; that if it is used, debtors should attempt repayment under Chapter 13 ... ; and
finally ... bankruptcy relief should be effective, and should provide the debtor with a fresh start."),
6087 ("there is a Federal interest in seeing that a debtor that goes through bankruptcy comes out
with adequate possessions to begin his fresh start.").
205. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988); see H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 157, at 126, 360 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6087 ("Under current law, what property is exempt is determined under State law .... The his-
torical purpose of these exemption laws ... [was so] the debtor will not be left destitute and a public
charge. The purpose has not changed, but neither have the level of exemptions in many States. Thus,
the purpose has largely been defeated."), 6316 ("section [522], is a significant departure from present
law. It permits an individual debtor in a bankruptcy case a choice between exemptions systems.").
206. 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) (1982) (before the 1984 amendment to eliminate the double exemption
feature); In re Ancira, [1978-1981] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 67,580 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 1980)
(permitting double exemptions). Contra In re Skipworth, [1978-19811 Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 67,885
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 1981) (denying double exemptions); see also Baldwin v. Marshack (In re
Baldwin), 70 B.R. 612 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987) (denying aggregating of exemptions as thwarted by opt-
out statute); In re Riebow, 114 B.R. 656 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990) (same).
207. Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 452, 488-89 (1983) (hereinafter Bankruptcy Reform Hearing). See
generally Karen Gross, Preserving a Fresh Start for the Individual Debtor: The Case for Narrow
Construction of the Consumer Credit Amendments, 135 U. PA. L. Rav. 59 (1986).
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debts that were non-dischargeable in a Chapter 7 liquidation. °8 The
consumer credit industry proposed two major changes: (1) an "abil-
ity to pay" test2°9 for a Chapter 13 rehabilitation plan rather than
just "good faith, ' 210 and (2) a requirement for a Chapter 7 liqui-
dation filing that the debtor cannot repay his debts out of a rea-
sonable portion of future income. 211 Both of these proposals would
have insured greater recovery by creditors but fewer assets and less
income for the debtor's fresh start. Congress rejected both of these
efforts to undo the protection of the fresh start guaranteed by the
Bankruptcy Code.212 The fact that Congress rejected this major ef-
fort to thwart the fresh start suggests that courts should interpret
the Bankruptcy Code to preserve that fresh start, unless Congress
specifically acts to undo it.213
Achievement of a fresh start depends on insuring the ability of
the debtor-participant to produce income in the future.214 Individuals
in today's society produce income by two methods. First, income
is earned by rendering services for compensation during their pro-
ductive lives before they are required to quit working either by law21 5
or inability to render further services. 21 6 Second, income is earned
208. Bankruptcy Reform Hearing, supra note 207, at 487.
209. E.g., S. 863, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 128(b) (1981) (bona-fide-effort test); S. 658, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 128(b) (1980) (good-faith-effort test); S. REP. No. 150, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-
19 (1981) (ability to pay test).
210. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1988).
211. E.g., S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1983) (comments of Senators Kennedy and
Metzenbaum concerning "future income test" contained in an earlier version of S. 445, 98th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1983)).
212. Congress gave the consumer credit industry three minor changes: (1) access to Chapter 7
can be eliminated if the court determines such a filing would be a "substantial abuse," 11 U.S.C.
§ 707(b) (1988); (2) if a creditor objects to a Chapter 13 plan, a bankruptcy court should not confirm
the plan unless the debtor uses all his disposable income over the next three years to make payments
under the plan, id. at § 1325(b); and (3) an unsecured creditor may seek an increase in an individual
debtor's payments under a Chapter 13 plan, id. at § 1329(a). See Gross, supra note 207, at 65-66.
213. See Carey v. Donohue, 240 U.S. 430, 437 (1916) (court cannot supply construction clearly
rejected by Congress); Pennsylvania R.R. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184, 198-99
(1913) (same). See also supra note 153 and accompanying text.
214. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 157, at 126, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6087 (the purpose of
the exemptions is so "the debtor will not be left destitute and a public charge.").
215. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 631(c)(1)-(d) (1988) (age 65 for management executives; age 70 for tenured
faculty).
216. GEOROE E. REIDA, SOCIAL INSURANCE AND EcoNoMIC SECURITY 7 (2d ed. 1984) (old age);
see also American Honda Fin. Corp. v. Cilek (In re Cilek), 115 B.R. 974, 990 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.
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by a return of capital and income from retirement savings after
having reached that terminable working age. 217 Failure to exclude218
pension-plan interests from the debtor-participant's estate constitutes
a serious threat to achieving the desired result of a fresh start. The
amount of pension interest a debtor-participant has depends gen-
erally on the amount of time the debtor-participant has available to
collect them. 2 9 Younger debtors would have at least a chance of
redeveloping retirement savings since they have the most years re-
maining in their lives to garner savings. Older debtors not only would
not have much time left to garner savings,m but would also be the
most exposed, since they generally have larger pre-bankruptcy re-
tirement savings.
Therefore, the failure to exclude retirement benefits from the
debtor-participant's bankruptcy estate falls the hardest on those
debtors closest to the time when they will be unable to support
themselves. A fresh start means protecting these interests; Congress
recognized this. The Bankruptcy Code expanded the property in-
cluded in the bankrupt's estate and available for distribution to the
1990) (permitting an exemption for car dealership owner since he had only a few remaining working
years); In re Woodford, 73 B.R. 675, 681 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987) (permitting a partial exemption
because the lawyer-debtor had only a few remaining working years).
217. REDA, supra note 216, at 4; see Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 110
S. Ct. 680, 687 (1990) (purpose of ERISA's anti-alienation provision is to safeguard a stream of
income for pensioners); see also Turpin v. Wente (In re Turpin), 644 F.2d 472, 475 (5th Cir. 1981)
(under pre-Bankruptcy Code law, fresh start means protection for future wages and pension benefits
are a substitute for future wages).
218. Even if applicable, exemptions will not work for this purpose since under the federal scheme
and several state schemes, they would be limited by the amount needed for current support. See 11
U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-352b(m) (Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. §
627.6(8)(e) (West Supp. 1991); ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4422(13)(E) (West Supp. 1990); MinN.
STAT. ANN. § 550.37-24 (West 1988); Mo. Ray. STAT. § 513.430(10)(e) (Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 31-2-106 (1991) (reference to federal exemption with support limitation); NED. Rv. STAT. §
25-1563.01 (1989); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2329.66(A)(6) (Anderson 1991); W. VA. CODE § 38-10-
4G)(5) (1985). These limitations, for a current worker, could be nil.
219. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (requiring pension plans to have determinable benefits based
generally on years of service and compensation), -(ii) (1991) (requiring a definite predetermined formula
for allocating contributions and trust earnings annually for profit-sharing plans generally based on
compensation). When defined benefit pensions are excepted from the anti-alienation provision, the
debtor participant only receives a fraction of the benefit he otherwise would have received. See 29
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (1988) (providing for the split in the case of domestic relations orders).
220. See In re LaFata, 41 B.R. 842, 844 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984) (refusing to include owner-
doctor's plan interest in the estate due to his age of 62).
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creditors under a Chapter 7 liquidation or under a Chapter 13 re-
habilitation. 221 Nevertheless, the Bankruptcy Code retained the ex-
clusion from the bankrupt's estate available under the prior statute
for interests in certain trusts. Those trusts had restrictions on trans-
fers made by the beneficiary that courts enforced under applicable
nonbankruptcy law.m" Such interests include most pension-plan in-
terests. For those retirement interests not encompassed by this ex-
clusion, Congress created new exemptions. Those debtor-participants
selecting the federal exemptions may use the federal exemption for
(1) those interests from qualified pension plans and retirement ac-
counts not subject to ERISA's anti-alienation provision, albeit with
a support limitation,2 and (2) those non-contractual, non-trust in-
terests subject to a federal statutory anti-alienation provision.24 Those
debtor-participants voluntarily or involuntarily choosing the state
exemptions generally receive the same exemptions.
V. THE INCOMPATIBLE INTERPRETATION OF ERISA AN) THE
BANKRUPTCY -CODE PREVALENT IN THE COURTS
When interpreting the interrelationship between ERISA and the
Bankruptcy Code, the courts have shown a sympathetic concern for
those creditors confronted with debtors using ERISA's anti-alien-
ation provision to shield some of their pension interests in accor-
dance with Congressional intent. Rather than using the traditional
statutory interpretation methods, these courts have allowed this con-
cern to create a conflict between ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code
and have ruled that the Bankruptcy Code is superior. These courts
221. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 157, at 175-76, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6136 ("The bill
makes significant changes in what constitutes property of the estate .... These changes will bring
anything of value that the debtors have into the estate."); S. REP. No. 989, supra note 51, at 5,
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5791, ("Chapter 5 reflects the policy of the revision of the Bankruptcy Act
to include all of the property of the debtor in the bankruptcy case .... As a result of these changes
the amounts that will be returned to all creditors can be greater.").
222. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 157, at 176, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6136 ("The bill also
continues over the exclusion from property of the estate of the debtor's interest in a spendthrift
trust .... "); S. REP. No. 989, supra note 51, at 83, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5869 (the bill "preserves
restrictions on a transfer of a spendthrift trust" as an exclusion).
223. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1988).
224. Id. § 522(b)(2)(A).
225. See supra notes 180-91 and accompanying text.
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have focused on the two Bankruptcy Code provisions relating to
exclusions and exemptions.
A. The Exclusion Issue
The key issue in resolving whether ERISA's anti-alienation pro-
vision prevails in bankruptcy is whether d court excludes pension-
plan interests from the debtor-participant's estate. On this issue, the
circuit courts have taken three incompatible positions, two of which
are obviously incorrect. Those courts have ruled these interests (1)
included, 226 (2) potentially included, 227 or (3) excluded.228
1. Inclusion in the Estate
The earliest view adopts the position urged by the improvident
creditors: pension-plan trusts are not spendthrift trusts to which the
exclusion applies. This view prevails in the Second22 9 and Eighth
Circuits. 2 0 These courts base their position on four propositions.
First, ERISA's compatibility provision means that the Bankruptcy
Code is superior.8 1 So ERISA's provisions, including the anti-al-
ienation provision, are irrelevant to an interpretation of the pro-
visions of the Bankruptcy Code.232 This is the key point: it permits
the court to ignore any policy furthered by ERISA. This proposition,
however, overlooks the statutory interpretative principle that courts
interpret statutes harmoniously if possible. 233
Second, since the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code re-
fers only to spendthrift trusts, the exclusion applies only to tradi-
tional spendthrift trusts.2 4 Traditional spendthrift trusts protect the
226. See infra notes 229-46 and accompanying text.
227. See infra notes 247-82 and accompanying text.
228. See infra notes 283-90 and accompanying text.
229. Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81, 85-86 (2d Cir. 1982) (state employee retirement system opted
into ERISA and so was subject to ERISA's anti-alienation provision).
230. Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268, 1270-73 (8th Cir. 1984); see Humphrey
v. Buckley (In re Swanson), 873 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1989) (dicta as teacher retirement system not
subject to ERISA's anti-alienation provision).
231. Graham, 726 F.2d at 1273; Gouveia v. Pulley (In re Pulley), 111 B.R. 715, 732, 747, 752
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989); In re Bartlett, 67 B.R. 455, 456 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986).
232. See Graham, 726 F.2d at 1273 (no discussion of ERISA's policy or legislative history).
233. See supra notes 338-40 and accompanying text.
234. Graham, 726 F.2d at 1271-72; Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81, 85-86 (2d Cir. 1982)
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beneficiary from his own profligacy. Since pension trusts provide
deferred compensation, they are not spendthrift trusts and hence
not encompassed within the exclusion. 235 This proposition misreads
the legislative history and fails to properly define "spendthrift trust."
Congress created the exclusion for two types of trusts, namely,
spendthrift trusts and support trusts.2 6 Moreover, Congress, when
using the term, clearly understood it to include certain qualified
pension plans. 237
Third, the existence of the federal-scheme exemption for retire-
ment benefits 238 means that the exclusion provision does not exclude
any retirement benefits, including those from qualified pension
plans. 2 9 This proposition fails to note that not all qualified pension
plans are subject to ERISA's anti-alienation provision.3
Fourth, since legislative history indicates the Bankruptcy Code
enlarged the bankrupt's estate, courts must interpret the exclusion
narrowly not to encompass pension-plan benefits. 241 This proposition
235. E.g., Halverson v. Mico, Inc. (In re Loe), 83 B.R. 641, 645-46 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988)
(deferred compensation plans cannot be spendthrift trusts); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Health
and Wealth Pension Fund v. Stephenson (In re McLean), 41 B.R. 893, 897 (D.S.C. 1984) (ERISA
plan permits alienation in certain circumstances), rev'd sub noma. McLean v. Cent. States, S.E. &
S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 762 F.2d 1204 (4th Cir. 1985).
Both Regan, 691 F.2d at 85-86, and Graham, 726 F.2d at 1271-72, conclude that pension trusts
are not spendthrift trusts, despite the anti-alienation provision. Regan notes that the anti-alienation
provision has a divorce exception and so is not spendthrift in nature. Graham notes the inconclusive
legislative history for the exclusion, calling for determination by state law, not federal law.
236. See supra note 158.
237. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
238. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1988).
239. E.g., Humphrey v. Buckley (In re Swanson), 873 F.2d 1121, 1124 (8th Cir. 1989) (surplusage
otherwise); Samone v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268, 1272 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing pre-
Bankruptcy Code legislative history, a suspect practice since the goal then was to abolish the spend-
thrift-trust exclusion); Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1982) (surplusage otherwise); (In re
Nadler, 122 B.R. 162, 166 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) (surplusage otherwise); Nelson v. White (In re
White), 47 B.R. 410, 412 (W.D. Wash. 1985); In re Elsea, 47 B.R. 142, 147 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1985) (same); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Health and Welfare Pension Fund v. Stephenson
(In re McLean), 41 B.R. 893, 899-90 (D.S.C. 1984), rev'd sub noma. McLean v. Central States, S.E.
& S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 762 F.2d 1204 (4th Cir. 1985); In re Kelley, 31 B.R. 786, 788 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1983) (same).
240. See supra note 178; see also Chrysler-UAW Pension Plan v. Watkins (In re Watkins), 95
B.R. 483, 487 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (rejecting Graham, 726 F.2d 1268, since it's improper to conclude
some pension benefits cannot be excluded because some are subject to the exemption).
241. Regan, 691 F.2d at 85 (discussing Chapter 13's expansion); Graham, 726 F.2d at 1270.
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overlooks Congressional intent to preserve the prior law's exclusion
for retirement benefits in a trust, subject to a transfer restriction
under federal law. 242
Several lower courts have followed this reasoning.243 The debtor-
participant's only hope for a fresh start in these circuits is an ex-
Chapter 13 permits pensioners to have rehabilitation plans. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 157,
at 312, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6269 (individuals "on welfare, social security, fixed pension incomes,
or who live on investment incomes, will be able to work out repayment plans with their creditors
rather than being forced into straight bankruptcy."). However, permitting an individual to obtain
the broader discharge from existing debts than permitted under Chapter 7 liquidation, see supra note
197, does not mean that all his pension income is disposable income for distribution to the creditors
under the rehabilitation plan. See Regan, 691 F.2d at 85 (suggesting so). Some will be exempted,
e.g., social security, depending on the exemption scheme chosen. See supra notes 180-84 and accom-
panying text. Hence, other pension income, such as from a qualified plan, may be excluded because
of ERISA's anti-alienation provision.
The Bankruptcy Code intended to expand the limits of the bankrupt's estate. S. REP. No. 989,
supra note 51, at 82, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5868 ("The scope of [Section 541] is broad .... [I]t
includes as property of the estate all property of the debtor, even that needed for a fresh start.");
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 157, at 366-68, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6322-24; see United States v.
Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198, 205 (1983). See also supra note 98 (For one class of benefits now
included in the bankrupt's estate). However, this does not mean that there are no exclusions. Congress
intended to exclude interests in trusts with transfer restrictions. See supra notes 146-66 and accom-
panying text.
242. Id.
243. E.g., Nelson v. White (In re White), 47 B.R. 410, 413 (W.D. Wash. 1985) (highly-com-
pensated); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Health and Welfare Pension Fund v. Stephenson (In
re McLean), 41 B.R. 893, 902-03 (D.S.C. 1984), rev'd sub nom. McLean v. Central States, S.E. &
S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 762 F.2d 1204 (4th Cir. 1985) (lowly-compensated); In re Nadler, 122
B.R. 162, 166 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990); In re Bryant, 106 B.R. 727, 729 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989)
(same); In re Sheppard, 106 B.R. 724, 726 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (lowly-compensated); Halverson
v. Micro, Inc. (In re Loe), 83 B.R. 641, 645 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988) (lowly-compensated); B.K.
Medical Systems, Inc. Pension Plan v. Roberts (In re Roberts), 81 B.R. 354, 362 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1987) (highly-compensated); In re Bowen, 80 B.R. 1012, 1017 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1987) (lowly-compen-
sated); In re Bartlett, 67 B.R. 455, 456 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986) (same); In re Goldberg, 59 B.R.
201, 205 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986) (highly-compensated); In re Flygstad, 56 B.R. 884, 887 (Bankr.
N.D. Iowa 1986) (lowly-compensated); Samore v. Independent Pension Services, Inc. (In re McKenna),
58 B.R. 221, 223 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985) (lowly-compensated); Gray v. Ingles Markets, Inc. Em-
ployees' Stock Bonus Plan & Trust (In re DeWeese), 47 B.R. 251, 255 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985)
(same); Rodgers v. Norman (In re Crenshaw), 44 B.R. 30, 33 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1984) (same), rev'd,
51 B.R. 554 (N.D. Ala. 1985); In re Kelley, 31 B.R. 786, 788 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983) (same);
Threewitt v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. (In re Threewitt), 20 B.R. 434, 438 (Bankr. D. Kan.) (same), rev'd,
24 B.R. 927 (D. Kan. 1982); accord In re Kochell, 26 B.R. 86, 87 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982) (assumed),
affd, 31 B.R. 139 (W.D. Wis. 1983); Barr v. Hinshaw (In re Hinshaw), 23 B.R. 233, 234 (Bankr.
D. Kan. 1982) (same); In re Watson, 13 B.R. 391, 392 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) (on the basis of pre-
Bankruptcy Code law); In re Donaghy, 11 B.R. 677, 679 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (assumed); Joelson
v. Tiffin Savings Bank (In re Everhart), 11 B.R. 770, 772 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981) (same).
This rule includes within the debtor-participant's estate interests in pension plans regardless of
whether the employee is lowly-compensated.
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emption for pension-plan interests. 244 The position of the circuits
treats the Bankruptcy Act as impliedly amending ERISA to eliminate
ERISA's anti-alienation provision in bankruptcy without any basis
in any legislative history245 or any attempt to show a court cannot
achieve harmony between the two statutes. 246
2. Potential Inclusion in the Estate
The majority view of the courts is a compromise of sorts: the
courts will recognize ERISA's anti-alienation provision as excluding
the debtor-participant's pension-plan interests in certain circum-
stances. This is the prevalent view of the Fifth,247 Ninth,248 and
Eleventh249 Circuit Courts of Appeal. These courts interpret the ex-
clusion, on the basis of the inconclusive legislative history, as re-
ferring only to state spendthrift trust law.210 This view neglects the
pre-Bankruptcy Code decisions recognizing federal spendthrift law.2 1
244. See supra notes 167-92 and accompanying text.
245. See Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Health and Welfare and Pension Fund v. Stephenson
(In re McLean), 41 B.R. 893, 900-02 (D.S.C. 1984) (on the basis of pre-Bankruptcy Code legislative
history), rev'd sub nom. McLean v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 762 F.2d 1204
(4th Cir. 1985).
Congressional Hearings on an earlier bill recorded the following exchange between Senator Bur-
dick and John J. Creedon, Chairman of the Committee of the American Life Insurance Association:
Senator Burdick. What provision would you recommend to reconcile the provisions
of [ERISA and the proposed bankruptcy bill]?
Mr. Creedon. This I guess has to do with the fact that ERISA provides that a pension
benefit is not assignable and the Commission's bill would allow an exemption only with
respect to that portion of the pension plan that is necessary for the bankrupt's maintenance.
I guess something could be put in the Bankrutpcy Act to the effect that not with-
standing the provision in ERISA or otherwise, the trustee will be able to get the excess.
Hearings, supra note 192, at 678.
This legislative history is irrelevant, since the Committee's bill was to abolish the spendthrift-
trust exclusion, H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 51, at 17, 197, and since the recommended provision
concerning ERISA was never included.
246. See infra notes 338-40 and accompanying text.
247. Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 582-86 (5th Cir. 1983). See also Brooks v.
Interfirst Bank (In re Brooks), 844 F.2d 2589 260 (5th Cir. 1988); Reagan v. Austin Mun. Fed. Credit
Union (In re Reagan), 741 F.2d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1984); Johnson v. Fenslage (In re Johnson), 724
F.2d 1138, 1140-41 (5th Cir. 1984).
248. Daniel v. Sec. Pac. Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352, 1360 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); see also Watson v. Kincaid (In re Kincaid), 917 F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th
Cir. 1990).
249. Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488, 1490 (lth Cir. 1985).
250. Daniel, 771 F.2d at 1360; Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d at 1490; Goff, 706 F.2d at 581-82.
251. See supra note 98.
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These courts also use the first and third propositions of the decisions
including pension benefits to confirm their interpretation . 2
These courts then proceed to examine the pension plan in ac-
cordance with the choice-of-law rules of the state where the debtor-
participant filed the bankruptcy action.23 The choice-of-law rules
vary from state to state. The initial problem is to determine the
essence of the employee pension plan. Some states contend that the
trust document governs, so the situs of the trust determines which
state's law governs.0 4 Other states claim that the plan document
governs, so the law specified in the plan governs.2 55 Still other states
252. Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 584, 582-87, (5th Cir. 1983).
253. E.g., McLean v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 762 F.2d 1204, 1206
(4th Cir. 1985) (fund uses Illinois law, not South Carolina law); Donald H. Hartwig, Inc. v. Kellas
(In re Kellas), 113 B.R. 673, 677 (D. Or. 1990) (plan provides for Colorado law; Oregon choice-of-
law rule gives clause effect unless no substantial relationship to Colorado); Morter v. Farm Credit
Services, 110 B.R. 390, 393 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (plan provides for New York law); Stilson v. Gulf States
Paper Corp. (In re Pilkington), 89 B.R. 911, 918 (N.D. Ala. 1987) (using the relationship between
an Alabama employee and employer to use Alabama trust law, rather than New York trust law as
provided in the trust agreement); Rodgers v. Norman (In re Crenshaw), 51 B.R. 554, 556 (N.D. Ala.
1985) (plan and employer located in Illinois; plan provides for Illinois law); Tyler v. Putnam (In re
Putnam), 110 B.R. 783, 792-98 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990) (plan provides for New York law, trust for
Massachusetts law; Virginia choice-of-law rule uses contracts for plans, so use New York law); Walker
v. Guy F. Atkinson Co. of California (In re Sanders), 89 B.R. 266, 269 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1988)
(using a California trustee with California funds to use California trust law as called for in the trust
agreement, rather than Georgia law); Govaert v. Strehlow (In re Strehlow), 84 B.R. 241, 244 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1988) (plan provides for Illinois law); In re Hohl, 81 B.R. 450, 453 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 1987)
(plan provides for New York law); In re Rodriguez, 82 B.R. 74, 75-76 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1987)
(plan executives are in Pennsylvania, so use Pennsylvania law); Simon v. Braden (In re Braden), 69
B.R. 93, 94 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987) (plan documents provide for New York law). See also Watson
v. Kincaid (In re Kincaid), 96 B.R. 1014, 1017 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989) (refusing to choose between
plan in Oregon and plan document specification of Massachusetts law since both are the same), rev'd,
917 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1990); Currell v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 119 B.R. 170, 173 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa 1990) (stipulated Minnesota law); Howison v. W.W. Grainger, Inc. (In re Peterson), 88 B.R.
5, 7 (Bankr. D. Me. 1988) (conceded Illinois law); Bakst v. Guernsey (In re Guernsey), 54 B.R. 68,
69 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (stipulated Michigan law).
254. E.g., McLean v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 762 F.2d 1204, 1206
(4th Cir. 1985) (fund uses Illinois law); Walker v. Guy F. Atkinson Co. of California (In re Sanders),
89 B.R. 266, 269 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1988) (California trustee with California funds, so use California
trust law).
The Second Restatement provides that a trust document choice-of-law clause, if any, governs,
and in its absence the situs of the trust for administrative matters controls. REsTATEmENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 268 (1971).
255. E.g., Donald H. Hartwig, Inc. v. Kellas (In re Kellas), 113 B.R. 673, 677 (D. Or. 1990)
(plan provides for Colorado law); Govaert v. Strehlow (In re Strehlow), 84 B.R. 241, 244 (Bankr.
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use a significant contacts test and use the law of the situs of the
employment contract to govern. 256 Thus, it is a complex matter for
the plan administrator to determine which law to apply for an in-
terstate plan. 257
But Congress fashioned ERISA's preemption provision to avoid
these conflicting state rules.218 Congress directed the courts to es-
tablish a federal common law259 using the practice under the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA).260 Under LMRA, the courts
S.D. Fla. 1988) (plan provides for Illinois law); In re Hohl, 81 B.R. 450, 453 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1987)
(plan provides for New York law); Simon v. Braden (In re Braden), 69 B.R. 93, 94 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1987) (plan documents provide for New York law); see also In re Rodriguez, 82 B.R. 74, 76
(Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1987) (plan executed in Pennsylvania so use Pennsylvania law); Rodgers v. Norman
(In re Crenshaw), 51 B.R. 554, 556 (N.D. Ala. 1985) (plan and employer located in Illinois; plan
provides for Illinois law).
The Second Restatement provides that a choice-of-law clause in a contract, such as the plan,
governs, unless there is no substantial relation with the forum state or its law is contrary to the forum
state's policy. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CONFuCT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
256. E.g., Stilson v. Gulf States Paper Corp. (In re Pilkington), 89 B.R. 911, 918 (N.D. Ala.
1987) (using the relationship between an Alabama employee and employer to use Alabama trust law);
Rodgers v. Norman (In re Crenshaw), 51 B.R. 554, 556 (N.D. Ala. 1985) (plan and employer located
in Illinois).
The Second Restatement's main thrust is the significant contacts test, the employment relationship
contract being the most significant for the debtor-participant. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1977).
257. See, e.g., Watson v. Kincaid (In re Kincaid), 96 B.R. 1014, 1018 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989)
(refusing to choose between plan in Oregon and plan document specification of Massachusetts law),
rev'd, 917 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1990).
258. 120 CoG. REc. 29,933 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams) ("eliminating the threat of
conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans").
259. 120 CONG. REc. 29,942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits) ("[A] body of Federal substantive
law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private
welfare and pension plans."); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110-11 (1989)
(The courts are to develop a "federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated
plans."); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 55-57 (1987) (same); Franchise 'Tax Bd. v.
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26 (1983) (adopting Sen. Javits' statement).
260. Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1990)). See H.R. REP. No. 1280, supra note 68, at 327, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5107 ("All such actions ... are to be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States in
similar fashion to those brought under section 301 of the Labor-Management Labor Relations Act
of 1947."); 120 CoNG. REc. 29,933 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams) (same). The Supreme Court
used this legislative history in applying the preemption removal rules of LMRA practice to ERISA
cases. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-67 (1987) (benefits-due lawsuits). This
legislative history applies only to actions brought under ERISA, but a turnover demand is surely a
derivative action for a claim for benefits under ERISA, even though brought under the Bankruptcy
Code.
1991-92]
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
create a uniform federal common law26 1 in which state law is merely
a source of potentially compatible rules.262 Under this principle, the
courts have determined that the applicable contract construction rules
for collective bargaining agreements are the federal rules, not the
state rules,263 even if the contract specifies a particular state's law.2"
The end result is only one choice of law for a pension plan, namely
federal law.
Having failed to resolve the choice-of-law issue properly, these
bankruptcy courts next determine whether the selected state's law
would recognize the employee trust as a spendthrift trust. Again the
various states vary widely concerning the extent to which they rec-
ognize spendthrift trusts.26 . In some states the matter is unsettled.266
Even if the state does enforce spendthrift trusts, the main problem
for the plan administratorwould then be whether a qualified pension
trust would satisfy that state's rules. The real issue is whether to
follow the approach that merely inquires whether the anti-alienation
provision is enforceable.2 67 The alternative "traditional" spendthrift
261. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
262. Id.; John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 548 (1964).
263. E.g., Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 199-201 (1962); Local 174, Teamsters
v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1962) ("The possibility that individual contract terms might
have different meanings under state and federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon
both the negotiation and administration of collective bargaining agreements .... The importance of
the area which would be affected by separate systems of substantive law makes the need for a single
body of federal law particularly compelling."); Clark v. Kraftco Corp., 510 F.2d 500, 506 (2d Cir.
1975); Teamsters, Local Union No. 688 v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 488 F.2d 738, 740 (8th Cir.
1973); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 950 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964).
264. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 174 A.2d 298,
303 (Conn. 1961).
265. 4 GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusTEES § 222 (2d ed. rev. 1979).
Three states deny them (New Hampshire, Ohio, and Rhode Island), four states have no case law or
statutes concerning them (Alaska, Idaho, New Mexico, and Wyoming), some have comprehensive
statutes (Delaware, Lousiana, Nevada, and Oklahoma), some make a principal-income distinction
(e.g., New York and California), and many recognize support and tax exceptions by statute or case
law. Id.
266. See, e.g., Stilson v. Gulf States Paper Corp. (In re Pilkington), 89 B.R. 911, 920 (N.D.
Ala. 1987) (Alabama law unsettled with respect to retirement plans with anti-alienation provisions,
so include); Rodgers v. Norman (In re Crenshaw), 51 B.R. 554, 556-57 (N.D. Ala. 1985) (Illinois
law unsettled, so guess); In re Wiggins, 60 B.R. 89, 93 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) (Ohio law unsettled,
so include); see also In re Craddock, 62 B.R. 583, 585 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986) (Georgia law only
if incompetent), rev'd, Craddock v. Anderson, No. C86-1815 A (N.D. Ga. Dec. 31, 1986).




approach demands that the ERISA pension plan must have the char-
acteristics of a spendthrift trust for a profligate. 6s
This introduces another element quite at variance with the na-
tional uniformity ERISA was to foster. Generally, under the en-
forceable approach, if the debtor-participant is a lowly-compensated
employee of a large corporation, the court excludes the plan interests
from the debtor-participant's estate. 269 In contrast, the traditional
approach concerns itself with the self-settled trust, which is dis-
qualified as a spendthrift trust210 if the settlor is the beneficiary271
268. Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 582 (5th Cir. 1983).
269. See, e.g., McLean, 762 F.2d at 1206 (union plan); Donald H. Hartwig, Inc. v. Kellas (In
re Kellas), 113 B.R. 673, 677 (D. Or. 1990) (US West plan); Morter v. Farm Credit Serv., 110 B.R.
390, 393 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (TIAA-CREF plan); Chrysler-UAW Plan v. Watkins (In re Watkins), 95
B.R. 483, 490 (W.D: Mich. 1988) (Chrysler plan spendthrift trust in Chapter 13); Cornell v. Taylor
(In re Taylor), 119 B.R. 170, 178 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1990) (Northwest Airlines plan); In re Bartlett,
116 B.R. 1015, 1020 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1990) (grocery store plan); Tyler v. Putnam (In re Putnam),
110 B.R. 783, 791 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990) (Xerox plan); In re Hysick, 90 B.R. 770, 777 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1988) (small employer adopting bank master plan); In re Zabelski, 81 B.R. 89, 90 (Bankr.
N.D. Fla. 1988) (Centel plan); In re Hohl, 81 B.R. 450, 453 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987) (Eastern Airlines
plan); In re Vogel, 78 B.R. 192, 194 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987) (G.D. Searle plan); In re Richardson,
75 B.R. 601, 605 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987) (Catepillar plan); Simon v. Braden (In re Braden), 69 Bankr.
93, 94 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987) (TIAA-CREF plan); Tamboy Trustee, Inc. v. Florida Progress Corp.
(In re Lawson), 67 B.R. 94, 97 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986) (FP & L plan); Blackwell v. Wallace (In
re Wallace),,66 B.R. 834, 841 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1986) (utility company plan); In re West, 64 B.R.
738, 743-44 (Bankr. D. Or. 1986) (Intel plan), affd, 81 B.R. 22 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987); In re Matteson,
58 B.R. 909, 911 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986) (insurance company plan); In re Elsea, 47 B.R. 142, 147
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985) (insurance company plan); Bezanson v. Maine Nat'l Bank (In re Kwaak),
42 B.R. 599, 601-02 (Bankr. D. Me. 1984) (bank plan).
270. See 4 BOERT & BooERT, supra note 265 § 223.
271. E.g., Daniel v. Sec. Pac. Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352, 1360 (9th Cir. 1985)
(doctor corporate plan under California law), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Lichstrahl v. Bankers
Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488, 1490 (l1th Cir. 1985) (same under Florida law); Goff v.
Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 587 (5th Cir. 1983) (doctor Keogh plan under Texas law); NCNB
Texas Nat'l Bank v. Volpe (In re Volpe), 120 B.R. 843, 846 (W.D. Tex. 1990) (doctor Keogh plan
under Texas law); Siegel v. Swaine (In re Siegel), 105 B.R. 556, 560 (D. Ariz. 1989) (doctor corporate
plan under Arizona law); Wear v. O'Brien (In re O'Brien), 94 B.R. 583, 588 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (doctor
plan under Missouri law); In re Felts, 114 B.R. 131, 133 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (lawyer corporate
plan under Texas law); Heitkamp v. Dyke (In re Dyke), 99 B.R. 343, 344-46 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989)
(doctor corporate plan under Texas law), rev'd, 119 B.R. 536 (S.D. Tex. 1990), aff'd, 943 F.2d 1435
(5th Cir. 1991); B.K. Medical Systems, Inc., Pension Plan v. Roberts (In re Roberts), 81 B.R. 354,
374 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987) (doctor corporate plan); In re Kerr, 65 B.R. 739, 745 (Bankr. D. Utah
1986) (dentist partnership plan under Utah law); Parkinson v. Bradford Trust Co. (In re O'Brien),
50 B.R. 67, 74 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) (Keogh plan under Virginia law); In re Ridenour, 45 B.R.
72, 78-79 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984) (owner-employee plan under Tennessee law).
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or exercises control over the trust assets.272 This means that the self-
employed never have their interests excluded. 273 The traditional ap-
proach, however, often defeats the expectations of even the lowly-
compensated employees for minor infractions permitted by the plan
under ERISA, such as augmenting retirement savings through em-
ployee contributions274 or having the option to make withdrawals
272. E.g., Shuman v. McDonald (In re Shuman), 78 B.R. 254, 256 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987) (sole
shareholder-employee plan under Nevada law); Kaplan v. Primerit Bank (In re Kaplan), 97 B.R. 572,
576 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989) (radiology corporation plan under Arizona law); Creasy v. Coleman Fur-
niture Corp., 83 B.R. 404, 410 (W.D. Va. 1988) (owner-employee plan under Virginia law); In re
Ullman, 116 B.R. 228, 230 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990) (doctor corporate plan under Montana law);
Berman v. Mead (In re Mead), 110 B.R. 434, 437 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990) (owner-employee plan
under Missouri law); In re Veils, 109 B.R. 64, 70 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989) (Keogh plan under New
Jersey law); In re Walker, 108 B.R. 769, 773 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1989) (oilfield services Keogh plan
under Oklahoma law); In re Alagna, 107 B.R. 301, 307 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989) (owner-employee
plan under Colorado law); Foglen v. Flindall (In re Flindall), 105 B.R. 32, 39 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1989)
(doctor-owner plan under Arizona law); In re Toner, 105 B.R. 978, 980 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989)
(owner-employee plan under Colorado law); In re Gifford, 93 B.R. 636, 639-40 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.
1988) (doctor corporate plan under Indiana law); Govaert v. Strehlow (In re Strehlow), 84 B.R. 241,
244 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988) (owner-employee plan under Illinois law); Hunter v. Ohio Citizens Bank
(In re Hotchkiss), 75 B.R. 115, 117-18 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (doctor-owner plan under Ohio law);
In re Slezak, 63 B.R. 625, 628 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986) (doctor plan under Kentucky law); In re
Gillett, 46 B.R. 642, 644 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (owner-employee plumber plan under Florida law);
see also, Boron v. Moorman Mfg. Co. (In re Coldsen), 105 B.R. 500, 501 (N.D. Iowa 1988) (lowly
compensated employee has no control under Iowa law); Chrysler-UAW Pension Plan v. Watkins (In
re Watkins), 95 B.R. 483, 490 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (same under Michigan law); In re Bartlett, 116
B.R. 1015, 1020 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1990) (same under Iowa law); Thimmig v. Elmore (In re Elmore),
108 Bankr. 612, 614 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989) (same under Ohio law); In re Hysick,'90 B.R. 772,
777 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (same under Pennsylvania law); In re West, 64 B.R. 738, 743-44 (Bankr.
D. Or. 1986) (same under Oregon law); Bakst v. Guernsey (In re Guernsey), 54 B.R. 68, 69 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1985) (same under Michigan law).
273. See In re LaFata, 41 B.R. 842, 843-44 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984) (refusing to use the
spendthrift rule in a doctor case because it places a physician in worse shape than an assembly worker,
solely because the physician lacks an independent trustee).
The self-employed's retirement plan, a Keogh plan, is established pursuant to the Keogh-Smathers
Act, Pub. L. No. 87- 792, 76 Stat. 809 (1962) (codified in scattered sections of the Internal Revenue
Code, 26 U.S.C.), and is usually controlled and administered by the self-employed individual.
274. E.g., Reagan v. Austin Mun. Fed. Credit Union (In re Reagan), 741 F.2d 95, 97 (5th Cir.
1984) (nurse self-settior due to own contributions under Texas law); Watson v. Kincaid (In re Kincaid),
96 B.R. 1014, 1017 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989) (lowly-compensated employee in salary-reduction plan under
both Oregon and Massachusetts law), rev'd, 917 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1990); Verwer v. Fullmer (In
re Martin), 115 B.R. 311, 316 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990) (lowly-compensated employee in salary-reduction
plan under Utah law); Schechter v. Balay (In re Balay), 113 B.R. 429, 436 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 1990)
(lowly-compensated employee is self-settlor due to employee contributions under Illinois law); In re
Tisdale, 112 B.R. 61, 64-65 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990) (lowly-compensated employee in salary-reduction
plan under Connecticut law); In re Conroy, 110 B.R. 492, 498-99 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990) (lowly-
compensated self-settlor due to employee contributions under Montana law); In re Weeks, 106 B.R.
257, 261 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1989) (lowly-compensated employee self-settlor due to own contributions
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for hardship, 275 loans, 276 or upon termination of service. 277 To avoid
to thrift plan under Oklahoma law); Federman v. Gallagher (In re Gallagher), 101 B.R. 594, 600
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989) (clerk in airline plan is self-settlor due to matching contributions under
Missouri law); Walken v. Guy F. Atkinson Co. (In re Sanders), 89 B.R. 266, 269 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
1988) (lowly-compensated employee in plan is self-settlor due to employee contributions under Cal-
ifornia law); Miner v. Boon (In re Boon), 90 B.R. 988, 992 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987) (clerk in bank
plan is self-settlor since the money is "deferred income" under Missouri law), rev'd, 108 B.R. 697,
706 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Iarmacone v. Trustees of Pillsbury Co. (In re Hansen), 84 B.R. 598, 601
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1987) (self-settled as making employee contributions under Minnesota law). But
see Miller v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank (In re Cook), 43 B.R. 996, 1000-01 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (employee
contributions do not make a self-settled trust under Indiana law); Miller v. Jones (In re Jones), 43
B.R. 1002, 1006-07 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (same).
Pension plans may include provisions permitting voluntary employee contributions, see Rev. Rul.
80-350, 1980-2 C.B. 133 (up to 10% of compensation), salary reduction contributions, see 26 U.S.C.
§ 401(k) (1988), and requiring involuntary employee contributions. See Rev. Rul. 80-307, 1980-2 C.B.
136 (up to 6% of compensation).
The distinction made by the bankruptcy courts between employee contributions and employer
contributions to a plan is a meaningless distinction. Employee contributions are treated for tax pur-
poses similar to employer contributions. Employee contributions are generally tax deductible. See 26
U.S.C. § 219 (providing a deduction for very small limits), § 401(k) (providing a deduction for salary
reduction contributions) (1988). The maximum limits to annual plan contributions include employee
contributions. See infra notes 310-14 and accompanying text. Employee contributions are really a
mechanism for an employee to contribute himself to the plan when the employer is laggard in con-
tributing employer contributions. The bankruptcy court's different treatment of employee contributions
only serves to condemn those trying to avoid becoming wards of the state in their old age and to
reward profligates seeking current consumption who make no employee contributions.
275. E.g., Miller v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank (In re Cook), 43 Bankr. 996, 1000-01 (N.D. Ind. 1984)
(hardship moneys under Indiana law); Miller v. Jones (In re Jones), 43 B.R. 1002, 1006-07 (N.D.
Ind. 1984) (same); Tabor v. Employee Benefits Comm. (In re Cress), 121 B.R. 1006, 1011 (Bankr.
S.D. Ind. 1990) (hardship moneys under Indiana law); In re Williams, 118 B.R. 812, 814 (Bankr.
N.D. Fla. 1990) (hardship moneys under Florida law); Gouveia v. Pulley (In re Pulley), 11 B.R.
715, 738 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989) (hardship moneys under Indiana law); White v. Babo (In re Babo),
81 B.R. 389, 391 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988) (funds for house under Pennsylvania law); lannacone v.
Trustees of Pillsbury Co. (In re Hansen), 84 B.R. 598, 601 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987) (alienation for
qualified domestic relations order and ability to get hardship funds under Minnesota law); see also
In re Berndt, 34 B.R. 515, 519 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (Sears plan: can withdraw contributions under Indiana
law); In re Goshe, 85 B.R. 157, 159 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988) (can obtain early withdrawal on request
under Florida law); In re Rodriguez, 82 B.R. 74, 76 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1987) (can withdraw moneys
under Pennsylvania law); In re Pettit, 61 B.R. 341, 345-46 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1986) (withdraw two
year-old contributions per plan provision under Washington law); Firestone v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. (In re DiPiazza), 29 B.R. 916, 921 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983) (NL Industries plan: can withdraw
contributions under Illinois law).
Plans may provide for withdrawal of funds in certain circumstances. See, e.g., supra notes 141-
42 and accompanying text.
276. See Brooks v. Interfirst Bank (In re Brooks), 844 F.2d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 1988) (1 of 23
doctors in plan to get loan funds, hardship funds and lump sum by quitting under Texas law); In
re Martin, 119 B.R. 297, 299 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (to borrow money under Florida law); Howison
v. W.W. Grainger, Inc. (In re Peterson), 88 B.R. 5, 7 (Bankr. D. Me. 1988) (to borrow money under
Maine law); Nixon v. P.J. Pedone & Co. (In re Nichols), 42 B.R. 772, 776 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984)
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these disasters, the plan would have to exclude many of the pro-
visions Congress intended to foster the growth of pension plans. 278
The application of state law to the plan trust shocks plan ad-
ministrators. The plan sponsor wrote the trust with ERISA in mind,
which specifically preempted that same state law to the extent it
relates to an employee pension plan. 27 9 So plan sponsors gave no
thought to whether the trust would satisfy the spendthrift laws of
a particular state. 280 Moreover, the inconsistent results for different
states destroys the uniform federal common law of trusts that Con-
gress intended ERISA to develop ' and makes it difficult for a plan
sponsor of an interstate plan to design a plan to avoid these dis-
asters. The result also conflicts with the legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Code to preserve the spendthrift-trust exclusion: deci-
sions under the pre-Bankruptcy Code law recognized the spendthrift-
trust exclusion for retirement plans created under the authority of
(to borrow money under Florida law).
Plans may provide for borrowing of funds with certain limits. See, supra notes 143-45 and
accompanying text.
277. See Christison v. Slane (In re Silldorff), 96 B.R. 859, 862 (C.D. Inl. 1989) (to quit and get
lump sum under Illinois law); In re Morrow, 122 B.R. 151, 153 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (to quit
and get moneys under Florida law); In re Spears, 121 B.R. 896, 900 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (same);
In re Nuttleman, 117 B.R. 975, 979 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990) (to quit and receive lump sum under
Nebraska law); In re Hartman, 115 B.R. 171, 173 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1990) (to quit and receive
lump sum under Arkansas law); Forbes v. Lucas (In re Lucas), 100 B.R. 969, 970 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1989) (can get moneys if you quit under Tennessee law), rev'd, 924 F.2d 507 (6th Cir. 1991);
In re Leimbach, 99 B.R. 796, 799 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989) (quit and get moneys under Ohio law);
In re Sundeen, 62 B.R. 619, 620 (Bankr. C.D. IMl. 1986) (quit and get moneys under Illinois law);
see also Johnson v. Fenslage (In re Johnson), 724 F.2d 1138, 1140-41 (5th Cir. 1984) (revokable trust
funded by own earnings under Texas law); In re Gribben, 84 B.R. 494, 496 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (owner-
employee; ability to get funds under Ohio law).
Plans may provide for a distribution upon termination of service, even if before the retirement
age. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(a) (1990).
278. See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
280. Many of the provisions that destroy the spendthrift nature of pension plans under state
laws are the very provisions permitted under ERISA. See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 109-25 and accompanying text. See also In re Majul, 119 B.R. 118, 121
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (ERISA preempts state spendthrift law to the extent it applies to pension
plans); Nelson v. White (In re White), 47 B.R. 410, 413 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1985) (same); Shults
v. Rose's Stores, Inc. (In re Holt), 32 B.R. 767, 770 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983) (same); S. RP. No.
575, supra note 31, at 18, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2564 ("A plan that does not include these required
spendthrift provisions is not qualified under the Code, and State law permitting such an assignment
or alienation is generally preempted by ERISA.").
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federal statutes without reference to state law. 2 2 This position im-
pliedly amends ERISA twice to eliminate partially ERISA's anti-
alienation provision and to eliminate ERISA's preemption provision
in a bankruptcy proceeding.
3. Exclusion from the Estate
The correct view takes the position of the plan administrator:
ERISA itself is the applicable nonbankruptcy law referred to in the
Bankruptcy Code exclusion, and it does contain a restriction on
transfer. This is the recently prevailing view in the FourthU3 and
Sixth2 Circuits. This interpretation is based on three propositions.
First, legislative history is irrelevant unless the statute is ambiguous,
and there is no ambiguity in the Bankruptcy Code's exclusion for
trusts with transfer restrictions. 285 Therefore, the alleged analysis of
the other circuits is wasted effort.
Second, a court must interpret the same language in a statute
in the same fashion throughout the statute, and "applicable non-
bankruptcy law" elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code means federal
and state law.U 6 The "applicable nonbankruptcy law," then, cannot
be limited to only "state spendthrift law."
Third, the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code exclusion
is inconclusive; it means merely that state spendthrift law is one of
the applicable nonbankruptcy laws, but not the only one.2 7 So ER-
ISA's anti-alienation provision is one of the "applicable nonbank-
282. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
283. Anderson v. Raine (In re Moore), 907 F.2d 1476, 1477-79 (4th Cir. 1990) (likely overruling
McLean v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 762 F.2d 1204 (4th Cir. 1985)). The
Fourth Circuit claims that it has consistently applied a broad interpretation of what constitutes "ap-
plicable nonbankruptcy law." Id. at 1478.
284. Forbes v. Lucas (In re Lucas), 924 F.2d 597, 600-02 (6th Cir. 1991).
285. Lucas, 924 F.2d at 600; Moore, 907 F.2d at 1479; In re Majul, 119 B.R. 118, 122-23
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); see Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 808 n.3 (1989);
Burlington N. R.R. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987); Rubin v. United States,
449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981).
286. Lucas, 924 F.2d at 601; Moore, 907 F.2d at 1478.
287. Lucas, 924 F.2d at 602; Moore, 907 F.2d at 1479.
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ruptcy laws." 8 Several lower courts have followed this position.219
This decision treats ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code as compatible
statutes; 290 preserving benefits from retirement trusts with transfer
restrictions (as required by both ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code)
under a uniform federal common law (as required by ERISA) to
preserve a fresh start (as required by the Bankruptcy Code).
B. The Exemption Issue
The exemptions apply to qualified pension plans With anti-al-
ienation provisions only in those jurisdictions failing to recognize
the exclusion for (1) employee plans (primarily the Second and Eighth
Circuits), and (2) the self-settled, controlled plans (primarily the Fifth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits). The exemptions - an issue the courts
never should have reached - frequently fail to preserve the debtor-
participant's retirement benefits and hence his fresh start.
The exemption for pension-plan benefits under the federal scheme
applies only to the extent needed for support. 291 Consequently, this
exemption is of interest only for Chapter 7 liquidations. 292 Courts
frequently deem benefits not in pay-status unnecessary for support,
because they are not available for support presently. 293 However,
288. Lucas, 924 F.2d at 602-03; Moore, 907 F.2d at 1479-81.
289. E.g., Clotfelter v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. (In re Threewitt), 24 B.R. 927, 929 (D. Kan. 1982);
In re Majul, 119 B.R. 118, 122 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); In re Ralstin, 61 B.R. 502, 503.04 (Bankr.
D. Kan. 1986); Liscinski v. Mosley (In re Mosley), 42 B.R. 181, 191 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1984); In re
LaFata, 41 B.R. 842, 843 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984); Warren v. G.M. Scott & Sons (In re Warren),
34 B.R. 543, 544 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983); In re Pruitt, 30 B.R. 330, 331 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983);
In re Rogers, 24 B.R. 181, 182-83 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1982); cf. In re Leamon, 121 B.R. 974, 979
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1990) (for government plan subject to 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) but not ERISA).
290. See infra notes 338-40 and accompanying text.
291. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1988).
292. Chapter 13 rehabilitations exclude amounts needed for support from the definition of dis-
posable income that goes to creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A) (1988).
293. Some courts conclude that, since the exemption literally only applies to "payments" from
pension plans, it cannot include rights not yet in pay status. E.g., Clark v. O'Neill (In re Clark),
711 F.2d 21, 23 (3d Cir. 1983) (43-year-old family therapist); In re Tisdale, 112 B.R. 61, 66 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 1990) (41-year-old sales manager); In re Velis, 109 B.R. 64, 68 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989) (63-
year-old doctor); Parkinson v. Bradford Trust Co. (In re O'Brien), 50 B.R. 67, 77 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1985) (young doctor); In re Clark, 18 B.R. 824, 829 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (37-year-old doctor).
Other courts, concerned about the ability of the debtor-participant to reestablish his pension benefits,
consider the future ability of the debtor-participant to support himself. These courts deny the ex-
emption for healthy workers and the young. E.g., In re Kochell, 732 F.2d 564, 565-66 (7th Cir. 1984);
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courts also deem benefits in pay-status unnecessary for support un-
less the debtor-participant is destitute.294
The federal nonbankruptcy exemption for the few remaining non-
opt-out states under the state-exemption scheme 295 also frequently
fails. Since the legislative history list excludes ERISA296 and primarily
mentions payments that are federal in nature, 297 many courts deem
this exemption inapplicable to pension plans.298 Other courts - since
cf. In re Montavon, 52 B.R. 99, 102 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (same rule for IRA). These same courts
grant the exemption for the ill and the old. E.g., In re Bari, 43 B.R. 253, 256 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1984) (50-year-old heart-attack victim on disability leave); In re Grant, 40 B.R. 612, 614 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1984) (one-wage-earner family with spouse in school); In re Johnson, 36 B.R. 54, 56 (Bankr.
D.N.M. 1984) (47-year-old unemployed engineer); In re Miller, 33 B.R. 549, 553 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1983) (54-year-old insurance company employee); cf. American Honda Fin. Corp. v. Cilek (In re
Cilek), 115 B.R. 974, 984 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1990) (IRA using same rule for 54-year-old).
294. The factors to determine the amounts needed for support are age, health, future earnings
capacity, and necessary expenditures. See Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 580 n.15 (5th
Cir. 1983); In re Kochell, 26 B.R. 86 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982), aff'd, 31 B.R. 139 (W.D. Wis. 1983),
aff'd, 732 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1984). In practice only the destitute are permitted to reserve some benefits
for support. E.g., In re Fill, 84 B.R. 332, 339 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (64-year-old doctor, a victim
of heart attack and stroke, got support from Keogh and IRA); In re Rosen, 52 B.R. 96 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1985) (69-year-old metal buyer with cardiac condition and dependent on Keogh income got
support since trustee provided no evidence to the contrary); In re Donaghy, 11 B.R. 677 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1981) (62-year-old unemployed with emphysema and wife vith cancer and large medical
bills got support due in lump sum from plan); Warren v. Taff (In re Taff), 10 B.R. 101, 107 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 1981) (retired corporate executive living from spouse's investments got 50% of plan benefits
for support despite no evidence of special needs).
295. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1988). See supra note 169 for a listing of the opt-out states.
296. See supra notes 180-87 and accompanying text.
297. See Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268, 1274 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Gribben,
84 B.R. 494, 497 (S.D. Ohio 1988); Creasy v. Coleman Furniture Corp., 83 B.R. 404, 410 (W.D.
Va. 1988); In re Bowen, 80 B.R. 1012, 1015 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1987); Rodgers v. Norman (In re Cren-
shaw), 44 B.R. 30, 34 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1984), revd, 51 B.R. 554 (N.D. Ala. 1985).
298. E.g., Daniel v. Sec. Pac. Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352, 1359 (9th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488,
1491 (11th Cir. 1985); Graham, 726 F.2d at 1268; Gribben, 84 B.R. at 497; In re Lingle, 119 B.R.
672 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1990); In re Martin, 115 B.R. 311, 323 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990); In re Conroy,
110 B.R. 492, 498-99 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990); In re Alagna, 107 B.R. 301, 314-15 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1989); In re Toner, 105 B.R. 978, 981-83 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989); Heitkamp v. Dyke (In re Dyke),
99 B.R. 343, 346-47 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989), rev'd, 119 B.R. -536 (S.D. Tex. 1990), aff'd, 943 F.2d
1438 (5th Cir. 1991); Helverson v. Mico, Inc. (In re Loe), 83 B.R. 641, 646 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988);
Bowen, 80 B.R. at 1015; In re Shuman, 68 B.R. 290, 295 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1986); In re Kerr, 65
B.R. 739 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986); In re Slezak, 63 B.R. 625, 629 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986); In re
Goldberg, 59 B.R. 201, 205 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986); In re Flygstad, 56 B.R. 884, 888 (Bankr.
N.D. Iowa 1986); Samore v. Indep. Pension Serv. (In re McKenna), 58 B.R. 221 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1985); Parkinson v. Bradford Trust Co. (In re O'Brien), 50 B.R. 67, 78 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985); In
re Gillett, 46 B.R. 642, 645 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985); Crenshaw, 44 B.R. at 34; Nixon v. P.J. Pedone
& Co. (In re Nichols), 42 B.R. 772, 777 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984); see also Goff v. Taylor (In re
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the legislative history list contains mistakes, 299 and other legislative
history indicates the list was not exclusive30° - conclude that the
exemption does encompass interests in pension plans.01
The debtor-participant faces the same problems under the state
exemptions whether for opt-out states or non-opt-out states. Un-
fortunately, many state exemptions are patterned after the federal-
scheme exemption and so contain the support limitation.30 2 Courts
in these jurisdictions follow the decisions concerning the corre-
sponding federal-scheme exemption.30 3 Another danger to the state
Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 585 (5th Cir. 1983) (dicta); Gilbert v. Osburn (In re Osburn), 56 B.R. 867, 874
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986) (same for state government plan).
299. The list contains two statutory provisions that were repealed before 1978 when the Bank-
ruptcy Code was passed, namely, civil service benefits (changed in 1966) and foreign service benefits
(changed in 1974). Secondly, the list misnames veterans benefits as Congressional Medal of Honor
benefits. See In re Burns, 108 B.R. 308, 315 n.7. (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989).
300. H.R. RaP. No. 595, supra note 157, at 360, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6316 ("If the debtor
chooses [sec. 522(b)], some of the items that may be exempted under other Federal laws in-
clude. . . ."); S. REP. No. 989, supra note 51, at 75, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5861 ("Some of the
items that may be exempted under Federal laws other than title 11 include .... ).
301. E.g., In re Majul, 119 B.R. 118, 124 (W.D. Tex. 1990); In re Starkey, 116 B.R. 259, 264
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); In re Messing, 114 B.R. 541, 547-50 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1990); In re Felts,
114 B.R. 131, 133-34 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); In re Burns, 108 B.R. 308, 308 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1989); In re Komet, 104 B.R. 799, 805-16 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989); Barr v. Hinshaw (In re Hinshaw),
23 B.R. 233, 234 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982).
This position makes little sense. Congress intended to overcome puny state exemptions by adding
the option of federal exemptions. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. Yet, according to this
position, the state scheme has exempted pension-plan benefits while the federal scheme exempts only
pension-plan benefits to the extent needed for support.
302. See supra note 218 for a listing of the states with a support requirement.
303. For benefits not in pay status, some courts conclude the exemption inapplicable since there
are no "payments." E.g., In re Craddock, 62 B.R. 583, 586 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986) (young bank
employee under Georgia law), rev'd, Craddock v. Anderson, No. C86-1815 A (N.D. Ga. Dec. 31,
1986). Other courts engage in a future support analysis and deny the exemption for the young and
healthy. E.g., In re Herzog, 118 B.R. 529, 532 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990) (59-year old healthy lawyer
under Ohio law); In re Syrtveit, 105 B.R. 599, 606 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1989) (income exceeds expenses
under Montana law); In re Bartlett, 67 B.R. 455, 457 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986) (41-year-old salesman
under Missouri law); see also In re Sederstrom, 52 B.R. 448, 451 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (57-year-
old teacher under Minnesota law for school annuities); cf. In re Bell, 119 B.R. 783, 785 (Bankr. D.
Mont. 1988) (45-year-old military retiree with IRA under similar state exemption). Similarly, these
courts grant the exemption for the old and infirm. E.g., In re Hunsucker, 106 B.R. 220, 222 (Bankr.
D. Mont. 1988) (57-year-old teacher's aide for teacher retirement under Montana law); In re Weaver,
98 B.R. 497, 499 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1988) (under Nebraska law, creditor failed to show absence of
need by 28-year-old); In re Woodford, 73 B.R. 675, 680 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987) (under New York
law, 58-year-old lawyer had few working years remaining); In re Schlee, 60 B.R. 524, 527 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1986) (under Minnesota law, unemployed with degenerative back, unemployed wife, and
asthmatic son with large medical bills); In re Lawrence, 57 B.R. 727, 729 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986)
(under Iowa law, 48-year-old unemployed farmer with disabled wife); In re Flygstad, 56 B.R. 884,
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exemption is the courts' decision that ERISA preempts the exemp-
tion since it relates to an employee benefit plan. 3° Not only does
the exemption's effectiveness for a pension plan depend on state law
- not federal law, as mandated by ERISA - but it varies between
bankruptcy courts within a state. 30 5
C. The Fallacious Reasoning of the Judicial Exception to
ERISA's Anti-Alienation Provision
The main reason given by some courts for their tortured inter-
pretation of ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code is to prevent an oth-
889 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986) (54-year-old healthy manufacturing employee under Iowa law); In re
Pettit, 57 B.R. 362, 363 (S.D. Iowa 1985) (under Iowa law, 48-year-old unemployed with disabled
spouse).
304. Courts have stricken down statutes in Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas. E.g., In re Schlein, 114 B.R. 780, 783 (M.D. Fla. 1990)
(exemption refers specifically to ERISA, so preempted); Siegel v. Swaine (In re Siegel), 105 B.R. 556,
564 (D. Ariz. 1989) (same); In re Lee, 119 B.R. 833, 834 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (same); In re
Gardner, 118 B.R. 860, 863 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (same); In re Starkey, 116 B.R. 259, 263-64
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (same); In re Messing, 114 B.R. 541, 543-45 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1990) (same);
In re Conroy, 110 B.R. 492, 496 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990) (same); In re Bums, 108 B.R. 308, 311
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989) (same); In re Sheppard, 106 B.R. 724, 727 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (same);
In re Alagna, 107 B.R. 301, 317 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989) (same); In re Sellers, 107 B.R. 152, 155
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989) (same); In re Bryant, 106 B.R. 727, 730 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (same);
In re Weeks, 106 B.R. 257, 262 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1989) (same); In re Gaines, 106 B.R. 1008, 1016
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989) (same), revd, 121 B.R. 1015 (W.D. Mo. 1990); Fogler v. Flindell (In re
Flindall), 105 B.R. 32 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1989) (same); Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. McLeod (In re
McLeod), 102 B.R. 60, 63 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1989) (same); In re Brown, 95 B.R. 216 (Bankr. N.D.
Okla. 1989) (same); Penick v. Hirsch (In re Hirsch), 98 B.R. 1, 2 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1988) (same),
aff'd, 105 B.R. 556 (D. Ariz. 1989) (same); In re Komet, 93 B.R. 498, 500 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988)
(same), aff'd on reh'g, 104 B.R. 799, 801 (1989).
Courts have upheld statutes in Florida, Missouri, Nebraska, and Texas. E.g., In re Dyke, 119
B.R. 536, 539 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (exception does not interfere with plan operation under ERISA), aff'd,
943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1991); In re Williams, 118 B.R. 812, 815-16 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990) (same);
In re Nuttleman, 117 B.R. 975, 979-82 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990) (ERISA compatability provision makes
it inferior to Bankruptcy Code); In re Vickers, 116 B.R. 149, 153-54 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.) (same),
ff'd, 126 Bankr. 348 (W.D. Mo. 1990); In re Martinez, 107 B.R. 378, 380 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989)
(exemption doesn't interfere with plan operation under ERISA); In re Selkop, 107 B.R. 776, 778
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989) (same); In re Bryan, 106 B.R. 749, 751 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989) (same); In
re Volpe, 100 B.R. 840, 848-55 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) (same), aff'd, 120 B.R. 843 (W.D. Tex.
1990). Since some of these states are the same ones where other courts have stricken the statute, this
area of the law is unsettled.
See generally Charles Sterbach et al, Pre-Bankruptcy Planning for Professionals and ERISA
Qualified Pension Plans: Are State Created Statutory Exemptions D.O.A. in Bankruptcy Proceedings?,
94 Com. L.J. 229 (1989).
305. Compare In re Schlein, 114 B.R. 780, 783 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (Florida exemption preempted)
and In re Komet, 93 B.R. 498, 500 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988) (Texas exemption preempted), aff'd
on reh'g, 104 B.R. 799, 801 (1989) with In re Williams, 118 B.R. 812, 815-16 (Bankr. N.D. Fla.
1990) (Florida exemption not preempted) and In re Volpe, 100 B3.R. 840, 848-55 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1989) (Texas exemption not preempted), aff'd, 120 B.R. 843 (W.D. Tex. 1990).
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erwise wealthy debtor from placing the bulk of his assets into excluded
property - namely the pension benefit plan - immediately prior
to the filing of bankruptcy.3 ° The concern then is whether the bank-
rupt has defrauded his creditors by sheltering his assets in accordance
with federal law.
The Bankruptcy Code has a provision to prevent any such fraud.3t 7
Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code allows the conversion of non-ex-
empt property into exempt property, even on the eve of bankruptcy,
without the debtor losing the exemption. 0 8 The remedy for these
306. Daniel v. Sec. Pac. Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir. 1985) (doctor
with $98,000 in plan used plan loans for current needs and converted $39,000 nonexempt property
into plan on eve of bankruptcy), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In
re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488, 1490 (11th Cir. 1985) (strong public policy against placing property in
a revocable trust for own benefit at expense of creditors); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726
F.2d 1268, 1272 (8th Cir. 1984) (doctor with $150,000; purpose of the support limitation on the
federal exemption was to eliminate corporate officers and professionals from shielding hundreds of
thousands of dollars in pension plans at expense of creditors); Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d
574, 588 (5th Cir. 1983) (to create a revocable trust for their own benefit); In re Burns, 108 B.R.
308, 314 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989) (so stating for Goff, Daniel, Graham, and Lichstrah); Christison
v. Slane, (In re Silldorff), 96 B.R. 859, 863 (C.D. Ill. 1989) (too much room for a participant an-
ticipating bankruptcy to shield assets).
307. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988) (dealing with preferentiai conveyances within 90 days of the
bankruptcy filing); id. § 548(a) (dealing with fraudulent conveyances within I year of the bankruptcy
filing). The bankruptcy trustee may not recover the assets from a good faith transferree for value.
Id. § 550.
Some courts have suggested that trustees may recover from pension-plans contributions made
as fraudulent transfers, e.g., In re LaFata, 41 B.R. 842, 844 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984) (contributions
made after notice of malpractice claim against self-insured doctor), or as preferential conveyances.
E.g., Sterling Die Casting Co., Inc. v. Local 365 UAW Welfare and Pension Fund (In re Sterling
Die Casting Co., Inc.), 118 B.R. 205, 208 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1990) (eve-of-bankruptcy payment on
judgment for arrearages to multi-employer pension plan); Pulaski Highway Express, Inc. v. Central
States S.E. & S.W. Areas Health and Welfare and Pension Funds (In re Pulaski Highway Express,
Inc.), 41 B.R. 305, 308 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984) (same).
ERISA generally prohibits contributions to pension plans from inuring to the benefit of the
employer; however, an employer may recover contributions within I year of when made, if made in
accordance with a mistake of fact, 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)(A)(i) (1988), or, for multi-employer plans,
made within 6 months, if made in accordance with a mistake of fact or law. Id. § 1103(C)(2)(A)(ii).
However, the cases ordinarily arise after the allowed periods and so involve the superiority of the
Bankruptcy Code over ERISA's non-inure provision.
308. E.g., Norwest Bank Nebraska v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871, 874 (8th Cir. 1988) (doctor con-
verted, among other things, pension- plan benefits into life insurance exempt under Minnesota law);
Hanson v. First Nat'l Bank in Brookings, 848 F.2d 866, 868 (8th Cir. 1988) (farmer prepaid homestead
mortgage); Ford v. Poston, 773 F.2d 52, 54 (4th Cir. 1985) (converted inherited land to tenants by
the entirety); Armstrong v. Lindberg (In re Lindberg), 735 F.2d 1087, 1091 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1073 (1984) (between conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 sold house for farm); First
Texas Say. Assoc. v. Reed (In re Reed), 700 F.2d 986, 990 (5th Cir. 1983) (sold collections to prepay
[Vol. 94
ERISA AND BANKRUPTCY
situations, when done on the eve of the bankruptcy, is not to deny
the exemption but rather the discharge, provided there is other ev-
idence of fraudulent intent.3°9 The same remedy should apply to
mortgage on family residence). See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 157, at 361, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6317.
As under current law, the debtor will be permitted to convert nonexempt property before
filing a bankruptcy petition .... The practice is not fraudulent as to creditors, and permits
the debtor to make full use of the exemptions to which he is entitled under the law.
Id.; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 51, at 76, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5862.
Pre-Bankruptcy Code law permitted the conversion. E.g., Grover v. Jackson (In re Jackson),
472 F.2d 589, 590 (9th Cir. 1973) (converted business receipts to $1000 exempt savings account);
Wudrich v. Clements, 451 F.2d 988, 990 (9th Cir. 1971) (on advice of counsel, refinanced car loans
to obtain $1000 exempt savings account); Love v. Menick, 341 F.2d 680, 682-83 (9th Cir. 1965) (on
advice of counsel, converted life insurance to $1000 exempt savings account); Schwartz v. Seldon,
153 F.2d 334, 335 (2d Cir. 1946) (paid off whole life insurance policy loan); Doethlaff v. Penn Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 117 F.2d 582, 584 (6th Cir. 1941) (paid insurance premiums while insolvent); Forsberg
v. Security State Bank of Canova, 15 F.2d 499, 501 (8th Cir. 1926) (converted livestock to exempt
personalty); Crawford v. Sternberg, 220 F. 73 (8th Cir. 1915) (withdrew partnership funds to partners
who bought exempt personalty when there was no action against them); In re Wilson, 123 F. 20, 22
(9th Cir. 1903) (sale of grocery business to pay off existing homestead mortgage); In re Irvin, 120
F. 733, 734 (8th Cir. 1903) (converted storehouse to homestead by moving from rented house); Hu-
energardt v. John S. Brittain Dry Goods Co., 116 F. 31, 33 (8th Cir. 1902) (converted town homestead
to country farm homestead).
309. E.g., Tveten, 848 F.2d at 876 (17 transactions on the eve was evidence of fraud); Ford,
773 F.2d at 55 (converted one day after judgment, allegedly to correct mistake, constituted fraud);
Reed, 700 F.2d at 991 (numerous transactions on eve was evidence of fraud). Otherwise, the conversion
is ignored. E.g., Hanson, at 848 F.2d at 869 (converted to reduce living expenses); Lindberg, 735
F.2d at 1091 (converted to change occupation from oil industry to farming).
The discharge is denied for Chapter 7 cases under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (1988). The effect of
denying the discharge is that the debtor-participant retains his exempted property and remains liable
for his debts. The trustee may have satisfied some of his debts before the discharge denial since on
the filing he has title to the bankrupt's estate. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1988).
The corresponding tactic for Chapter 13 is failure to approve the rehabilitation plan as not
proposed in good faith. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(aX3) (1988). However, the problem should be of little
consequence in Chapter 13, since only disposable income is distributable to creditors, and conversion
of assets from non-exempt property to exempt property should have little effect on disposable income.
The bankrupt can always dismiss a Chapter 13 case, id. § 1307(b), and so would only loose a few
payments made to the trustee, id. § 1326(a)(1) (within 30 days of filing the proposed plan), before
dismissal.
So, the effect of this remedy is to permit the debtor-participant to retain interest in his fraud-
ulently conveyed pension moneys and remain liable on his outstanding debts.
Pre-Bankrutpcy Code law, if the court found fraudulent intent beyond the mere conversion,
denied the exemption rather than deny the discharge. E.g., Lyon v. Arnold, 46 F.2d 451, 452 (5th
Cir. 1931) (land sold before bankruptcy disallowed by state as a fraudulent conveyance, claimed as
a homestead); Levinson v. Greene, 296 F. 598, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1924) (paid insurance premiums in
advance for five years); Kangas v. Robie, 264 F. 92, 94 (8th Cir. 1920) (converted business receipts
to homestead while not paying trade obligations); Peyton v. Farmers Nat'l Bank, 261 F. 326, 328
(5th Cir. 1919) (bought homestead on eve with six-month renter in house); McGahan v. Anderson,
113 F. 115, 119 (4th Cir. 1902) (sold unpaid-for-goods to build homestead on wife's land conveyed
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exclusions. The Bankruptcy Code, therefore, already provides a rem-
edy for creditors faced with a defrauding debtor-participant. They
do not require an additional judicially-created remedy.
The sheltering primarily affects professionals who have estab-
lished owner-employee plans for themselves and minimal number
employees: a secretary, a professional assistant, such as a nurse or
legal assistant, and a receptionist. Trying to punish the professional
debtor by forfeiting his plan interests overlooks the very extensive
ERISA provisions aimed at the same problem.
First, ERISA limits the amount of assets such persons can shel-
ter. For all defined contribution plans of the employer, the limit of
the annual contribution for a participant, including employee con-
tributions, is the lesser of twenty-five percent of the employee's an-
nual compensation or $30,000.310 For all defined benefit plans of
the employer, the limit is the lesser of the amount to fund the em-
ployee's benefit computed on an average compensation3 1' over three
years or set at $108,963.312 If the employer has more than one type
of plan, there is a method to combine these limits. 3 3 The net effect
is a maximum contribution to one plan type plhs a little more in
the second type. Unless the plan has extensive coverage for numerous
employees, however, the top-heavy plan rules reduce these combined
limits.314 These lesser benefits mean that the employer generally can
make the maximum contribution only to one plan type. The result
is that the highly-compensated debtor-participant can only shelter a
to debtor).
Since the prior law did not make a distinction between exclusions and exemptions, see, e.g.,
Judson v. Witlin (In re Witlin), 640 F.2d 661, 663 (5th Cir. 1981) (referring to the spendthrift-trust
exclusion as an exemption under pre-Bankruptcy Code law); Levinson, 296 F. at 600 (referring to
the spendthrift-trust provision as an exemption), the result of discharge denial should be applicable
to the spendthrift-trust exclusion as well as to exemptions.
310. 26 U.S.C. § 415(c) (1988); 26 C.F.R. § 1.415-6 (1990). The dollar limitation is subject to
cost-of-living adjustment. 26 U.S.C. § 415(d) (1988).
311. The maximum compensation considered for these purposes for owner-employees is $222,220.
26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(17) (1988) (specifying $200,000); I.R.S. News Release IR-91-12 (Jan. 17, 1991)
(cost-of-living adjustment).
312. 26 U.S.C. § 415(b) (1988) (specifying $90,000); 26 C.F.R. § 1.415-3 (1990); I.R.S. News
Release IR-91-12 (Jan. 17, 1991) (cost-of-living adjustment).
313. 26 U.S.C. § 415(e) (1988); 26 C.F.R. § 1.415-7 (1990).
314. 26 U.S.C. § 416(h) (1988). A top-heavy plan is one for which more than 60 percent of the
contribution goes to key employees. Id. § 416(g).
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certain amount of funds each year. This amount was the trade-off
Congress devised to encourage these higher compensated individuals
to establish plans to provide benefits to their lower-compensated
employees.
Second, ERISA also limits the ability of the debtor to imme-
diately establish the plan and then to terminate it after bankruptcy
a short time afterward. Employers can only establish a qualified
pension plan as part of a long-term program.31 5 Premature termi-
nation or cessation of contributions to a qualified pension plan with-
out a legitimate business reason results in disqualification of the
plan, possibly retroactive to its inception.31 6 Collection of past and
current taxes on a disqualified plan could be prohibitive.317 Regu-
lations limit the amount of funds that a terminated, defined benefit
plan - for which the shelter limits generally are greater - can
distribute to a highly-compensated employee unless the plan exists
for ten years. 318 Moreover, such action of prematurely terminating
a qualified pension plan, if done shortly after discharge in bank-
ruptcy, may constitute the necessary fraud for revocation of the
discharge under the Bankruptcy Code.319 Thus, the fear of the courts,
the revocable trust,320 doesn't work the way they imagined.
Third, ERISA similarly restricts the ability of the debtor to es-
tablish a plan solely for himself, thereby not shifting any of his
assets to his employees. A qualified pension plan must include as
participants sufficient lowly-compensated employees that they num-
ber (or their benefits amount to) at least seventy percent of the
number of highly-compensated employees (or their benefits).321
315. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-1(b)(2) (1990).
316. Rev. RUl. 69-25, 1969-1 C.B. 113 (a plan is presumed permanent initially; however, ter-
mination or discontinuance after a few years for other than a business cause reverses the presumption
ab initio).
317. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
318. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-4(c)(2)(iii) (1990) (the greater of $20,000 or 20 percent of the first $50,000
compensation multiplied by the number of years the plan existed). This limit applies to the 25 highest
compensated employees. Id. § 1.401-4()(2)(i).
319. 11 U.S.C. § 727(d), (e) (1988) (if brought within one year).
320. Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488, 1490 (lth Cir. 1985); Goff
v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 588 (5th Cir. 1983).
321. 26 U.S.C. § 410(b) (1988); 26 C.F.R. § 1.410(b)-I (1990). Employees include common law
employees, self-employed persons, and leased employees. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-9(a)(1) (1991)
reprinted in [1991] CCH FED. TAX RPrR. 2665TL.
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Moreover, ERISA contains numerous provisions to prevent the typ-
ical owner-employee from shifting employees so as to have a plan
that covers only himself. The qualification rules require pension plans
to treat all employees in a controlled group3' or an affiliated service
group 3  and leased employees324 as if a single employer employed
them all. Thus, if the professional establishes a plan to shelter his
assets from bankruptcy, significant amounts will go to employees.
VI. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
To achieve justice, courts use different principles determined by
the circumstances before the court. 325 Two techniques exist for stat-
utory construction: (1) the analytical or plain-meaning method (act-
ing on the literal meaning of the words in the statute); and (2) the
teleological method (acting on the intended legislative remedy).326
322. 26 U.S.C. §§ 414(b)-(c), 1563(a)(2) (1988) (controlled groups have 50 percent common own-
ership in five persons). See H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 59, at 50, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4716
(commenting on Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 1015, 88 Stat. 829, 926 (1974)):
[Tihis provision ... makers] it clear that the coverage and antidiscrimination provisions
cannot be avoided by operating separate corporations instead of separate branches of one
corporation. For example, if managerial functions were performed through one corporation
employing highly-compensated personel, which has a generous pension plan, and assembly-
line functions were performed through one or more other corporations employing lower-
paid employees, which have less generous plans or no plans at all, this would generally
constitute an impermissible discrimination.
Id..
323. 26 U.S.C. § 414(m) (1988) (affiliated service groups have one member providing service
for another that historically was done by employees). See H.R. REP. No. 1278, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
34-35 (1980) (commenting on Pub. L. No. 96-605, § 201, 94 Stat. 3521, 3526-27 (1980)):
[This provision prevents avoidance of the controlled group rules by] establishing individual
corporations which form a partnership of corporations. The partnership employs the rank
and file employees. Because none of the corporations have more than a 50 percent interests
in the partnership, the partnership is not a member of a group of commonly controlled
trades or businesses.
Id. See also Garland v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 5 (1979) (successfully using the described scheme).
324. 26 U.S.C. § 414(n) (1988) (added by Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 248, 96 Stat. 324, 526 (1982)).
This scheme involved the transfer of the employees to an entirely unrelated entity and then leasing
back the employees. L'o~amN & VoL, supra note 56, at 179. Consequently, there is a safe-harbor
from the leased employee rules if the unrelated entity contributes an amount equal to ten percent of
the compensation of the lowly-compensated employees to a pension plan for these leased employees.
26 U.S.C. § 414(n)(5) (1988).
325. See KARL N. LsLLnwnaN, Tm ComnoN LAw TRADMON 521-35 (1960). See generally Ron-
ERTO M. UNGER, TnE CnmcA. LEoGAL Sruvms Movmsmr 60-85 (1983) (discussing principles and
counterprinciples in contract law, such as the freedom to contract and fairness).
326. 2A SuTHERLAND, supra note 66, § 46.07; STANLEY A. DESmrrH, JuDic:L Rnvmw oF Ao-
munsTRATIvE AcTioN 86 (2d ed. 1968). The key difference between the two methods is the use of
legislative history to interpret statutes.
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A. Statutory Interpretation Techniques
The analytical method limits courts to consideration only of the
statute itself and intrinsic aids such as section headings, preambles,
titles, punctuation, context, grammar, and word choice. 327 Under the
analytical method, the court determines a statute's meaning through
its exact language using intrinsic aids only if necessary.32 A court
must enforce the statute as written, even if the literal construction
leads to unjust results.329 Courts frequently weaken this method by
combining it with the teleological method. They create an ambiguous
language exception to the plain-meaning rule under which the court
considers extrinsic aids in addition to intrinsic aids.330
The teleological method permits courts to consider external aids,
such as other statutes, prior judicial and administrative decisions,
historical context, and legislative history. 331 In contrast to the an-
alytical method, a court examines the problem that the legislature
set out to solve and the remedy it developed and then construes the
statute in light of achieving those ends. 332 Some courts treat this
method as an additional exception to the analytical method to pre-
vent unjust or absurd results. 333
327. See generally 2A SuTERrAND, supra note 66, §§ 47.01-.38.
328. See Burlington Northern R.R. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987); Cam-
inetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917); see also Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v.
Davenport, 110 S. Ct. 2126, 2131 (1990) (applying the plain-meaning rule to definitions in the Bank-
ruptcy Code); United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-42, 247-48 (1989) (ap-
plying the plain-meaning rule to section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1988), since
there is no ambiguity). See generally Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning
Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 CoLJm. L. Ray. 1299 (1975)
(analyzing cases in which the Supreme Court only appeared to give weight to the rule and other cases
where federal courts followed Caminetti, 242 U.S. 470, in its full rigor); 2A Surn.AND, supra note
66, §§ 47.01-.38.
For criticism of the plain-meaning rule, see Richard A. Posner, Legislation and Its Interpretation:
A Primer, 68 NEn. L. Rnv. 431, 442 (The rule is unnecessary; competent judges do not need grammar
handbooks; incompetent judges are unable to apply them). See generally Michael R. Merz, The Mean-
inglessness of the Plain Meaning Rule, 4 U. DAYToN L. Rnv. 31 (1979).
329. See, e.g., Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 521 (1981) (concerning ERISA
preeemption, "[o]ur judicial function is not to second-guess the policy decisions of the legislature,
no matter how appealing we may find contrary rationales.").
330. 2A SuTHERuN, supra note 66, § 46.01.
331. Id. §§ 48.01-56.05.
332. Id. §§ 56.01-.02. The teleological method derives from Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637,
638 (1584) (Sir Edward Coke, reporter).
333. See, e.g., Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
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The United States Supreme Court has used both methods.334 With
respect to the key provisions of ERISA, the Supreme Court has
adhered to the analytical method for both the anti-alienation
provision335 and the preemption provision.3 36 With respect to the
Bankruptcy Code, the Supreme Court also has adhered to the an-
alytical method.337
The interpretation of the relationship of ERISA to the Bank-
ruptcy Code, however, involves an additional element. Courts pre-
sume that when Congress passes subsequent -legislation relating to
the subject matter of an earlier statute that it had the earlier statute
334. Compare Chung Fook v. White, 264 U.S. 443, 446 (1924) (if the language is plain and an
injustice arises, the remedy lies with Congress and not the courts) and Caminetti v. United States,
242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (if the language is plain and unambiguous, the duty of interpretation does
not arise and the court need not discuss the aids for resolving ambiguity) with Holy Trinity Church
v. United States, 143 U.S. at 459 (statutes should be sensibly construed so that the reason of the
law prevails over its letter if an injustice or absurdity would result) and Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547, 560 (1967) (teleological method, suggesting the rule in Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. at 638).
335. See Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Service Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 836 (1988).
Where Congress intended ... [to] extend anti-alienation protection to a particular type of
ERISA plan, it did so expressly in the statute. Specifically ERISA § 206(d)(1) bars (with
certaiin enumerated exceptions) the alienation or assignment of benefits provided for by
ERISA pension benefit plans .... Congress did not enact any similar provision applicable
to ERISA welfare benefit plans ....
Id.
But see Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1990) (applying
the anti-alienation provision to garnishments since this interpretation is consistent with Treasury re-
gulations, Congressional conferencd reports, and other similar federal statutes).
336. See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. 478, 482-83 (1990) (applying the
plain-meaning rule to the ERISA preemption provision); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403,
407 (1990) (same); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 50 (1987) (same); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 741 (1985) (applying the plain-meaning rule to the savings
clause of the ERISA preemption provison); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983)
(same).
337. See, e.g., Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 111 S. Ct. 1825, 1828-30 (1991) (confirming plain-meaning
interpretation for exemption contained in I1 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1988) with reference to legislative history
on the purpose of the section); Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. 2126,
2130-31 (1990) (uses plain meaning for 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1988) and refuses to entertain idea of
drafter's intention to vary the strict language); United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S.
235, 243 (1989) (same for 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1988)); Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of
Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1988)) ("[I]f Congress intends
for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific."),
reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1090 (1986). But see Davenport, 110 S. Ct. at 2134 (although the Court generally
uses the plain-meaning rule, it does not follow a literal interpretation for the Bankruptcy Code)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43-44 (1986) (to interpret the Bankruptcy
Code, the Court looks to its object and policy, not only the plain-meaning rule).
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in mind. Courts then construe the two statutes together as if they
were one. 338 If reasonably possible, courts construe them harmo-
niously even when in apparent conflict. 3 9 Only when there is an
irreconcilable conflict will the newer provision control the earlier
provision as the most recent expression of Congress.34 The validity
of the interpretation of the majority of the bankruptcy courts rests,
therefore, on a showing that ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code can-
not be harmonized.
Most courts considering ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code have
used ERISA's compatibility provision to ignore ERISA and consider
only the Bankruptcy Code rather than attempting to interpret them
consistently and compatibly. It is only the use of the compatibility
provision before finding a conflict that enables these courts to create
a conflict between ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code. Their resulting
interpretation effectively destroys both ERISA's anti-alienation pro-
338. E.g., Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972) (in light of each other); Allen
v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535, 541 (1954) (to read the later one without reference to
the earlier one is to read it out of context); United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64 (1940) (as one
statute); Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 42 (1939) (read a statute in light of closely related
provisions in another statute); British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299
U.S. 159, 166 (1936) (same); Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501, 508 (1927) (as a system); Com-
missioner of Immigration v. Gottlieb, 265 U.S. 310, 312 (1294) (same); 2A SuTm.AND, supra note
66, § 51.02.
339. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 110 S. Ct. 680, 687 (1990); Watt v.
Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266-67 (1981); Morton v. Moncari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974); 2A SUTHERAND,
supra note 66, § 51.02.
340. E.g., United States v. Arizona, 295 U.S. 174, 191 (1935) (unless a different purpose is
clear); United States v. Jefferson Elec. Mfg. Co., 291 U.S. 386, 396 (1934) (same); Maul v. United
States, 274 U.S. 501, 508 (1927) (same); Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 384 (1924) (same);
United States v. Sweet, 245 U.S. 563, 572 (1918) (same); United States v. Barnes, 222 U.S. 513, 520
(1912) (same); 2A SUTHERLAsD, supra note 66, § 51.03.
Critics have alleged various irreconcilable conflicts between ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code.
See, e.g., Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 586-87 (5th Cir. 1983) (ERISA's anti-alienation
provision versus the Bankruptcy Code's intent to broaden the property of the estate distributable to
bankruptcy creditors); D. Bruce Hendrick, Federal Nonbankruptcy Law Includes ERISA, 53 TEx.
B.J. 854 (1990) (ERISA's policy favoring accummulated retirement benefits versus the Bankruptcy
Code's policy of a "fresh start," but not a "head start"); Wohl, supra note 49, at 5 (ERISA's
protection of benefits at retirement time versus the dual policy of rehabilitating debtors and reim-
bursing creditors to the greatest extent possible). These conflicts involve various misunderstandings
of the purposes behind the Bankrutpcy Code.
If ERISA and the Bankruptcy Act conflict, the most recent statute would be ERISA's anti-
alienation provision under REA, clearly denoted as a spendthrift trust provision eligible for the bank-
ruptcy exclusion. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
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vision (by ordering transfers of plan interests reachable in no other
action)34' and ERISA's preemption provision (by making bankruptcy
exclusions and exemptions depend on varying state law).342 This pro-
cedure is improper statutory interpretation. 343
B. The Proper Solution
Under the interpretation principles, courts must interpret the
Bankruptcy Code to protect ERISA's anti-alienation provision and
its uniformity of federal common law if at all -possible. This means
that the distinction between creditors in and outside bankruptcy and
the use of state law to determine bankruptcy exclusions and ex-
emptions is erroneous.
The first step in interpreting the two statutes is to determine
whether there is any ambiguity in the statutes. In the absence of
that ambiguity,344 the plain-meaning rule governs. Under the plain-
meaning rule, the exclusion provision requires examination of trust
law as the "applicable nonbankruptcy law" enforcing a restriction
on transfers in trusts.345 ERISA's preemption provision346 mandates
the use of federal trust law rather than the state trust law used by
most courts. Fortunately, federal trust law exists - namely the fed-
eral common law of trusts developed under ERISA 47 and ERISA
itself, the embodiment of much trust law.348 This federal trust law
both requires a restriction on transfers and enforces it.349 Thus, courts
must exclude the interest of a debtor-participant in a qualified pen-
sion plan with an anti-alienation provision from the debtor-parti-
cipant's estate.
341. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 247-82, 302-05 and accompanying text.
343. See Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268, 1271 (8th Cir. 1984) (explaining
the basis of the interpretation as legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code without any finding of
ambiguity or any conflict with ERISA); Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 581 (5th Cir.
1984) (same).
344. See Forbes v. Lucas (In re Lucas), 924 F.2d 597, 600-02 (6th Cir. 1991) (explaining that
the key language of the Bankruptcy Code is not ambiguous).
345. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988).
346. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
347. See supra note 259.
348. See supra note 62.
349. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
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The next step in interpretation is to determine whether this plain-
meaning result is harmonious with the rest of ERISA and the Bank-
ruptcy Code and their respective legislative histories. This interpre-
tation preserves the language and policies of ERISA. The anti-
alienation requirement preserves retirement moneys for retirement
to prevent the participant from becoming a public charge. 350 This
preservation will not occur unless courts exclude interests in pension
plans from the debtor-participant's estate. The Supreme Court in-
dicated that ERISA's anti-alienation requirement has no exceptions
unless Congress specifically acts to legislate one. 5 t Congress has not
legislated one for bankruptcy. Congress labelled ERISA's anti-al-
ienation requirement a spendthrift-trust provision.35 2 Congress sim-
ilarly described the trusts with transfer restrictions subject to the
bankruptcy exclusion. 3 3 ERISA contains a federal compatibility pro-
vision. The Supreme Court stated that a court cannot interpret the
compatibility provision to eviscerate ERISA's anti-alienation pro-
vision whenever a creditor relies on other federal law.3 54 The Bank-
ruptcy Code is one such other federal law. Bankruptcy courts,
therefore, must honor ERISA's alienation restriction and exclude
interests in pension plans with anti-alienation provisions from bank-
ruptcy estates.
ERISA also seeks uniformity in pension-plan administration. ER-
ISA's preemption provision eradicates state law relating to pension
plans to foster that uniform federal common law. Under the Con-
gressional directive, for ERISA to pattern that uniform federal law
similar to that developed for collective-bargaining agreements, var-
ious state trust and contract interpretation rules are irrelevant.3 55
Consequently, federal law determines the effectiveness of ERISA's
anti-alienation requirement, not the state law used by many bank-
ruptcy courts. 356 Under that federal law, courts protect interests in
350. See supra notes 56-79 and accompanying text.
351. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 86-89.
353. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
354. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 258-64 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 247-82, 302-05 and accompanying text.
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pension plans with anti-alienation provisions from creditors.35 7 More-
over, ERISA aims to encourage the growth of private pension plans.
Congress accomplished this through a complex, delicate balance of
incentives (namely tax-free compounding, certain plan withdrawals,
and integration with social security)358 for the highly-compensated
employees with participation (namely vesting, coverage, and mini-
mum contributions)359 for the lowly-compensated. Only the above
interpretation preserves these goals.
The exclusion from the debtor-participant's estate of interests in
pension plans with anti-alienation provisions avoids several problems
that otherwise would arise under ERISA. The pension plan would
not risk potential disqualification by the Internal Revenue Service
for not abiding by ERISA's anti-alienation requirement.3 The dis-
qualification would result in adverse tax consequences for manage-
ment employees unable to reach funds in the pension plan with
which to pay their individual tax. Employers would then become
reluctant to continue retirement programs, thwarting one goal of
ERISA. The courts also would not need to resolve the jurisdictional
forum for determining pension-plan rights. ERISA mandates state
or federal district court.3 61 The Bankruptcy Code specifies the bank-
ruptcy court. Moreover, the need for Congressional action over how
to enforce the bankruptcy turnover order would cease. The bank-
ruptcy estate only receives the same title that the debtor-participant
had. For most of these interests in pension plans, the participant
has no current right to receive anything. 362 Should the bankruptcy
estate remain open until the bankrupt's rights are in pay status, or
should they order a direct transfer subject to third-party rights? Do
these third party rights include those of the plan? There presently
is no qualified bankruptcy order analogous to a qualified domestic
relations order to properly account for a split in pension benefits
between participant and creditors.3 63 Furthermore, whether a court
357. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 130-45 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 137-40, 321-24 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 35-40, 76 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 23-31.
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preempted state-scheme exemptions for pension plans under ER-
ISA's preemption provision3 64 would become irrelevant. States no
longer would attempt to circumvent the preemption by either making
no reference to ERISA in their exemption statutes or defining spend-
thrift trusts to include pension plans.3 6 Interpreting the Bankruptcy
Code as compatible with ERISA avoids all of these problems.
But more importantly, this interpretation also complies with the
provisions and policies of the Bankruptcy Code. Congress intended
"available nonbankruptcy law" in the Bankruptcy Code's exclusion
to preserve prior law regarding the bankrupt's interest in spendthrift
trusts.36 That prior law excluded interests in pension plans with anti-
alienation provisions under federal law. 367 Elsewhere in the Bank-
ruptcy Code, "applicable nonbankruptcy law" includes both state
and federal law. 368 The Bankruptcy Code uses a different phrase to
limit the applicable law to only state law. 69 So ERISA is included
within the "applicable nonbankruptcy law" of the exclusion. During
the Bankruptcy Code's passage, Congress resisted attempts to abol-
ish the exclusion for trusts with transfer restrictions. 370 Afterwards,
Congress rejected attempts to restrict the availability of bankruptcy
discharge for consumers.3 71 Thus, Congress did not intend the courts
to accomplish what it refused to do - include within the debtor-
participant's estate interests in pension plans with anti-alienation
provisions.
The exclusion of interests in qualified pension trusts meshes with
the exemption schemes designed to protect those other retirement
benefits not included within the exclusion.37 2 The federal-scheme ex-
emption applies to both federal benefits that are divestible, and to
which trust law does not apply, and to those retirement benefits to
364. See supra notes 304-05.
365. E.g., KAN. STAT. Am. § 60-2308(b) (1990) ("Any [ERISA] plan shall be conclusively pre-
sumed to be a spendthrift trust under these [exemptions] statutes and the common law of the state.").
366. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
367. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 162-64 and accompnaying text.
369. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 207-13 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 175-91 and accompanying text.
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which ERISA's anti-alienation provision does not apply. The state
scheme has only an exemption for those federal benefits that are
divestible and to which trust law does not apply, since many states
have exemptions for those retirement benefits to which ERISA's
anti-alienation provision does not apply. So Congress intended the
Bankruptcy Code's exclusion to provide similar protection for in-
terests in pension trusts subject to ERISA's anti-alienation provision.
Congress passed the Bankruptcy Code to provide the debtor with
a fresh start so that he could avoid becoming a public charge. To
carry out that policy demands the preservation of his retirement
moneys. The destruction of these retirement funds in a bankruptcy
proceeding only insures that the debtor has a significant probability
of becoming a public charge. The Bankruptcy Code has a number
of provisions to insure this result: the trust exclusion for pension
plans subject to ERISA's anti-alienation provision, a federal ex-
emption under both the federal- and state-exemption schemes for
federal benefits not provided by enforceable trusts, and a federal
exemption under the federal-exemption scheme (copied in many state
exemption schemes) for those pension-plan benefits not subject to
ERISA's anti-alienation provision. Preservation of retirement ben-
efits through exclusion and exemptions is vital to that fresh start.373
This interpretation also avoids several problems that otherwise
would arise under the Bankruptcy Code. No longer would creditors
reach through a bankruptcy proceeding interests in pension trusts
with anti-alienation provisions that they cannot reach in a non-
bankruptcy proceeding. 374 No longer would courts need to imply a
repeal of ERISA's anti-alienation and preemption provision without
evidence of any conflict between the two statutes and contrary to
the Bankruptcy Code's repealer. 375
Instead, since the two statutes are compatible, the courts and
the creditor can use the Bankruptcy Code as Congress intended.
Their concern is improper shielding of assets through use of ERISA.
373. See supra notes 214-25 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 50, 73-74 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 100-08 and accompanying text.
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Under the Bankruptcy Code, the remedy is not elimination of the
exclusion, which destroys the debtor-participant's fresh start, but to
deny the discharge.3 76 Thus, the proper interpretation of ERISA and
the Bankruptcy Code requires excluding interest in certain pension
plans from the debtor-participant's estate.
VII. CONCLUSION
Both ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code mandate that courts ex-
clude from the debtor-participant's bankruptcy estate his interest in
a pension plan that contains an anti-alienation provision. ERISA
requires certain pension trusts to include an anti-alienation provi-
sion. The Bankruptcy Code excludes from the bankrupt's estate in-
terests in trusts with a restriction on transfer enforceable under
"applicable nonbankruptcy law."
Courts interpreting these two statutes must do so harmoniously,
The circuit courts presently have three approaches. One approach
uses the plain meaning of the statutes and concludes that the Bank-
ruptcy Code requires exclusion of all interests in pension plans with
ERISA's anti-alienation provision from the debtor-participant's
bankruptcy estate. These courts have no further problems since this
interpretation complies with the exact language and policy of both
statutes. Regarding such policy, ERISA's preservation of retirement
moneys and the Bankruptcy Code's preservation of the fresh start
are both designed to prevent the debtor-participant from becoming
a public charge. The other two approaches, however, engender con-
flicts. One approach makes interests in pension plans with anti-al-
ienation provisions available for distribution to creditors, a result
that courts disallow in the nonbankruptcy setting. This approach
eviscerates ERISA's anti-alienation provision. The other approach
uses state spendthrift law to determine whether the court includes
interests in certain pension plans in the debtor-participant's estate.
This procedure creates a horribly complex web of conflicting state
rules with which plan administrators must cope. This approach evis-
cerates both ERISA's anti-alienation provision and preemption-of-
state-law provision.
376. See supra notes 307-09 and accompanying text.
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Exclusion of all interests in pension plans that contain an anti-
alienation provision pursuant to ERISA from the debtor-partici-
pant's bankruptcy estate, even those capable of various withdrawals,
is the only interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code and ERISA that
comports with the Bankruptcy Code's fresh start policy and ERISA's
encouragement of the private pension system. It is also the only
interpretation that does not do violence to other provisions in the
Bankruptcy Code (the exemption scheme) and in ERISA (the anti-
alienation and preemption provision).
